



CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that following students have completed their Master of Political Science final year Research Project entitled “**US FOREIGN POLICEY TOWARDS SOUTH ASIA & CHINA**” for the partial fulfillment of their master degree requirements.

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DEDICATION

This project is dedicated to our teacher Sir Dr. Muhammad Ali (Assistant Professor Department of Political Science).He is the source of Inspiration and motivation for us.

His guidance and expert opinions make it possible to complete this project in a Systematic manner.



DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE



ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Firstly, we are thank full to Allah almighty, who give us corage health and knowledge, to accomplish this task, without his blessing and kindness we are nothing. All the apperception and admirations belong to Allah and his last prophet Muhammad (S.W.A).

Secondly, on the behalf of my group I am grateful to our foreign policy mentor Sir, Dr Muhammad Ali, who provided us with an opportunity and conducts a research work on the selected aspect of our course. His support and kindness made us able to find our potential qualities. His expert assistance and continuations team lined our path.

Thirdly, mightily thankful to all my group members for great for job done, because all credit goes to them for great struggle this project would not has been completed without help and hard struggle put in BY **Faiza, Shazia, Anum, Sidra, Hira, Iqra, Kanwal, Gulsnober, Afshan Bashir, Ghazal**, I will not forget this work thought out my life.

We completed his project work through books, internet, newspapers, and lecture of our professor dr. Muhammad Ali. InshAllah, the collected material title "**US Foreign Policy towards South Asia**" provide knowledge to all our students of department and other departments to.

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US FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS SOUTH ASIAN COUNTRIES

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ABSTRACT

South Asia is a most complex, volatile and politically explosive region and it remains the most Enigmatic and baffling in the world. It is also one of the most socially divided and fertile regions. The region of South Asia mainly consists of seven states: Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. It is home to 1.4 billion people, more than 20 percent of the world population. Thus, about one fifth of humanity lives between the western reaches of Afghanistan and Pakistan on one side and the eastern reaches of Bangladesh and India on the other. It is a region that lies between the sea routes of the Indian Ocean (Persian Gulf and the Asia Pacific) and the land routes of Central Asia connecting Europe to the East.

American foreign policy in Southeast Asia from 1975 to the present can be characterized as exhibiting varying degrees of benign neglect, with episodic attention to perceived security threats. Current policies are narrowly focused on antiterrorism; their perceived anti Muslim overtones, while engendering instrumental cooperation, have tended to alienate Southeast Asian publics. U.S. influence in Southeast Asia appears to be waning, with China capitalizing on opportunities to expand its influence.

During the early Cold War. It highlights the connections between U.S. policy priorities and commitments in South Asia on the one hand and developments in Tibet on the other. Southeast Asia has been considered by some to be a region of relatively low priority in U.S. foreign and security policy. The war against terror has changed that and brought renewed U.S. attention to Southeast Asia, especially to countries afflicted by Islamic radicalism. To some, this renewed focus, driven by the war against terror, has come at the expense of attention that regional issues such as China's rapidly expanding engagement with the region. Some fear that rising Chinese influence in Southeast Asia has come at the expense of U.S. ties with the region, while others view Beijing's increasing regional influence as largely a natural consequence of China's economic dynamism. China's developing relationship with Southeast Asia is undergoing a significant shift. This will likely have implications for United States' interests in the region.

While the United States has been focused on Iraq and Afghanistan, China has been evolving its external Engagement with its neighbors, particularly in Southeast Asia. Long

considered a "strategic backwater" from the U.S. perspective, South Asia has emerged in the 21st century as increasingly vital to core U.S. foreign policy interests. During the Cold War era, the U.S. regarded South Asia as an area of marginal strategic importance barring to check the communist expansion in the region. However, the recent shifts in global power relationships have made South Asia an important region not to ignore. The situation after September 11 and the Indo U.S. strategic cooperation have changed the relationship pattern between the U.S. and South Asia. Present involvement of the U.S. in Afghanistan and Pakistan, Indo Pak rivalry, concerns about the proliferation of nuclear weapons, combating terrorism, and growing presence of Chinese influence in the region has significantly increased the strategic importance of South Asia in the U.S. policy making circles.

Since the end of Cold War, US has acquired deeper engagement with South Asia, especially India.

Overt leaning of US towards India since 1990's was not entirely unexpected, India being the largest and most stable country in South Asia has always been more charming to the super power. There had always been potentials for deeper relations both being large democracies and even larger economies. In the New World Order, United States has emerged as the leader and its alignment with any state will definitely make a difference in the concerned region.

It seems that United States will be dealing Pakistan and India differently. Interests and objectives of the United States in South Asia region seem to change with changing situations or circumstances. Any visible tilt of the United States in South Asia towards either India or Pakistan will definitely affect the stability of the region. In sum, for US, India is now a partner in strategy and Pakistan a partner in exigency. According to the United States policy of enhanced engagement in South Asia, US will keep a close strategic relationship with India, but at present US also has to ensure an intense and rather longish partnership with Pakistan as well. That certainly carries a promise of a stable South Asia under an enhanced engagement and influence of U.S.A.

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1

AN INTRODUCTION TO FOREIGN POLICY: DEFINITION, NATURE & DETERMINANTS¹

“Foreign Policy is the use of political influence in order to induce other states to exercise their law-making power in a manner desired by the states concerned: it is an interaction between forces originating outside the country’s borders and those working within them”.

Prof. F. S. Northedge

Foreign policy of a state is concerned with the behavior of a state towards other states. It refers to the ways in which the central governments of sovereign states relate to each other and to the global system in order to achieve various goals or objectives. Through its foreign policy it endeavors to persuade others in accordance with one’s own ends. It is primarily in proportion to its national power that its persuasive power is effective in this regard. However, even a powerful state cannot afford to enjoy a solo flight in this regard. It has to take into account, not only its own objectives and interests, aspirations and problems, but also those of other states. This process involves intricate processes of diplomacy short of war. It is also based on the observations regarding the traditional behavior of a given state. Moreover, a state while implementing its foreign policy cannot afford to ignore the rules of International law and canons of international morality. The whole essence of this prelude is that the term foreign policy cannot be studied in isolation from the factors that determine it.²

“Foreign policy is the key element in the process by which a state translates its broadly conceived goals and interests into concrete course of action to attain these objectives and preserve interests”

Padelford and Lincoln

So foreign policy is the bundle of principles and practices that regulate the intercourse of a state vis-à-vis other states. Through foreign policy a state seeks to achieve a variety of objectives. The objectives sought to be attained by a state are of different types and

¹Singh Nirvikar, The Idea of South Asia and its Middle Class, Paper presented at the Conference Marking the launch of Institute for South Asian Studies at the National University of Singapore from 27-28 January, Paper No., (243), 1 (2005)

categories, yet there are certain objectives which are uniformly pursued by all states i.e. Political independence and territorial integrity, economic well being and, prestige and status of a nation. They have been classified into short range, middle range and long-range objectives.

Foreign Policy Analysis is the systematic study of and research into the processes and theories of foreign policy. It is that branch of political science, which deals with the study of and research into the processes and theories of foreign policy.

Foreign Policy Analysis involves the study of how a state makes foreign policy. Because Foreign Policy Analysis involves the study of both international and domestic politics, the academic discipline is located at the intersection of international relations theory and public policy. Foreign Policy Analysis also draws upon the study of diplomacy, war, intergovernmental organizations, and economic sanctions, each of which are means by which a state may implement foreign policy. In academia, foreign policy analysis is most commonly taught within the disciplines of Political Science or Political Studies, and International Relations.

Stages in foreign policy decision making the making of foreign policy involves a number of stages:³

- Assessment of the international and domestic political environment - Foreign policy is made and implemented within an international and domestic political context, which must be understood by a state in order to determine the best foreign policy.⁴

The focus and content of a text on "American Foreign Policy" is the parochial, self-centered, often selfish, interests of the United States in the world of nations. If the text was titled "International Relations," the focus and content would be on the U. S. effort to cooperate with and "get along with" the other nations of the world. Because the text is titled "American Foreign Policy," the text focuses on efforts by the U. S. to achieve its own national objectives and to further and enhance itself, sometimes at the expense of other nations, nationalities, interests, and groups. This primer, American Foreign Policy I,

³ Hasan Zubeida, South Asia as a Region, Pakistan Horizon, 17(2), 161-167 (1964)

focuses on the sixteen key principles upon which American foreign policy appear to be built. For a discussion of American foreign policy history, please go to American Foreign Policy II: A Brief History of American Foreign Policy.

The United States bases its pursuit of specific foreign policy objectives on a variety of justifying principles; these "key principles of American foreign policy" are the focus of this text. Most foreign policy decisions incorporate several of the principles, each principle adding its portion to shaping the final foreign policy decision. Most of the key principles of American foreign policy have their origin with the founding of the nation. Quotes from Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century American statesmen document the history of many of these principles.



Fifteen Key Principles of American Foreign Policy

Basic Approaches to Foreign Policy

Isolationism and Neutrality vs Internationalism and Interventionism: An Historic Overview

"Idealist" School vs "Realist" School

Sixteen Key Principles Shaping American Foreign Policy Toward the Nations of the World

1. Maintaining or Restoring and International "Balance of Power"
2. Support for Western Values
3. Protecting United States National Security and National Autonomy
4. Domestic United States Public Policies Extended Abroad
5. Geopolitical Considerations
6. Administrative and Political Expediency and Bureaucratic Infighting
7. Beliefs and Cognitions of Top Officials
8. Limitations Imposed by the Decision-Making Process
9. Non-Entanglement with Europe
10. Freedom of the Seas, Freedom of Commerce, and Freedom of Movement
11. Maintenance of a Protective Tariff
12. Peaceful Settlement of Disputes
13. Protection of the Nations of Western Europe
14. Perpetuation of Existing Political Regimes
15. American Insularity and Isolationism

Principle 1:

Maintaining or Restoring an International "Balance of Power"

"Balance of power," as an international relations concept, is an outgrowth of the Napoleonic Wars in Europe in the late Eighteenth and early Nineteenth Centuries. The nations of Europe become convinced the only way to prevent France, or any other European nation, from making another attempt to conquer a European empire is to create a series of perfectly balanced alliances. The power of each of the separate individual alliances is perfectly balanced by the power of each other individual alliance. No one

alliance can conquer any one other alliance. No combination of alliances can conquer any combination of the remaining alliances. The power of each of the individual alliances is so perfectly balanced that no one alliance can successfully aggress on any of the other alliances. In addition to a balance of alliances, there is also a balance among the individual nations so no one nation can defeat any other nation. Under a balance-of-power system, each state maximizes its ability to arm and defend itself. Warfare is possible, but also irrational, even useless, in attempting to achieve state objectives. Under a balance-of-power system, cooperation and mutual accommodation among states is encouraged, and the continued, perpetual existence of each state is virtually guaranteed.⁵

"The 'balance of power' international system is characterized by the operation of the following essential rules, which constitute the characteristic behavior of the system:

- (1) Increase capabilities, but negotiate rather than fight;
- (2) Fight rather than fail to increase capabilities;
- (3) stop fighting rather than eliminate an essential actor;
- (4) Oppose and coalition or single actor that tends to assume a position of predominance within the system;
- (5) Constrain actors who subscribe to supranational organizational principles; and
- (6) Permit defeated or constrained essential national actors to re-enter the system as acceptable role partners, or act to bring some previously inessential actor within the essential actor classification.

Principle 2:

Support for Western Values

The foreign policy of nations usually reflects some degree of national ethnocentrism. Ethnocentrism is belief in the superiority and correctness of one's own nation and the

^{5 5} Xun Sun, New Nuclear Triangle and China's Role in South Asia, RCSS Policy Studies 32, Colombo, 19 (2005)

superiority and correctness of the nation's domestic and international policies. For example, the Imperial Chinese consider all peoples other than their own people to be barbarians. The Republican and Imperial Romans consider all non-Roman and non-allied peoples to be uncivilized. The Christian nations of medieval Europe consider non-Christian peoples to be heathens and Godless, God-forsaken peoples. The Nineteenth-century European colonial nations consider non-Western people to be morally, intellectually, and economically inferior even child-like. All these great world powers deal with foreign nations and foreign people from a position of assumed superiority. The United States is also guilty of this behavior.

Throughout the history of the United States, Americans express a broad consensus of support for liberal, democratic, individualistic, and egalitarian values, dubbed "the American Creed" by social scientist Gunnar Myrdal. American foreign policy assumes that the form of pluralist, capitalist, individualistic, egalitarian, republican government practiced in the United States is inherently superior to other forms of government; it may even be a God-given form of government.

"For most Americans...foreign-policy goals should reflect not only the security interests of the nation and the economic interests of key groups within the nation but also the political values and principles that define American identity.... Hence the recurring tendencies in American history, either to retreat to minimum relations with the rest of the world... or... to set forth on a crusade to purify the world, to bring it into accordance with American principles.

Principle 3:

Protecting National Security and National Autonomy

If the United States is to survive for long in the often predatory international world of nation-states, the United States must give primary concern for the factors that insure its national survival. America must be able to defend and secure its borders, maintain its territorial integrity, maintain access to key raw materials and commercial trading partners, defend geographic positions of defensive and offensive strategic importance, be secure in its national secrets, hide its weaknesses from its enemies, defend its citizens and

protect its young. America must be able to define national goals and have some degree of assurance those national goals can be achieved, must be able to define itself as a nation-state different from and apart from other nation-states, and must be able to develop and maintain its military and industrial strength.

National security and national autonomy are issues related to the organic state itself-- to the state as an entity distinct from the people that populate the state.

"In a very vague and general way 'national interest' does suggest a direction of policy which can be distinguished from several others which may present themselves as alternatives. It indicates that the policy is designed to promote demands which are ascribed to the nation rather than to individuals, sub-national groups or mankind as a whole." (Wolfers, 481)

According to structural-functional theory, all organizations, including all nation-states, must maintain access to resources, must maintain their boundaries, must be able to self-perpetuate them, and must have the ability to achieve goals the organization believes to be important if the organization is to survive. The drive to survive is paramount in all perpetual organizations, including nation-states. Organizational and national security is, therefore, high priority concerns for the national organization.

"Any foreign policy which operates under the standard of the national interest must obviously have some reference to the physical, political, and cultural entity which we call a nation. In a world where a number of sovereign nations compete with and oppose each other for power, the foreign policies of all nations must necessarily refer to their survival as their minimum requirements. Thus all nations do what they cannot help but do: protect their physical, political, and cultural identity against encroachments by other nations....

Principle 4:

Domestic Public Policies Extended Abroad

The domestic policies developed and enacted into law to govern the social, economic and political relationships among Americans are often promoted abroad through America's

foreign policy initiatives. This is clearly seen in President Woodrow Wilson's attempt to export American domestic relations to the remainder of the world through the establishment of the League of Nations, as previously discussed under the "Support for Western Values" principle.

But, this extension of domestic values abroad goes beyond mere exportation of "the American Creed" abroad; it extends to specific items of public policy-- to specific laws, rules, and regulations. Once Americans, through the political process, agree on a just interrelationship among citizens and develop domestic policies and enact domestic legislation that Americans consider to be good, proper and morally appropriate, there is an effort to impose that "just" relationship on all peoples of the world. Once Americans decide on the best public policy for themselves, they often attempt to bestow the virtues and benefits of those policies on the rest of the world, even if the rest of the world does not view those policies as good, proper or morally appropriate, and even if those policies run counter to the religious beliefs and social and economic traditions, norms, and values of individual foreign nations. For example, once Americans agree on just child labor practices, on just pay practices, and on just factory working conditions, those practices are promoted abroad through foreign policy initiatives. Foreign acceptance of these practices is often a precondition for beginning or continuing commercial relations with America. If foreign nation-states want to continue commercial relations with the United States, they have little choice than to modify their own conceptions of morality and justice concerning child labor, appropriate wage rates, and "sweatshops," and to conform to American conceptions of morality and justice on those issues. Of course, every time a foreign nation-state makes such an adjustment, the nation must sacrifice some small portion of their nationhood and their national autonomy, so such adjustments are likely to come reluctantly and with protest. Those adjustments also often disrupt the existing social and economic relationships within the nation, creating new inequalities of privilege, pay, and life-styles.

Principle 5

Geopolitical Considerations

Geopolitics is a concept more familiar to Europeans than to Americans. Geopolitics was developed by European geographers in the Nineteenth Century and was a primary foreign policy consideration for both Adolph Hitler and Joseph Stalin. Because of geopolitics' association with such nefarious leaders as Hitler and Stalin, many American academics avoid open discussion of geopolitics as a theory and as a principle for foreign policy, although geopolitical considerations are manifested in much of American foreign policy.

Geopolitics is based on an "organic analogy;" the nation-state is seen as a living organism. Like all living organisms, the nation-state must be able to grow and expand to its natural ideal size; it must have access to raw materials and nutrients necessary for growth; it must have living space in which it can maneuver and feel comfortable and safe; it must be able to develop self-sufficiency and national self-actualization (national autonomy).

Hitler talks constantly of expanding Germany to the nation's "natural", boundaries, of guaranteeing access to all the natural resources necessary to achieve national economic self-sufficiency ("autarchy"), and of surrounding Germany with buffer states to shield Germany from its enemies and provide Germany with secure "living space" ("lebensraum"). Stalin articulates similar goals for the Soviet Union, surrounding the Soviet Union with buffer states and attempting to secure a warm-water port so the Soviets would have access to the resources and markets of the world. Communist China, North Vietnam, Iraq, and a number of other nation-states also experience periods of geopolitical fervor, often leading to aggression against their neighboring states.

Geopolitics sees the nation-state as a living organism apart from the biological citizens who populate the state. The nation-state is more than the sum of its constituent citizens and has a life apart from the collective lives of its citizens. Nation-state survival is, therefore, something more than the survival of the citizens of the state. Taken to the near absurd, the nation-state may survive even with the death of all its citizens. "National survival" is possible even if all citizens are destroyed in a "mutual assured destruction"

nuclear weapons exchange in which America's doomsday machine destroys the enemy's doomsday machine in an Armageddon fought by pre-programmed machines after all human citizens of the state had been killed. The organic state may survive and be victorious even if all its human citizens are dead. Because the nation-state is seen as an organism apart from, and superior to, its constituent citizens, individual citizens are expendable in the effort to insure the nation-state's survival, or to insure national autarchy, or to acquire national lebensraum. War, and citizen sacrifice for the greater good of the nation-state, becomes a viable and legitimate option in foreign policy intent on achieving geopolitical objectives.

Principle 6:

Administrative and Political Expediency and Bureaucratic Infighting

The dispersal of decision-making power in the American system of "separation of power" and "checks and balances" makes the development of a coherent foreign policy an ordeal of considerable magnitude.

"(T) here is the fragmentation of power that the separation between the presidency and the Congress entails; there is the dispersion that results from the increasing importance of the House of Representatives in the control of foreign policy; there is the mushrooming of executive agencies that insist on participating in the definition of foreign policy--sometimes on an equal footing with the State Department, often on behalf of particular domestic interest groups in their constituency. If one also takes into account the proliferation of experts who work as consultants for all those institutions, and the press (which is both a sounding board for the various organs and a power of its own), one gets an awe-inspiring picture of government by interagency and interbranch compacts, government by leaks and subcontracts." (Hoffman, in Ikenberry, 55-56)

Principle 7:

Beliefs and Cognitions of Top Officials Foreign policy is the creation of man. Man's creations reflect the beliefs, personalities, character and experiences of their creator. In

the case of American foreign policy, the creator tends to be the President of the United States.

The American leader's personal beliefs, subjective perceptions, and ideological assumptions play a significant role in shaping foreign policy and American relations with the various nations of the world. One leader's "self-determining socialist state" is another's "evil empire." One leader defines freedom as "freedom from" an undesirable state (i.e., capitalist oppression) while another defines freedom as "freedom to be" (i.e., to be a capitalist). Semantic and ideological definition of abstract concepts such as freedom, justice, democracy, equality, peace and prosperity differs from leader to leader. As leaders are replaced, the definitions change and the foreign policy related to those definitions also changes. The leaders' past personal working relationships with foreign leaders influences the leaders willingness to work with those foreign leaders in the future. The working relationship between Central Intelligence Agency chief George Bush and Panamanian military officer Manuel Noriega influences their later working relationship when both are presidents of their respective countries. President Bush's obsession with capturing President Noriega and branding him a "drug runner" appears to be as much a personal issue personal as a matter of sound foreign policy. Other experiences affecting the foreign policy-makers decisions include exposure to various teachers in college, peer and mentoring relationships during the formative career-building years, and travel abroad.

Finally, the transactional states which leaders use in dealing with one another also help shape foreign policy. Leaders speak to one another and respond to one another from parent, child or adult states. "Parents" are authoritarian; "children" are disobedient and contrary; "adults" are rational. When American President George Bush takes a "parent" state in admonishing Iraqi President Saddam Hussein to cease acts of aggression or to submit to the discipline of arms inspections, President Bush should not be surprised when Saddam Hussein responds from a "child" state and invades his neighboring states or resists the discipline by any means possible. The transactional states in international exchanges can have a significant impact of the policy options selected by those in foreign policy decision-making positions.

Principle 8:

Limitations Imposed by the Decision-Making Process

Foreign policy is usually developed through some group decision-making process. Public administration and organizational development specialists identify several significant problems inherent in any group decision-making process.

It is generally assumed the best policy is a policy arrived at through "synergy" and consensus. Synergy is the additional energy and wisdom generated when a group of people work together to develop policy or accomplish a task. The shared wisdom and energy of the group is superior to the wisdom and energy of the individual members of the group if each was acting solely on his or her own. Consensus is a decision which every member of the group supports. Synergistic decisions often have consensus support simply because of the group processes used to develop the decision. However, if the synergistic consensus is achieved through either "Groupthink," the "Abilene Paradox," "Incrementalism," "Oppositional Mentality," or "Crisis Breakdown," that consensus may be the wrong choice. 78Other organization decision-making limitations include failures to communicate accurately and effectively, failure to conduct appropriate and thorough research, lack of time to act or react, lack of information or the means to share information, problems with secrecy or jealousy, and problems with accurate definition of terms. All these problems are featured in the flawed decision-making by President Lyndon Johnson during the Vietnam War. He simply lacks accurate, timely, honest information upon which to base his foreign policy and military decisions.

Finally, current choices limit future choices. Once a branch of the decision-making tree is selected, it is nearly impossible to jump to another branch of the tree. Current decisions have future consequences and sometimes leaders can do little more than allow decisions to play themselves out to their logical or inevitable conclusion. For example, once the Czar of Russia decides to mobilize his troops in anticipation of an eventual German mobilization, the German need to launch a first-strike against Russia's allies becomes inevitable and the dominoes leading quickly to World War I begin to fall.

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Principle 9

Non-Entanglement with Europe or Hemispheric Isolation

Americans, from the founding of the United States, are suspicious of Europe, of the European diplomatic process, and of the intentions of individual European states. This suspicion may be the result of witnessing the palace conspiracies and the international intrigues involved with the French Revolution and balance of power politics in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries. This suspicion is also the result of the realization that much of European politics is a parlor game played by the inter-related, inter-married royal families that dominate the governments of Europe in the past and still play important roles today.

The era of hemispheric isolation and non-entanglement ends with World War I. America does not join the League of Nations, but, during the coming decades, America participates in a series of international conferences and international treaties intended to secure peace, encourage disarmament, and regulate the international affairs of nations. All these entanglements fail, and the world is thrust into World War II. Following that

war, America joins the United Nations and enters a period of increased reliance on international treaties and alliances leading the nations of the world toward a "new world order" of independent and intertwined nation-states bound together through world-wide economic interdependence, through a series of interlocking supra-national treaties, alliances and agreements, and through increased participation in and reliance on the United Nations as a global decision-making body.

Principle 10

Freedom of the Seas, including Freedom of Commerce, and Freedom for Citizen Mobility

America is a seafaring nation. Colonial Americans use the sea for commerce with the colonial "mother country," as a highway for transport up and down the Atlantic coastline, as a rich fishing ground, and as a highway for commerce with European colonies in the Caribbean. Merchants in the new nation depend on sea commerce for trade and depend on trade for wealth.

Because America is founded by people who cross the seas themselves, or are descended from people who made the voyage across the seas, and because the commerce, wealth, and survival of the young nation depends on the sea, Americans are vocal and forceful defenders of the principles of freedom of the seas and of freedom of commerce.

The rights of American citizens traveling and living abroad face repeated challenge from foreign powers, beginning with British efforts to impress American sailors into British naval service and the refusal of many nations to recognize the American citizenship of their former subjects immigrating to America.

: There have been some significant lapses in America's defense of freedom of movement over the years. For example, America imposes blockades of its own, most recently in Cuba, Vietnam and Haiti. America enacts laws restricting the free flow of goods into and out of America, including trade restrictions on South Africa, retaliatory trade limits on Japan, and bans on the export of "strategic" technology. America interrupts the free emigration and immigration of the world's citizens, beginning with the immigration laws

against the "yellow peril" from Asia in the Nineteenth Century to the recent interdiction of "boat people", from Haiti and Cuba.

The case of American opposition to immigration of Asians into the United States throughout the last half of the Nineteenth Century is especially interesting. The Democrat, Whig and Republican parties are all supporters of free and open immigration policies, yet, in their centennial party platform of 1876, Democrats make a direct attack on Asian immigration. In their 1876 platform statement, and in the years to come, Democrats claim their opposition is intended to prevent abuse of Asian immigrant workers, prevent the unemployment of American workers and maintain immigration opportunities for European immigrants.

In an ironic turn of events, the expansion of communism throughout Asia in the late Twentieth Century results in Asians being given preference in immigration. Nationalist Chinese, South Koreans, South Vietnamese, Hmong Tribesmen, Laotians, Cambodians and others escaping communism are each given preferences in their turn.

Principle 11

Maintenance of a Protective Tariff

One of the most persistent themes in American foreign policy history is the debate over protective tariffs. A tariff is a charge or "tax" levied on goods coming into the U.S. from abroad. It makes foreign products more expensive to buy, thus, hopefully, decreases consumption demand for those products.

Mercantilist economics rely heavily on tariffs to limit the quantity and value of products coming into a country in order to limit the quantity and value of the specie-- mostly gold and silver-- flowing out of the country to pay for those products. Mercantilist nations of the Sixteenth, Seventeenth, and Eighteenth Centuries measure their success in international affairs and their national strength and power in terms of the excess of gold and silver hoarded in their national treasuries. Whenever national monopolies or merchants sell products abroad, gold and silver flows into the country from abroad to pay for the product. But, whenever foreign products are purchased, gold and silver flows out

of the country to pay for the product. The secret to national success and power is to sell more abroad than is purchased from abroad.

Capitalist economies also rely on protective tariffs, but they are interested in protecting domestic manufacturers by insuring those manufacturers have a domestic market for their product, even if foreign producers can manufacture the product at a lower cost and sell it for a price cheaper than domestic products of similar quality.

The debate over tariffs continues to the beginning of the Twenty-first Century, with many of the same arguments in support of tariffs and in opposition to tariffs used in the Twentieth Century as are used in the Nineteenth Century. The globe is moving toward a system of free exchange and a system of free markets unencumbered by tariffs. The European Common Market, the North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and numerous other international compacts gradually remove most tariff burdens to international trade and commerce. The tariff restrictions that remain are largely used in diplomacy and as a tool of foreign policy negotiations and are used to protect a few specific domestic industries from "unfair" foreign competition.

Principle 12:

Peaceful Settlement of Disputes

When faced with a choice between peaceful settlement of disputes or armed conflict, the United States prefers peaceful settlement of disputes, although vocal groups within the citizenry, media or political arena may prefer armed conflict. The United States enters war cautiously and as a last resort. Once committed to armed conflict, the U.S. intention is usually to win quickly and decisively.

The American government often submits to international blackmail and abuse without resort to arms. In the years following American independence, British naval vessels commandeer American ships and impress American seamen into British service and, in spite of considerable political and public pressure, the U.S. government works for a diplomatic solution. America submits to the tribute demands of the Barbary pirates for years before finally invading North Africa. In recent years, petty dictators in Libya,

North Korea, Somalia and Latin America, and fanatical authoritarian regimes in Iran, Iraq and throughout Africa, from time to time, abuse, humiliate and vilify the most powerful military nation on Earth without suffering the sting of retaliation. Four decades of intense disarmament and arms-control negotiations with the Soviet Union could easily be avoided if America is willing to respond with a swift American first strike after any one of dozens of Soviet provocations, extending from the Soviet blockade of Berlin in the 1940s, through the Hungarian invasion, the U-2 spy airplane downing, the Cuban Missile Crisis, the de-stabilization of Africa, Central America and the Middle East, and the invasion of Afghanistan, to the downing of a Korean commercial aircraft in the 1980s. America practices remarkable self-restraint. Soviet aggression, no matter how egregious, is countered with diplomacy, not the force of arms aimed either at the point of aggression or the heartland of the Soviet Union itself.

The United States increasingly relies on the United Nations and other international organizations as instruments for the peaceful settlement of disputes. The U. N. and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) are intimately involved in helping to resolve conflicts in the Balkans and in the Middle East. Republican President George Bush and Democrat President Bill Clinton both rely heavily on international organizations in their attempts to find peaceful solutions in both regions before committing to military action, demonstrating both the continuing importance of the key principle and the principle's bipartisan support.

As America moves into the 21st Century, President George W. Bush declares an intention to initiate a first strike posture toward nations that support international terrorist groups and toward nations' intent on developing weapons of mass destruction, including chemical and biological weapons. In spite of this posturing, the president continues to work through the United Nations to resolve conflicts before resorting to the first strike. The principle of "peaceful settlement of disputes" may have been weakened by President Bush's first strike declaration, but the principle has not been entirely abandoned.

Principle 13⁶

Protection of the Nations of Western Europe

During the twentieth century, America reestablishes its cultural and psychological ties with Europe. Three times during the twentieth century America is forced to commit its wealth, manpower, and war machinery to support the nations of Western Europe. First, in World War I against an assault by the prussian-austrian-turkish-german bloc of central europe; second, in world war ii against german aggression; finally, in the "cold war" against soviet union aggression. america commits both money and manpower to the marshal plan to rebuild europe after world war ii. the rebuilding includes both the victorious allies and the vanquished germans. america commits still more money and manpower to the north atlantic treaty organization (nato) to insure the "west" remains free from communist aggression from the "east." that effort begins when president harry truman commits the american reputation and american military power to containing communism inside the Black Sea when the Soviets threaten Turkey and Greece and threaten to increase their influence in the Mediterranean Sea and continues even after the collapse of the Soviet Union. NATO appears destined to expand and to assume new missions rather than to wither away. In the course of these "rescues" of Western Europe, diplomatic, political, cultural, economic, and personal ties are strengthened and the Europeans and Americans are drawn closer together., in the European Union, the United States develops increasingly closer ties with both the individual nations and with the European Union even if closer ties with the Second and Third World of developing nations might be of greater economic advantage. The key princliple of "non-entanglement with the nations of Europe" is in rapid decline as the United States seems more and more intent on uniting itself politically, economicly, and culturally with the developed nations of Europe. This may change, however, if the European Union becomes Euro-centric, if the Europeans fail to support U. S. anti-terrorism efforts, or if America returns to its old isolationist ways. Still, when the nations of Europe again call for help

⁶ Allison, Graham T., et al., eds. Hawks, Doves and Owls: An Agenda for Avoiding Nuclear War. W. W. Norton, 1985.

from across the Atlantic, America will surely return to European soil to once again defend the nations of Europe.

Principle 14:

Perpetuation of Existing Regimes

Many nations of the world suffer from domestic civil unrest. This unrest usually takes the form of a revolutionary challenge to the existing governments of those nations and to the current regime in control of those governments. Many developing nations lack a functioning mechanism for the peaceful transfer of power from the current governmental regime to its successor regime, or for replacing one form of government with another, or replacing one constitution with another. Civil unrest leads to civil disturbance and ultimately to a coup d'état or civil war. In both coup d'état and civil wars, the United States tends to support the status quo; the status quo is the existing regime. Only after the challengers successfully replace the existing regime or government, and demonstrate an ability to control the entire nation, will the United States recognize the challengers as the legitimate government of the nation. Since the U.S. is seen by the new government as a supporter of the old regime, the new regime often initially rejects American overtures of friendship, recognition and support.⁷

In some cases, national boundaries are created as an arbitrary consequence of colonialism or international diplomacy rather than created by any logic based on natural geography, ethnic or religious or cultural inclusion (or exclusion), ancient empires, or natural or manmade barriers. The U.S. supports maintaining existing boundaries even when those boundaries fail the test of rationality and common sense. The U.S. opposes Katanga independence in the Congo, ethnic separatism throughout Africa and Asia, the breakup of Yugoslavia into its constituent republics and further fragmentation of the Soviet Union beyond that of the initial collapse. In some cases, American national interests may be furthered by a division of a nation-state. For example, the establishment of an independent Kurdish nation in the Middle East would work to the detriment of

⁷ Morgenthau, Hans J. *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*. Knopf, 1960. Organski, A. F. K. *World Politics*. Knopf, 1958.

America's enemy, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, and the establishment of an aboriginal homeland in Brazil would help protect the equatorial rain forests essential to maintaining American weather patterns, yet the United States gives little support to either initiative.

Perhaps, if the organic analogy is correct, nation-states, including the United States, realize, in order for each to survive, they must support the survival of all others. If citizens in one nation-state can freely replace regimes and governments and successfully demand the fragmentation of existing national boundaries to allow for self-determination and self-government of constituent minorities in one nation-state, a similar fragmentation can happen in all nation-states. The United States federal government fights a costly Civil War in 1861-65 to prevent that fragmentation from happening in the United States; the United States government certainly does not want to encourage Americans to think in secessionist and separatist terms again by encouraging independence, secession, revolution, and separatism in other nation-states around the world.

Principle 15:

Insularity and Isolationism

Insularity is a detached, insulated, self-focused, narrow-minded state of mind associated with people living on an island. The island is their world and their only consideration. Insularity is a form of isolationism. Isolationism is withdrawal from the remainder of the globe; the other nations of the world are recognized, but a choice is made to remain withdrawn and detached from interaction with those nations. Insularity goes one step further than isolationism; the other nations of the world are no longer recognized. Insularity fails to give the remainder of the globe consideration or thought; the remainder of the globe does not even exist.

There are also additional practical reasons for American isolationism and insularity. First, Americans lack the language training and language skills to communicate freely around the globe. Europeans often speak and read two, three, or more languages. Many Third World residents speak and write in a native language and a "colonial language." Americans tend to speak and write in only one language-- English. Second, Americans lack an understanding of foreign culture-- literature, philosophy, religion, political

thought, everyday folkways, largely because Americans lack the language skills to communicate with those cultures. Third, when Americans seek information about foreign lands, that information is often relayed through sources expert in the language and culture, sources outside the U.S.⁸



The information these sources provide is filtered through their own national interests and through the context of their own culture and nationality. All too often, Americans learn about affairs in the Third World through European journalists and scholars, who often put a decided European slant to that information, or through propagandists who can easily fool Americans because Americans lack the skills to confirm the information. This combined ignorance of language and culture isolates Americans from the rest of the world, even in times when America chooses not to be isolated.

The terrorist attack on the Pentagon and the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001 may have marked the beginning of the end of American isolation and insularity. America finally realizes that isolation is no longer a practical possibility. The Atlantic and Pacific Oceans and friendly neighbors to the north and south no longer provide a protective barrier against the outside world. If America can no longer remain isolated, it can no longer take an insular view of the world. The issues and interests of all the peoples of the world must now be taken into consideration in developing American foreign policy. If America does not pay attention to the world, the world can easily come to America and make her pay attention.⁹

⁸ The Annals of America. Encyclopedia Britannica, 1968. Original documents from American history.

⁹ Wolfers, Arnold. "'National Security' as an Ambiguous Symbol." Political Science Quarterly. 67 (December 1952), pp. 481-502.

American Foreign Policy Flow Chart



The U.S. Interests and Policies towards South Asia

(From Cold War Era to Strategic Rebalancing)

South Asia is a huge land mass home to about one quarter of the world's population. It has assumed much importance in international politics today. Strategically located at the cross roads of Asia, this region lies on the perimeter to China. It is separated by a narrow strip of Afghan territory (the Wakhan) from Central Asia². Furthermore, it links the Middle East with South East Asia and forms the most important strategic area bordering the Indian Ocean. In this context, the U.S. as the sole Super power has some vital interests in this dynamic region. In retrospect, the U.S. did not see South Asia as an area of strategic importance. Before Second World War, the U.S. interests in South Asia were very limited and were primarily commercial in nature.

The American Tobacco Company was making trade with South Asia and many educational, cultural and religious links were maintained between the U.S. and the South Asian region as a whole. After 1945, the U.S. left its traditional policy of "isolationism" and joined the world affairs mainly to check the expansion of Soviet Communism in the International Science Congress Association world. Thereafter, the U.S. involvement in the South Asia grew as a result of the political, military, and ideological competition with the Soviet Union.

The principle determinant of the U.S. policy toward South Asia was the U.S. perception of region's relevance to the pursuit of its wider global geo-political and strategic goals. The U.S. interests in South Asia were governed by the region's geostrategic location in the proximity of major powers like China and the Soviet Union. This significance was also governed by the fact that South Asia is a region that overlooks the vital sea lanes of communication in the Indian Ocean where it connects the two politically volatile and economically critical regions of Asia –

The Gulf and South East Asia 3. Thus the U.S. interests in South Asia instead of being direct and economically motivated, were governed by the strategic competition with the Soviet Union and her drive of maintaining superiority viz-a-viz the rest of the powers. Though the U.S. viewed South Asia as an area of marginal strategic importance (other than to check the expansion of communism during the Cold War period), the recent shifts in global power relationships has made South Asia an important region not to ignore.

The situation after September 11 and the Indo-U.S. strategic cooperation have changed the relationship pattern between U.S. and South Asia. Present involvement of the U.S. in Afghanistan and Pakistan, Indo-Pak rivalry, concerns about the proliferation of nuclear weapons, fight against terrorism, and the growing influence of China in the region have significantly increased the strategic importance of South Asia in the U.S. policy making circles⁴. Thus seen in this context, today the U.S. policy interest is not anchored on a single set of issues - but on a set of core issues. These include counter-terrorism

Counter terrorism:

Counter Terrorism In South Asia, terrorism and the related violent activities are not new phenomena. In fact, various groups have been using terrorism as an instrument to advance their respective causes such as national self-determination, separatism, militant religious extremism, so on and so forth. However, it is the increasingly global nature of terrorism that is playing a significant role in altering the rhetoric and challenges in South Asia⁶. Every state in South Asia is currently a victim of or has fallen victim to the terrorism related activities.

In this regard, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India are presently affected by terrorism and extremist violence on their soil⁷. Other regional states like Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka also face the nuisance of terrorism either in the form of ethnic turmoil and religious or political schism⁸. The region of South Asia is Indo-centric and all other South Asian states are located around India. Due to this close geographical proximity between South Asian states, the terrorist groups are exploiting cross-border ethnic ties, globalised financial networks, and widely available communication technologies to advance their influence beyond the local to the national, regional, and even international levels.

The lack of governmental capacity to check the menace of widespread corruption and socio-economic inequality makes South Asia a fertile breeding ground for terrorist organizations. Furthermore, mistrust, suspicion, and hostility that characterize the political relationship between states have been a major hurdle in the way of effective regional cooperation in South Asia. Although, the SAARC has endeavored at several occasions to create regional responses to common challenges posed by terrorism, its efficacy is often held hostage to the political hostility between the two main South Asian actors - India and Pakistan. Since the initiation of 'War on Terror' by the U.S. in Afghanistan, South Asia has become a breeding ground of international terrorism. It can be asserted without any doubt that the emergence of terrorism as a destabilizing factor in South Asia has put in danger the whole quest for peace and progress⁹. Thus, the menace of terrorism and terrorism related activities will remain an important threat to the U.S. interests in the region and also to the South Asian states. In this context, the U.S. has a

long term interests and strategy in the region regarding the threats posed by terrorist organizations. International Science Congress Association Nuclear Non-Proliferation Nuclear non-proliferation has been a cornerstone of the U.S. foreign policy and this policy has somewhat engaged the U.S. in South Asian affairs. In South Asia the main concern comes from the tensions between India and Pakistan (potentially leading to nuclear attack), and the way nuclear energy and weaponry are developed, stored, transported, and used¹⁰. On 11 and 13 May 1998, India conducted five underground nuclear tests and on 28 and 30 May 1998, Pakistan followed the suit by conducting six nuclear tests.

These tests created a global storm of criticism, and a serious setback for prolonged U.S. nuclear non-proliferation efforts in the region. On 13 May, 1998 the U.S. president Clinton imposed military and economic sanctions on India, mandated by section 102 of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), and on 30 May the same sanctions were extended to Pakistan ¹¹. However in the subsequent years, these sanctions were lifted as they could not persuade India and Pakistan to halt their nuclear weapons program.

The issue of nuclear proliferation in South Asia is part of a chain of rivalries wherein India is trying to attain deterrence against China, and Pakistan seeking to achieve an "equalizer" against a traditionally stronger India. The U.S. considers the current arms race between India and Pakistan very dangerous as there is every possibility that it can end up in the nuclear confrontation between these two South Asian rivals. In a statement on 12 November, 1998 the U.S. Deputy Secretary, Strobe Talbot presented following three concerns of the U.S. government.

- i. To prevent the nuclear and missile race in the region,
- ii. Making the global non-proliferation regime more strong; and
- iii. Promoting the good relations between India and Pakistan and the resolution of Kashmir issue

Specific U.S. Foreign Policy Objectives for Key Actors in the South Asian region India ¹⁰

Foreign Policy Objectives for Key Actors in the South Asian region India: During the period of Cold War, the U.S. perception about India was very low and therefore, often ignored it. The closed and weak economy of India gave it little influence in global markets, and its non-aligned foreign policy caused periodic tensions with Washington¹⁵. However, today with its billion-plus population, democratic institutions and values, steady growing economy and substantial defense establishment, India represents a partner of great value. In few years, it will become one of the world's largest economies, and an important factor for the region's security and stability¹⁶. In this regard, the U.S. key interests in India include:

- i. Supporting India as counterweight to China by deepening strategic ties with it.
- ii. Supporting the emergence of India as a pro-Western regional power.
- iii. Strengthening India's "Look East" policy and its presence in East Asia.
- iv. Seeking India's support for a prolonged U.S. presence in the region.
- v. To gain more and more access to India's markets and other sectors.

Pakistan

Pakistan: The U.S.' main strategic objectives in Pakistan are to make Pakistan a stable and strong state which remains in control of its territory and nuclear capabilities, and also averts the export and development of extremist elements/organizations. The U.S. also expects that Pakistan should improve its relations with India in a comprehensive manner so that both the states could focus their attention on the socio-economic development of their respective countries. More broadly, the U.S.' interests in Pakistan include:

Afghanistan:

In Afghanistan, the U.S. has tried to improve the capacity and legitimacy of Afghan state and institutions, both military and civilian, as part of an overall effort to foster stability,

¹⁰ Crabb, Cecil. American Foreign Policy in the Nuclear Age. Harper & Row, 1988

reduce extremism and defeat Taliban. In this regard, the U.S interests in the region are based on the two pronged strategy, such as: First, fight against terrorism: The main reason for entering Afghanistan, the September 11 terrorist attacks on the U.S. soil, will remain the main motivation for continuing to engage with Afghanistan as long as there is possibility of return of international terrorists. Though, the U.S. does not face defeat in Afghanistan, but at the same time, there has not been any concrete political and military success so far.

China¹¹

All these assertive moves by China in South Asia are a cause of concern for the U.S. strategists. Just as the U.S. policy towards China will have consequence for U.S. relations with South Asian states, China's policy towards South Asia will have consequences for Washington's interests. Thus the U.S. interests in South Asia as far as China is concerned include: i. To working with China in maintaining regional and global security (but not at the expense of the U.S. interests or strategic dominance). ii. To enhance Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) with Chinese military, but also acting to contain its military expansionism (perceived or actual).

Though China is not located in South Asia, but it is always there due to its alliance with Pakistan and its rivalry with India¹⁷. Moreover, China shares borders with five (Afghanistan, Bhutan, India, Nepal, and Pakistan) out of eight South Asian states, making it an integral part of South Asia¹⁸. In this context, China perceives South Asia as its natural dominion where it is destined to play a crucial role and has therefore, taken dynamic steps to enhance its role as an influential actor in the region. China's main strategic interests in the region of South Asia consist of gaining access to markets and raw materials, securing safe Sea Lanes of Communications (SLC) in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) where bulk of its oil passes, and preventing the region from emerging as a source of anti-China activities

¹¹ Snow, Donald M. The Necessary Peace: Nuclear Weapons and Superpower Relations. Lexington Books, 1987.

IMPLICITLY OR EXPLICITLY BY THE INDO-US

All these assertive moves by China in South Asia are a cause of concern for the U.S. strategists. Just as the U.S. policy towards China will have consequence for U.S. relations with South Asian states, China's policy towards South Asia will have consequences for Washington's interests. Thus the U.S. interests in South Asia as far as China is concerned include: i. To working with China in maintaining regional and global security (but not at the expense of the U.S. interests or strategic dominance). ii. To enhance Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) with Chinese military, but also acting to contain its military expansionism (perceived or actual).

U.S. Policy towards South Asia Cold War Period ¹²

U.S. Policy towards South Asia Cold War Period: There are several factors that affect the conduct of the U.S. foreign policy in any particular region. These factors include the level of continuity of the U.S. interests, the attention, amount and quality of information available at various levels of government, the constraints that exist on the U.S. government and the constraints that exist with the region, and the type of influence and number of nongovernmental interests that are found in the region²⁰. In this framework, the U.S.' South Asia policy can be termed as a series of ups and downs or a periods of engagement and periods of disengagement. These patterns have been based on different calculations of what constitutes the U.S. interests.

Obama and His Rebalancing Strategy¹³

Obama and His Rebalancing Strategy It is widely believed that the rise of Asia would have profound implications for the future of U.S. That is why the strategic rebalancing initiated by Obama seeks to deepen the U.S. engagement with the region at various important levels. The main purpose of this strategy is to support the rise of prosperous and peaceful Asia. A dynamic and prosperous Asia, integrated with the global economy

¹² Janis, Irving L. Victims of Groupthink: A psychological study of foreign -policy decisions and fiascoes. Houghton Mifflin, 1972.

¹³ The Annals of America. Encyclopedia Britannica, 1968. Original documents from American history.

is central to the U.S. interests particularly to the U.S. economy³⁰. In this context, expanding the rebalancing to include South Asia is not just indispensable, it is also vital in the U.S. foreign policy calculations. The significance of South Asia lies in the fact that a peaceful and stable South Asia that joins East Asia's production networks will offer counter point to the predominance of China's economic expansion in the region and produce additional impetus and resilience to Asia's rise. Thus, by extending the strategic rebalancing to South Asia, the U.S. indicates a timely signal to its long term commitment to the region.

CHINA- INDIA POLICY:

China-India Policy Under Obama administration, the U.S policy towards South Asia has displayed more continuity than change. Thus, Obama's stewardship of the U.S. foreign policy is continuing his predecessor's success in maintaining regional stability and the U.S. preeminence in the South Asian region. In line with this strategy, Obama while continues to build a cooperative relationship with China but at the same time hedges against its growing military power, all the while forging a strategic partnership with India³¹. Obama, like Bush supports the emergence of India as an emerging power. During the term of Bush administration, the U.S. recognized that India would be a major power in 21st century. Therefore, the Bush administration accorded defacto recognition of India's acquisition of nuclear weapons and thereafter both the states have diversified the areas of cooperation including defense, security, economics and other areas. Likewise, Obama administration despite focusing on Pakistan as the key partner in the war against terrorism, continues to India as a valuable strategic partner.

PAK AFGHANISTAN POLICY¹⁴

At-Pak Policy One of the first foreign policy initiatives that Obama undertook immediately upon his assumption of office in 2009 was to address the deteriorating situation in the Afghanistan and Pakistan border region or Af-Pak. This historically 'wild' area with a porous border has been identified as the safe haven for the Taliban, al Qaeda

¹⁴ Allison, Graham T., et al., eds. Hawks, Doves and Owls: An Agenda for Avoiding Nuclear War. W. W. Norton, 1985.

and similar other terrorist groups. Obama had promised during presidential election to make 'Af-Pak' theater his number one priority, down grading the Iraqi theater of 'War on Terror'³². Thus, shortly after President Obama took office, he announced the creation of special envoy for the 'AfPak' region. The U.S. also directed a major review of policy and strategy towards Afghanistan and Pakistan that 'regionalized' the policy, closely linking the U.S. approach to both³³. The security agenda are/will remain paramount in the U.S. objectives in this region, and giving the ongoing flow of Taliban and other militants across the Durand Line, will irrevocably bind the two nations together. In Afghanistan, the U.S. and International Security Assistance Forces (ISAFs) will remain focused on training the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSFs) so that they can maintain peace when the international coalition forces led by the U.S. leave Afghanistan. While in Pakistan, the U.S. is increasingly focused on counter-terrorism, non-proliferation and ensuring the security of Pakistan's nuclear weapons.

THE US ROLE IN SOUTH ASIA



Written by: ANUM NASEER

INTENSIVE US ENGAGEMENT FOR ENHANCED ROLE IN SOUTH ASIA



Afghanistan



Bangladesh



Bhutan



India



Iran



Maldives



Nepal



Pakistan



Sri Lanka

Background

The Cold War era emerged at the end of the IInd World War with two antagonist blocks. The competition between US and USSR had affected the rest of the world as well. South Asia, too, suffered the effects of this war. Pakistan and India chose the opposite blocks. Pakistan became an ally of US and India that of USSR.

At the end of the Cold War, US adopted a foreign policy, precisely that of the sole Super Power in the world. The position of India and Pakistan became a prominent issue in the US foreign policy, as far as South Asian affairs were concerned. There exist two schools

of thought in the US as far as this choice is concerned. According to the traditional view, Pakistan has got eminence while other viewpoint supports India. Behind the second viewpoint Islamic fundamentalism and China are the motivating factors to drift US towards India rather than Pakistan¹.

This led to the new era of Indo-US relations. “The United States visibly displayed its marked indifference towards Pakistan and moved closer to India. United States is supporting India, out of all proportions to enable it to play the role of a regional surrogate” (Jan, 1993: 130-131). US turned towards India decisively in the year 2000, after the visit of Mr. Vajpayee to Washington. This tilt was visible both in policy and practice. There were many factors responsible for this, for instance Talibanization of the region, nuclearisation of both India and Pakistan, and Islamic fundamentalism.

In this scenario, US assessed all possibilities and it chose India as its permanent ally in its global agenda. America tried its level best to profess neutrality in its policy but practically it remained away from Pakistan.



¹ (Azmi, M. Raziullah, Pakistan-United States Relations)

INTRODUCTION

After years of relative marginalization, South Asia is steadily increasing its influence in international affairs. All major powers, including the United States, European Union, China, Japan, and Russia, are expanding their engagement with the Subcontinent. After China. India is now an important factor in managing new international trade, energy, and environmental challenges. On the political front, most major issues that confront U.S. policy international terrorism, Islamic radicalism, weapons of mass destruction, proliferation, state failure, nation building, and promotion of democracy are ingrained in the South Asian²

Sub continent. South Asia will become increasingly relevant to a number of new challenges confronting U.S. foreign policy. Since the late 1990s, the United States has devoted considerable political and diplomatic energies to its engagement with South Asia, which developed a new intensity after September 11, 2001. These bipartisan efforts have produced a number of positive results including producing a credible framework for an enduring strategic partnership with India, the centerpiece of which has been the historic civil nuclear initiative. Also, in the last few years, the United States has simultaneously helped to improve bilateral relations between New Delhi and Islamabad, an objective that for decades was deemed impossible. Deliberate American neutrality in the India-Pakistan conflicts has encouraged New Delhi and Islamabad to embark on a bilateral, and rather productive, peace process. Since 9/11, America has been involved in stabilizing Pakistan and Afghanistan against local and trans-national threats of terrorism and religious extremism, while also economically modernizing the region. Consequently, the United States has emerged as the single-most important external partner of the Subcontinent. Although America's recent gains in South Asia are indeed historic, they remain to be consolidated. There also exists the danger that some of the U.S. advances in the region might be reversed in the near future.

² (C R Raja Mohan;The u s role in soyj asia)

U.S Intensive Engagement in South Asia

Following are the main factors that have brought intensive engagement of USA in South Asia³.

Nuclear Proliferation

Nuclear non-proliferation has been a corner-stone of American foreign policy and this policy has somewhat engaged US in South Asian affairs. Although India was nuclearized decades before Pakistan but this region came under limelight when both countries went for nuclear explosions in 1998. Since then, South Asia has become the nuclear flash point. In this scenario, enmity of India and Pakistan and the continuing unresolved issues of these countries have raised the worries of US in this region. US is acting as an observer of nuclear advancement of both India and Pakistan.

In a statement on November 12, 1998, US Deputy Secretary, Strobe Talbot presented following three concerns of US government:

1. Preventing an escalation of nuclear and missile competition in the region;
2. Strengthening global non-proliferation regime;
3. Promoting a dialogue between India and Pakistan on long-term improvement of their relations, including on the subjection of Kashmir.

Southern Asia Nuclear Forces, October 2015

COUNTRY	YEAR OF FIRST NUCLEAR TEST	TOTAL ARSENAL ESTIMATES
CHINA	1964	250
INDIA	1974	110-120
PAKISTAN	1998	110-130

A number of factors after the end of Cold War have brought urgency in USA towards nuclear non-proliferation in South Asia. These include the concern that export of nuclear capability is not transferred to others and also India and Pakistan have had number of

³(Azmi,M.Raziullah,Pakistan American Relation)

wars and any future war may become nuclear. As the nuclear rivalry between Pakistan and India have an impact far beyond the region, averting a nuclear holocaust in South Asia has become a key US policy goal, that will keep US engaged here in future.

Sensitive soul of Kashmir

South Asia provides the regional context for one of the world's most intractable international disputes, the India-Pakistan conflict over Kashmir. Two countries have fought major wars over Kashmir in 1947-1948 and 1956, as well as a limited war there in 1999. Kashmir is the bone of contention between two antagonistic nuclear states. It is infect the root cause of the many other problems in the region. It is rightly said that no lasting peace can be attained without resolving this issue. By realizing its importance, US are now showing its interest in the problem. Kargil crisis of 1999 was sufficient to make US realize that after the acquisition of nuclear capability by both India and Pakistan, its involvement in the region has become inevitable and crucial too. That was the first point to be worried as far as explosiveness of South Asia was concerned. US reluctantly are trying to bring India and Pakistan for discussions and negotiations for settlement of all bilateral issues between them.



US are playing the role of facilitator rather than mediator. It is widely understood that the prolonged issue of Kashmir is one of the reasons of extremism in the region. This extremism has further developed into terrorism throughout the world. US administration is convinced that Kashmir is a sensitive, complicated and sentimental issue which requires special parameters. Satisfaction of both countries along with the people of Kashmir is necessary for logical settlement of the problem.

Economic Investment

Since the times India has opened-up its economy in 1991, US has become a major investor. Logically America needs smooth and favorable environment for its heavy investments. This environment can only be achieved through peace between India and Pakistan and it is nearly impossible without active involvement of America in the conflicting bilateral issues⁴.

Economic protection of big market of India along with a free market is crucial US agenda. To safeguard the interests of American people, especially in the service sector and joint industrial ventures, has compelled US to strive for perpetual interaction among three governments of US, India and Pakistan.

War Against Terrorism

America has long term interests and strategy in the region. First, it produced Jihadist to contain USSR. Now these Jihadist are well trained and capable enough to threaten the peace of the region. America has firsthand knowledge of the origin and potency of these militants, residing in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Now the economic and political future of US depends upon the success of its policy in Afghanistan, as it is the only gate way towards Central Asian states. This project is nearly impossible without help and support of India and Pakistan. Safe passage into Central Asian States depends on a balanced and pragmatic foreign policy of US for both India and Pakistan⁵.

⁴ (Umbreen Javaid , Intensive US Engagement for Enhanced Role in South Asia)

⁵(Malik, Hafeez. US Relations with Afghanistan and Pakistan)

Pakistan and India have to accommodate each other for sustainable peace which will lead to uplift the social, economic and political conditions of the region. They will have to create a euphoric environment. Of course Pakistan has strengthen its defense, under all circumstances in order to maintain minimum deterrence with India. With immense happenings around Pakistan, there is a dire need for strong and competent defense capabilities. India will always pressurize Pakistan through US diplomatic channels for the satisfaction of its own demands. At present, it wants US to control the cross border terrorism and crack down Islamic fundamentalist elements in Pakistan.


A dangerous opinion which is gaining currency in Pakistan is that US is now cementing its relations with India at the cost of Pakistan. It has started speaking the language of India. When in January 2010, Robert Gates visited Delhi and declared that another attack like Mumbai will invite the wrath of India, in fact tantamount to endorse the cold doctrine of India which certainly carries very grave implications for the region.



India has used the adverse climate created world over due to the wider belief that tribal areas of Pakistan are a central point of the terrorist activities across the globe. It has seriously damaged Pakistan's agricultural economy by building dam and other hydro electricity generation centers at river Chenab and Jhelum. India has done this by challenging and eroding Pakistan's genuine interests in Kashmir. It has maligned

Pakistan so much on the issue of cross border terrorism and equated the liberation movement with terrorism so craftily that the world led by USA is not prepared to listen to the genuine concern of Pakistan about the violation, committed by India with respect to Indus Basin Treaty and other pacts. India has built an almost impenetrable smoke screen over Kashmir and its relations with Pakistan and it seems that it has totally made the US blind.

When Indian Chief of Army staff talked of his capability of taking on both Pakistan and China, he infect was seeking a role for India beyond its size and its borders. And USA has too willingly obliged India which is establishing dozens of consulates in Afghanistan and doubling and tripling its armed forces in that country. USA looks like giving India greater space to override and contain China. This makes Pakistan morally afraid of the real American intentions in the area.



Pakistan gets further disturbed when India uses Afghan soil under the occupation of USA, in order to create disturbance in Balochistan and to infiltrate in tribal areas of Pakistan through pro-India segment of Taliban, called Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan who

receives Indian funds and armament in abundance. The conditions that are imposed by American aid bills and IMF on a beleaguered and embalmed Pakistan shakes the trust and the very foundation of friendship of Pakistan. On the other hand, when seen in the backdrop of a possible respite and an actual offer to that effect by certain groups of Taliban, in case Pakistan abolishes its partnership with US in the war against terror, the stakes for Pakistan of siding with US, inspire of its obvious tilt towards and patronage of Indian polity, get even higher. Therefore, it appears that US is on the course of losing its old ally wittingly or unwittingly. The turning point seems to be fast approaching where Pakistan has to decide whether it can sacrifice its national interests like stable and friendly Afghanistan, uninterrupted supply of river waters from Indian held Kashmir, its traditional moral and principled support for the right of self determination for the Kashmir is and respect for its sovereignty on all of its parts like FATA ad Balochistan. USA needs to give it a deeper thought whether India alone can safeguard its interest in the region and guarantee.

- Elimination of terrorism in Afghanistan
- Safe trade routes to Central Asia
- Non proliferation of nuclear weapons
- Containment of Iranian influence
- Containment of China on its Western side
- Above all, the eradication of Al-Qaeda and its supporters from tribal areas, straddling across Pak-Afghan border.

Security of its massive investment in India. The moment of truth is staring all three major players in the face. India must realize that it may isolate Pakistan internationally but it has to play a friendly tie for a peaceful and stable South Asia which would ensure a safe journey of progress for its burgeoning economy. If it would mix too much belligerence with its economic stature, it is likely to get negative dividends.

Seek free trade with and within South Asia

Amidst an acceleration of region-wide growth and the real prospects for eliminating mass poverty, the Subcontinent needs a strong economic partnership with the United States. With the U.S. becoming an observer at the SAARC, the region's economic expectations of the U.S. have sharply increased. Even the smaller countries in South Asia are no longer looking toward traditional forms of U.S. aid, but want opportunities for trade, foreign direct investment, and open markets. An American drift toward protectionism will harm South Asia's economic growth and push it deeper into China's economic political orbit. Washington can help accelerate the process of regional economic integration by offering preferential tariffs to goods produced across borders in South Asia, and encourage investments by its companies on the Subcontinent.

As the region moves toward a free trade area and seeks trans-border connections, the United States can raise its influence in the region by supporting region-wide projects for economic development, energy transfers, and trans-border transportation corridors.



Support transregional infrastructure projects:

The United States formally supports South Asia's integration with its abutting regions, especially Southeast Asia and Central Asia. Yet, the U.S. has come down hard against the region's expanding economic cooperation with Myanmar and Iran. The U.S. needs to rethink this policy. Traditionally, both these nations were very much part of British India's sphere of influence. Encouraging an India-led SAARC to regain a measure of influence in both Myanmar and Iran might be in the longer-term interests of the United States. Stronger cooperation between South Asia and Burma will serve to balance China's expanding influence there. That greater external pressure might only harden the xenophobic attitudes in Myanmar has been confirmed by the regime's refusal to allow substantive international assistance to the victims of Cyclone Nargis in May 2008. A more credible strategy toward Myanmar might involve Western reassurances on the unity and territorial integrity of the nation and promises of significant international assistance in stages in return for a genuine road-map on internal political liberalization. The United States must encourage SAARC and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to nudge Myanmar to open its economy and society by becoming a land bridge between the Subcontinent and Southeast Asia.

Strengthen civil society in the region

Unlike some parts of East Asia and much of the Middle East, the Subcontinent is defined by an irrepressible civil society. Across the Subcontinent, non-governmental organizations thrive to provide a measure of balance against excessive dominance by state structures. Any long-term U.S. strategy that aims to leverage its soft power in the region must focus on engaging civil society. It would involve a renewed outreach to South Asian Muslims, who have traditionally been moderate in their political orientation and deeply embedded in the eclectic culture of the Subcontinent. American engagement with South Asian Muslims is crucial as 40 percent of the world's Muslims live on the Subcontinent. While the Indian Diaspora has made its mark in the western world, the diasporas from Pakistan, Bangladesh, and elsewhere are equally accomplished and provide an important link between the United States and South Asia.

South Asian elites, as well as many in the lower middle class, highly value modern education as a critical resource for their future generations. The U.S. needs a massive public-private partnership between American institutions and those in South Asia to meet the huge shortfall in the supply of education and training at all levels. The U.S. should avoid visa restrictions against South Asian middle classes that are natural allies of the west⁷.

⁷ (C R Raja Mohan, The U S role in South Asia)

US FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS INDIA



“THE DIPLOMATIC POLICY OF A NATION IN ITS INTERACTION
WITH OTHER NATIONS”



U.S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS INDIA

HIRA SOHAIL & FIZA IDRESS

NEW DELHI, FRIDAY, AUGUST 15, 1947.

INDIA INDEPENDENT : BRITISH RULE ENDS

CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY TAKES OVER

MOUNTBATTEN'S APPOINTMENT AS GOVERNOR-GENERAL ENDORSED COLOURFUL CEREMONY MARKS BIRTH OF NATION

(By Our Special Representative)

NEW DELHI, Thursday - At midnight tonight the Constituent Assembly consisting of the chosen representatives of the Indian people, assumed sovereign power and the members solemnly took the pledge to serve India and her people. "We end today a period of all fortune and India discovers herself again," said Pandit Nehru in calling upon the members to take the new pledge.

Earlier the president of the constituent assembly, Dr. Rajendra Prasad, said: "To all



INDIAN BIG THREE - Earl Mountbatten, Governor General of India, Pandit Nehru, Prime Minister and Dr. Rajendra Prasad, President of the Constituent Assembly - at the Government House where the two Indian leaders went after the midnight session of the Constituent Assembly to endorse Earl Mountbatten's appointment as Governor-General.

Governors Sworn In As Free India Is Born

The new Governors of Indian provinces were sworn in at

NEW STAR RISES IN THE EAST

LEADERS TELL NATION OF TASKS AHEAD

The appointed day has come - the day appointed by destiny - and India stands forth again after long slumber and struggle, awake, vital, free and independent, says Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru in a message to the Nation on Freedom Day.

"The past clings on to us still in some measure and we have to do much before we redeem the pledges we have so often taken. Yet the turning point is past, history begins above for us, the history which we shall live and act and others will write about."

"It is a blessed moment for us in this day, for all Asia and for the world. A new era dawns, the star of freedom in the East, a new hope comes into being, vision long cherished materializes. May the age never set and that hope never be betrayed!"

"We rejoice in that freedom, even though clouds surround us, and many of our people are sorrow-stricken and distressed by the problems we confront us." But freedom brings responsibilities and burdens and we have to face them in the spirit of a free and disciplined people.

"On this day our first thoughts go to the architect of freedom, the father of our nation who, embodying the old spirit of India, held aloft the torch of freedom and lighted up the darkness that surrounded us. We have often been unworthy followers of his and have strayed from his message, but not

Attlee's Greetings To Nehru

My colleagues in the United Kingdom Government joined with me in wishing on this historic day greetings and good wishes to the Government and the people of India. It is our earnest wish that India may go forward in tranquillity and prosperity and in so doing contribute to the peace and progress of the world, says Mr. Arthur, British Prime Minister.



India-United States relations:

India-United States relations (or Indo-American relations) refers to the international relations that exist between the Republic of India and the United States of America.

Prominent leaders of India's freedom movement had friendly relations with the United States of America which continued well after independence from Great Britain in 1947. In 1954, United States of America made Pakistan a Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) treaty-ally. India cultivated strategic and military relations with the Soviet Union to counter US-Pakistan ties. In 1961, India became a founding member of the Non-Aligned Movement to avoid.

Involvement in the Cold War power-play between the USA and USSR. The Nixon administration's support for Pakistan during the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 affected relations till the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. In the 1990s, Indian foreign policy adapted to the Unipolar world and developed closer ties with the United States.

In the 21st century, Indian foreign policy has sought to leverage India's strategic autonomy in order to safeguard sovereign rights and promote national interests within a multi-polar world. Under Presidents Bush and Obama, the USA has demonstrated

accommodation to India's core national interests and acknowledged outstanding concerns. A unique feature of this relation is that U.S. is the world's oldest democracy, while India is the world's largest democracy¹.

Increase in bilateral trade & investment, cooperation on global security matters, inclusion of India in decision-making on matters of global governance (United Nations Security Council), upgraded representation in trade & investment forums (World Bank, IMF, APEC), admission into multilateral export control regimes (NSG, MTCR, Wassenaar Arrangement, Australia Group) and joint-manufacturing through technology sharing arrangements have become key milestones and a measure of speed and advancement on the path to closer US-India relations.

According to Gallup's annual World Affairs survey, India is perceived by Americans as their 6th favorite nation in the world, with 71% of Americans viewing India favourably in 2015.



¹ India and the United State in the 21st century: Reinventing Partnership pg 4 to 7

India's foreign policy

Five characteristics define India's foreign policy. First India came to see its natural place as being one of the world's major powers, and thus it redefined its relationship with other major powers. The rearrangement was the inevitable result of Russia's relative post-Soviet Union weakness. Although Russia remained a valued friend, it was no longer able to play same role in the world that

it had before. A new and vital partnership with the United States and improved relations with China

emerged the most prominent parts of India's approach to the world's great powers.

India saw the United States as the key to achieving two key strategic goals; international economic success and acceptance as one of the world's movers and shakers. The phrase "natural ally," used by both Vajpayee and Manmohan Singh, would have been unimaginable in Nehru's day. India sought a relationship with the United States that spanned the full range of subjects. The partnership started with stepped-up trade and investment. These essentially private relationships, backed up by intense government negotiations to address long-festering disputes on such issues as trade barriers and intellectual property protection, seen by business as obstacles to expanding trade and investment. By the year 2000, security had become the most active government-to-government "account," and by 2005 the United States and India had signed a ten-year defense agreement. By 2007, India topped the list of countries sending students to the United States, with over 80,000.

A second defining characteristic was that the new Indian foreign policy was driven by economics to a much greater extent than before. During the 1990s, India's exports had expanded, and it had become much more interested in attracting foreign investment, and its companies had become significant investors outside of India. National leaders in both government and business came to see foreign policy as an important means to reinforce economic success and deal with future economic challenges. In an earlier era, the economic dimension of India's foreign policy had focused to a large extent on seeking economic aid. In the 1990s, the emphasis shifted to trade, investment, and especially

energy security. Protecting the Indian Ocean sea-lanes, through which some 70% of India's oil supplies traveled, was a new priority. Partly as a result India came to see routine U.S. operations in the Indian Ocean as nonthreatening, perhaps even beneficial to India's security interests. At the same time, the Indian navy grew stature, in light of its role as protector of energy supplies.

The third aspect of the new Indian foreign policy was greater attention to India's neighbors to the East. The "Look East" policy, as it was called, was not based on hostility toward China –it coincided, as we have seen, with a deliberate effort to improve Sino-Indian ties-but it did reflect India's desire not to have China emerge as the only major player in Asia. India's aid relationship with Japan had always been important; now trade, investment, and political and security ties were added to mix. During the intervening years, India's policy makers and diplomats had paid relatively little attention to the region, and they had their work cut out for them to make India a significant player in Asia-wide deliberations. But increasingly, it was on the Asia-wide stage, not just the South Asian one, that India sought to engage.

The fourth element of India's transformed foreign policy, India's approach to South Asia, is familiar. Indian officials describe their foreign policy in terms of the changing priorities described above. Despite the United States' well- publicized efforts to develop its relations with India and with Pakistan on separate tracks-to "de-hyphenate" them- U.S. ties with Pakistan remain a very sensitive point for India.

The final characteristic for the new Indian policy its approach to global governance. Again this is a familiar theme to students of Indian foreign policy; Nehru saw the United Nation and related institution as an important part of India's global stage. What has changed is that India now aspires to join the most powerful councils of the international community on the basis of its own national power and international role, and not as moral arbiter or the representative of developing countries. The big prize, a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, does not seem to be close at hand. But India is an active participant in the other forums and a regular invited guest at gatherings of Group of Eight (G-8). It has positioned itself as both a donor and recipient of economic aid. Its rapid response to the Asian tsunami of 2004/225 demonstrated a capacity and

willingness to act and to work with others in complex civil-military operations, again as a donor rather than recipient.

Behind these patterns of India's foreign policy action one can discern the outlines of a strategy. India already is by far the most powerful country in South Asia. Its security space extends from the Himalayas and Hindu Kush across the Indian Ocean. The potential strategic threats it envisages come both from its nuclear neighbors and from the long term potential for Chinese expansion into the Indian Ocean. But its defense against these threats relies not just on foreign and security policy but also, and most fundamentally, on economic expansion, within India's democratic tradition.



U.S. Foreign Policy To India In The Cold War Era 1945:

Although the concern of the thesis is to delineate Indo-US relations during the post Cold War period, the primary focus of this chapter is to discuss the relations between the two countries during the Cold War period since India gained its independence in 1947. Another point to be observed is Pakistan. Pakistan plays an important role in the evolution of Indo-US relations. Any positive movement between the USA and Pakistan has invariably negative implication for Indo-U.S. relations. Actually Indo-U.S. relations during the post Cold War have witnessed many ups and downs, marked by the chilling bitterness, and some times, by friendly accommodation.²

Nehru and Non-Alignment

- *1947 – late 80s - non-aligned foreign policy stance*
- *For Nehru, cultural linkages and cooperation between nations and people were an important*
- *The end of the Cold War in the 1990s - change*
- *India's relationships with the United States, China and Russia were reconfigured, as were those with immediate neighbours, including Pakistan.*

U.S –India policy in the 1950s:

During the first decade after India's independence, much of the US foreign policy was based on the British perceptions and advice. The U.S. failed to deal with India directly in

1. ²² D.C. Jha, 'U.S. Policy towards India, Indian Journal of Political Science, vol. 37, No. 1, January - March 1976, pp. 41-43.

the context of India's perceived interests and Indian sensitivities. This was quite apart from the differences, between the two countries on strategic and security matters³.

American officials perceived India's policy of non-alignment negatively. Ambassador Henry F. Grady told then Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru that the United States did not consider neutrality to be an acceptable position. Grady told the State Department in December 1947 that he had informed Nehru "that this is a question that cannot be straddled and that India should get on the democratic side immediately".

The American choice fell on democratic India as a counterforce to communism in Asia, But the United States was sorely disappointed when Nehru refused to be drawn into the Cold War and decided to follow the policy of non-alignment or equal friendship with both blocs .Having failed to secure Indian support for its policy, the United States ultimately turned to Pakistan. America demonstrated a frankly hostile attitude towards India's policy of non-alignment. John Foster Dallas criticized India's neutralism as an impartial and shortsighted policy. Vice President

Nixon also advocated that this military assistance to Pakistan was an anti-dote to Nehru's policy of India. Huge amount of sophisticated military weapons were provided to Pakistan to maintain military parity between India and Pakistan. Baldev Raj Nayar, while analyzing the role of supply of arms to Pakistan as a factor in Indo-American relations, stated that the search for military parity between India and Pakistan was the cardinal principle of the American post war policy in South Asia. To minimize the damage to the U.S.-Indian relations, President Eisen However, wrote to Prime Minister Nehru, stressing that military aid for Pakistan was not actually directed against India, assuring him that America would come to India's help if Pakistan were ever to use this arms for aggression against India and offering to give sympathetic consideration to any Indian request for arms. India did not approve of the American policy of containing communist Soviet Union and China through system of military alliance and sought to promote a climate of peaceful co-existence and co-operation by recognizing the vital

³.J.N. Dixit, Indian Foreign Policy: Challenge of Terrorism, Fashioning New Inter-State Equations, Gyan Publishing House, New Delhi, 2002, p. 289

differences between their political and economic institutions and its own. India's policy towards China specially of fended the Americans. Nehru's mild stand on the Chinese invasion of Tibet, dissociation with American move to brand China as an aggressor in Korea and opposition to the United States Sponsored 'Uniting for Peace' resolution of November,1950 greatly irritated United States. India's attitude towards the peace Pact between USA and Japan concluded at San Francisco in September 1951 also caused some bitterness in Indo-American relations. India not only refused to take part in the conference but also criticized the American move not to invite Soviet Union and China to the conference.

Actually Washington had begin a friendly attitude towards India and offered an extended aid and weapon policy. But Nehru rejected the U.S. offer. One of the irritating issue and that emerged in the relations between Washington and New Delhi on Peace Treaty with Japan. In the mid 1951 Indian Prime Minister decided that India would not sign the treaty. The Prime Minister believed that treaty should have included the Soviet Union and the Communist China was also unhappy about the security arrangements between Japan and the United States.

⁴ North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was established in 1949. A few years later the South East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) and the Central Treaty Organization (CEATO) were born. The US would have welcomed India's membership on of these Asian military alliances. Neither of these had however happened. Having received cold shoulder from Nehru, the United States turned to Pakistan for alliance, which became members of both SEATO and CENTO. Pakistan, of course, was not sincere in its joining anti communist military alliances. It did not perceive a threat from Russia or China. India's policy enraged the American authorities and American enthusiasm for India diminished. Being, thus, snubbed by New Delhi, Washington now approached Islamabad and offered a bouquet of economic and arms assistance to Pakistan. There was, therefore, signed in May 1954, the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreements and founded a system of military alliance in Asia. After, the US military supply to Pakistan became a major

⁴ North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO,,,,, however happened
Nalini Kant Jha (ed.), India Foreign Policy in a changing World, South Asian Publications,New Delhi, 2000, p. 61.

irritant in Indo-U.S. relations. Bilateral relations was embittered and anti American elements and sentiments were strengthened in India. The U.S. military Pact with Pakistan changed the whole context of the problems existing between India and Pakistan. The bilateral Indo-Pak relations assumed a triangular relationship, with the United States as the third party. Thus the military alliance “Sharpened Indo-Pak relations. It became a constant factor in the reaction and counteraction which characterized the subsequent relations between the two suspicious neighbors⁵.”

However, Eisenhower was not fully antagonistic towards India moreover sympathetic to former colonial states. He worried that if the West failed to support de-colonization and economic development, the countries of Asia and Africa would become independent any way and find communism attractive. In the early days of Eisner However period, India’s economic development was not a popular theme to him. One of the secretary Dulles first decisions regarding India was, indeed, to slash the economic assistance request for fiscal year 1954 by 30% to \$140 million.

In 1954, a new agricultural commodity bill Public Law 480 also became law. -480, as it was soon known permitted the U.S. Government to dispose of mounting surplus farm products in return for blocked rupees. Washington supported the push for increased assistance for India. In the beginning of 1956, U.S. secretary Dulles and ambassador to India, John Sherman Cooper, (former Republican Senator from Kentucky) proposed a larger aid program to provide substantial U.S. support for the India second Five year Plan. Cooper justified the boost in assistance in terms of countering the increased Soviet effort to penetrate South Asia and of supporting India’s efforts to develop her economy by democratic means. The U.S. envisaged up to 5 million tons of food grains over three years to India in this time.


⁵ McMahon, Robert J. (13 August 2013). *The Cold War on the Periphery: The United States, India, and Pakistan*. Columbia University Press. p. 40. Retrieved 28 November 2015

American Policy towards India in 1960s and 1970s:

The decade of 1960s witnessed a slight alteration in the U.S.- India relations. Ideology played a part here. The outbreak of war between China and India in October 1962 represented ultimately a clash between the two systems of communism and democratic socialism. Here the U.S.A. supported India in its fights against China and advanced limited arms assistance to India. Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, when the Soviet policy of compromise was vehemently criticized by China, which called Moscow a 'coward'. However during Indo-China Border War American anti-communist attitude was demonstrated. The American Administrations was concern with China than with the U.S.S.R. was increasingly vexed by the Sino-Indian war of 1962. Not only that Kennedy desired China to be contained, and even extended subsequently a limited an arms and economic assistance to India. Being concerned now more with how to counter China and contain communism, the United States adopted a balanced policy towards Pakistan and India, i.e. favoring former and going somewhat against the latter. In early 1960s U.S. Administration announced, India would get modest military assistance to India. U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Mc. Namara declared, U.S. Sec a very real need for India to improve the quality of its defenses against the Chinese threat.

India's global role and its pacifist thrust were delivered by the India-China War of 1962. On June 30, 1963, President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan reaffirmed their policy of continuing to help India by providing further military aid to strengthen her differences against the threat of renewed Chinese communist attack.

In 1964, U.S.A. had signed a treaty with India for establishment of an India's largest fertilizer plants in Vishakhapatnam. U.S.A. sanctioned Rs. 23.6 crore loans for fertilizer plant. In that time decision was taken that, two American companies will invest \$ 6.08 million in foreign exchange in shares of Coromandal Fertilizers Limited and both companies will bring to the project extensive and successful experience in operating a number of fertilizer plants in the United States.



Indo-Pak War 1965 (US proxy war):

Another issue which acted as catalytic agent in the pronouncement of the U.S. policy towards India was eruption of the disputes of India and Pakistan on Kashmir and ultimately the war between India and Pakistan in 1965. The U.S.A. supported Pakistan vis-à-vis India; it could not continue much with its declared policy towards Pakistan due to the balanced approach of the U.S.A. towards South Asia. The U.S. Pakistani military assistance adversely effected Indo-U.S. relations.

U.S. foreign policy in the 1965 war pleased neither India nor Pakistan. U.S.A. had failed to prevent the use of U.S.'s arms despite repeated promises that it would do so. Washington' seven-handed action in stopping military and economic assistance to both

countries also irked New Delhi, for there seemed little doubt that Pakistan started the trouble by launching operation Gibraltar.⁶

The Indian Government felt intrigued by the continuing shipment of American arms to Pakistan and thought to take the help to U.S.S.R. of diplomacy in the U.S. On June 27, 1971, New Delhi sent a written protest to Washington against the continued supply of arms to Pakistan. In November, the military action had increased in East Bengal. Late in the month, Mrs. Gandhi authorized Indian forces to enter East Pakistan to pursue the Pakistani forces. On the night of December 3, Pakistan attacked eight Indian airfields in the western part of the country, and the next day declared war on India.

Year 1971 was also of great importance to Indo-U.S. relations. Indo-Soviet Friendship and Cooperation Treaty was signed on August 9, this year. Washington was not prepared for the sensational news of this treaty. The American people who were pro-India were also stunned.

Henry Kissinger had paid a visit in New Delhi on July 6, 1974. Kissinger's mission to the subcontinent was merely a subsidiary business, the main objective being how to bring about Washington - (Islamabad)- Beijing axis.

In response to the 1974 Indian nuclear test, the United States turned to technology export controls as a central instrument of policy. These controls, often coordinated with other countries, have been entirely nuclear or missile related. After 1974 Nuclear Supplies Group reduced and eventually halted the transfer of nuclear - related technology not just to India but several other states of proliferation concern.

Indo-U.S. POLICY During 1980s:

Between 1980 and 1982, the largest number of the joint ventures approved by the Indian Government was with American concerns, mainly in the chemical and petroleum fields. Direct American investment in India rose from \$ 350 million to \$ 396 million and, eventually, to \$ 500 million. Since 1949 until 1979 India received \$ 9.771 from the U.S.

⁶ Russel Brines, *The Indo-Pakistani Conflict*, Pall Mall Press, London, 1968, p. 104 Thus the military alliance "Sharpened In... suspicious neighbors."

to booster its economy. As much, or more than capital investment, India sought advanced technology from the U.S. It found most doors closed to transfers of high technology, even in simple non-military, non-nuclear areas. The collaboration between Ford Aerospace and Indian Space Organization resulted in Satellite known as INSAT-IB 1983. It was launched by NASA it covered a large numbers of TV transmitters in the country.

The question of U.S. supply of enriched uranium for the automatic power plant at Tarapur was a major irritant in Indo-U.S. relations. Of the total quantity of 39.6 tones of enriched Uranium scheduled for shipment from the U.S. during the period from 1979 to September 1980, only 19.8 tones had been received in India in the first week of October in 1980.

Mrs. Gandhi declared that India would be prepared to face any eventuality by using alternative way to ensure the continued operation of the Tarapur Atomic Power Plant without depending on outside sources. The issue was somehow resolved through a deal struck when the Prime Minister Mrs. Gandhi visited Washington in July 1982. Under it, the fuel for the Tarapur Reactor was to be supplied by the French.

U.S. Vice President George Bush visited India in May 1984. This visit helped the negotiations on the high technology MoU, which were dragging because of internal differences within the Reagan administration. These negotiations were not easy. Although the State and Commerce Departments took a positive attitude, Defense, Energy and the Arms Control and Disarmament .Agency (ACDA) dug in their heels, suspicious of India because of its close links with the Soviets and its nuclear policy.

Indo-U.S. POLICY during 1990s:

India adopted quite-co-operative attitude towards USA during the gulf war of 1990-91

and provided refueling facilities to American transport aircrafts bound for the war zone in the Gulf, even at the cost of internal as well as international criticism. Although since 1991, Indian government this started to maintain closer relations with USA continued to be unhappy with India because it refused to accept international inspection regimes on

the plea of country's threat perceptions vis-à-vis Pakistan and China, and peaceful use of nuclear power.⁷

Domestic factors also contributed to an Indo-US rapprochement in the post - Cold War era. The most important element was to serve financial crisis that gripped India in 1991, after the first Gulf War. The convergence of three distinct forces caused this crisis. First, India had badly depleted its foreign exchange reserves purchasing oil on the global spot market prior to the outbreak of the war. Second, the hostilities forced India to repatriate, at short notice, over 100,000 expatriate workers from the Persian Gulf region. Their return closed an important source of foreign .Exchange. Third, shortly after the War's end, a series of loan payments to multilateral banks came due. The combination of these three factors sent the Indian exchequer into a tail spin .Due to Persian Gulf War a major financial and Structural weakness of Indian economy has showed. To recover this crisis, in the early 1990's Indian Prime Minister Narashima Rao and Finance Minister Manmohan Singh were finding some short-term solution. They decided to shift some fundamental changes in India's economy. Indian government adopted some new approaches. Key aspects of this approach included adopting a structural adjustment regime, reducing tariffs and agricultural sub sides, loosening industrial regulations, and Paring down India's massive Public sector. Indian new market-oriented approach has helped to her economic growth. Adopting liberal economic policy, New Delhi was able to make a good diplomatic relations with Washington. Washington's rapprochement with New Delhi was possible, for its changing ideological practices. Both sides have much to gain from further cooperation in the future. They can no longer afford to ignore one another.⁸

S. Paul and Summit Ganguly have observed that, individual leadership had also played a major role in enhance by Indo-US ties. Various Indian and American leaders have made significant contributions in this regard. In the early 1990's Narashima Rao and Manmohan Singh launched a policy which represented a remarkable departure from the previous policies. On the other hand U.S. President Bill Clinton also took an initiative in

⁷ New York Times, February 8, 1954.

⁸ .. Japan and the United States. Nehru, vol-2, p. 484, letter of 15 August 1951

fostering Indo-US rapprochement. Clinton's role as a diplomat for normalizing Indo-US relations was vital, as he was the first one who did not blindly support Pakistan in Kargil War in 1999.

The dramatic announcement about the nuclear test was made by the Prime Minister, A.B. Vajpayee at a press conference on May 11, 1998: "I warmly congratulate the Scientists and Engineers who have carried out these successful tests." After explosion in Pokhran II, the U.S. administration stopped the assistance to the tune of \$ 142.3 million which this country earlier promised to grant. That apart, the U.S. would also oppose the loans and guarantees extended by the international financial institutions where India expected \$ 3.8 billion as assistance.⁹

The other part of the sanctions would basically impact on U.S. exports to India. For instance, the U.S. Export Bank said its action of ceasing all new approvals of financing of US exports to India would immediately affect approximately \$ 500 million transactions.

In 1990, the year before India launched its reforms, U.S. Private Sector investment in

India was a minuscule \$19 million. The removal of many - but far from all administrative restrictions on foreign investment spurned a major increase. Investment by U.S. companies rose to \$ 500 million a year by the mid 1990s but has since declined. Globally; India currently receives about \$3.5 billion a year in Foreign Direct Investment (FDI).

⁹ Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisen Hower: The President, vol. II, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1984, pp. 376-77



2004 to 2015:

During the tenure of the George W. Bush administration, relations between India and the United States were seen to have blossomed, primarily over common concerns regarding growing Islamic extremism, energy security, and climate change.¹ George W. Bush commented, "India is a great example of democracy. It is very devout, has diverse religious heads, but everyone is comfortable about their religion. The world needs India". Fareed Zakaria, in his book *The Post-American World*, described George W. Bush as "being the most pro-Indian president in American history."

After the December 2004 tsunami, the US and Indian navies cooperated in search and rescue operations and in the reconstruction of affected areas. Since 2004, Washington and New Delhi have been pursuing a "strategic partnership" that is based on shared values and generally convergent geopolitical interests. Numerous economic, security, and global initiatives - including plans for civilian nuclear cooperation - are underway. This latter initiative, first launched in 2005, reversed three decades of American non-proliferation policy. Also in 2005, the United States and India signed a ten-year defense framework

agreement, with the goal of expanding bilateral security cooperation. The two countries engaged in numerous and unprecedented combined military exercises, and major US arms sales to India were concluded. An Open Skies Agreement was signed in April 2005, enhancing trade, tourism, and business via the increased number of flights, and Air India purchased 68 US Boeing aircraft at a cost of \$8 billion. The United States and India also signed a bilateral Agreement on Science and Technology Cooperation in 2005. After Hurricane Katrina, India donated \$5 million to the American Red Cross and sent two plane loads of relief supplies and materials to help. Then, on 1 March 2006, President Bush made another diplomatic visit to further expand relations between India and the US.

On August 25, 2005 two car blasts had taken place in South Mumbai Killing 46 people and injuring 160. On October 29, 2005 New Delhi's Paharganj and Sarojini Nagar Markets was massively damaged by bomb blast when hundreds of people died. In December, 2005, Indian Institute of Science was attacked by grenades. It also operated by ISI that injured five people and killed a scientist. In March, 2006, three bombs stirred the city of Varanasi, killing at least 28 people in Sankat Mochan temple adjacent to Kashi Vishwanath. Minutes later, bombs went off in cantonment station, while the third blast took place in Shiv Ganga Express.

In November 2010, President Barrack Obama visited India and addressed a joint session of the Indian Parliament, where he backed India's bid for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. In 2006, Prime Minister M.Singh identified a worsening Maoist insurgency as "The single biggest internal security challenge" ever faced by India saying it threatened India's democracy and "way of life".

Between 2004 and 2014 Western *think-tanks*, especially in the US and UK, failed to foresee the swing in electoral voting patterns of the growing middle-class and anticipate the scale of political change in India brought about by improvements in basic education and freedom of the press. According to Michael Kugelman, South and Southeast Asia expert at the Woodrow Wilson International Center, the US was unprepared to meet new challenges in India because of its "inability to keep pace with the transformations."


There are more than 50 bilateral dialogue mechanisms between the two governments. The first meeting of the Strategic and Commercial Dialogue at the level of EAM and MOS (Commerce & Industry) was held in Washington DC on 22 September 2015; it has added a commercial component to the five traditional pillars of bilateral relations on which the erstwhile Strategic Dialogue has focused, namely: Strategic Cooperation; Energy and Climate Change, Education and Development; Economy, Trade and Agriculture; Science and Technology; and Health and Innovation. In addition, there are Ministerial-level dialogues involving home (Homeland Security Dialogue), finance (Financial and Economic Partnership), commerce (Trade Policy Forum), HRD (Higher Education Dialogue), Science & Technology (Joint Commission Meeting on S&T) and energy (Energy Dialogue).

There were a number of high-level delegations in both directions in 2015. In January, Secretary of State John Kerry led the U.S. delegation to the Vibrant Gujarat Summit in Ahmadabad. In February, U.S. Secretary of Treasury Jacob Lew visited India for the fifth meeting of the Economic and Financial Partnership Initiative with our Finance Minister. U.S. Secretary of Transportation Anthony Foxx visited India in April for meeting with his counterpart Ministers in India. Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter paid a bilateral visit to India in June. From the Indian side, Finance Minister and MOS (IC) for Environment, Forests & Climate Change visited Washington DC in April, the former for the Spring meeting of the IMF/World Bank and the latter for the Major Economies' Forum meeting. Finance Minister again visited the U.S. in June to promote Investment into India. External Affairs Minister and MOS(IC) for Commerce & Industry co-chaired the first meeting of the Strategic and Commercial Dialogue with their U.S. counterparts in Washington DC in September. MOS(IC) for Power held the Energy Dialogue with his U.S. counterpart in September in Washington DC. MOS(IC) for Power, Coal and New & Renewable Energy also attended the Climate and Clean Energy Investment Forum 2015 hosted by Secretary of State Kerry in Washington DC in October. MOS(IC) for Commerce & Industry held the 9th meeting of the Trade Policy Forum with the U.S. Trade Representative in Washington DC in October. Raksha Mantri visited the U.S. at the invitation of his U.S. counterpart in December 2015. Chief Minister of Haryana led a delegation of the State government in August. There have been numerous visits of parliamentarians and senior officials in both directions.

India and U.S. have in recent years instituted structured dialogues covering East Asia, Central Asia, West Asia, Africa and the Indian Ocean Region. India and the U.S. also have a trilateral with Japan (the first Ministerial-level meeting of the Foreign Ministers took place on 29 September 2015 in New York) and a trilateral with Afghanistan (last meeting held in 2013). Matters relating to international security and disarmament, multilateral export control regimes are reviewed under the Strategic Security Dialogue, while issues relating to high-technology trade are discussed in the India-U.S. High Technology Cooperation Group (HTCG); both these groups, led by Foreign Secretary of India and her counterparts in the US Departments of State and Commerce respectively, last met in November 2014 in New Delhi. The two sides have agreed to work closely for India's phased entry into the global export control regimes to strengthen global non-proliferation, arms control, as well as nuclear security.

Relationship with the United States. Private trade and investment tend to strengthen government ties with the United States. India's future growth and the continuing integration of India with the global economy are an essential foundation for a healthy U.S. India partnership.¹⁰

India's Nuclear Power Capacity - 25 units to 2016



Source: World Nuclear Association

¹⁰ In 1964, U.S.A. had.... n the United States. Times of India Report, from Washington, May 23, 1964.

The U.S. Nuclear Policy Shift towards India movement:

The United States has created a history by concluding the long overdue civilian nuclear cooperation agreement with India. This move came as a surprise to many countries which were not expecting such developments to take place. But for India, this is one of the most important steps taken by the United States during the last almost two decades since the cold war end.

Former U.S. President George W. Bush succeeded in what his predecessor failed to do and that is the successful culmination of the civilian nuclear cooperation with India. Paradigm shift in the U.S. nuclear policy toward India was made possible due to the strategic shift in the recognition of India as a major global player that has a significant role to play in ensuring regional and global peace and security, thereby shaping a prosperous and constructive world.

The Hyde Act allows the U.S. Administration to engage in civil nuclear cooperation with India by waiving three permanent and unconditional provisions of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act of 1954. Had President Bush and his administration not convinced the U.S. Congress to exempt India from certain Atomic Energy Act provisions, the successful



conclusion of the civil nuclear cooperation could not have taken place. These waivers include:

- That the partner country should not have exploded a nuclear explosive device in the past. This waiver is necessary because India had exploded a series of nuclear device in May 1998.
- That the partner country must have all its nuclear facilities and activities under full-scope safeguards. This waiver becomes necessary because India has rejected to place its strategic nuclear weapons program under the international safeguards.
- That the partner country is not currently engaged in the development and production of nuclear explosive devices. This waiver is required because there is no freeze or capping of India's strategic weapons program. India will continue to carry out its nuclear weapons program. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh special envoy Mr. Shyam Saran has made it very clear that if the U.S. Congress considers the 123 Agreement currently drafted as being in contravention with their own understanding of the Hyde Act, the agreement would be voted down.

Regional and Global Response:

Many countries have come out in support of this agreement and many opposed. It is always clear; Pakistan never wants any form of cooperation between India and its ally the United States. From the Islamabad perspective, this is one of the important steps taken so far by the United States favoring India despite it not being a member of nuclear regime, reflecting closeness between the two largest democracies. One reason as to why Pakistan is not happy with this is the fact that the United States is moving closer to engaging India, which would result in the United States tilting in favor of India. Pakistan Foreign Minister Khursheed Mehmood Kasuri has been quoted as saying, "the whole nuclear non-proliferation treaty will unravel. It's only a matter of time before other countries will act in the same way." The question of undermining nuclear non-proliferation arises when the cooperation is with India. The question does not arise when they were proliferating nuclear related materials to other countries. Instead of raising the question they should ask themselves where they stand today.

Russia is one country that had supported the deal start from the very beginning. Russia has insisted on making an exception for India to give it access to civilian nuclear fuel and technology outside of the NPT regime. According to Russian Foreign Minister Official, “we cannot ignore India’s energy requirements. It is a rapidly developing country with a good non-proliferation record. We should probably make an exception in this case without adopting new norms that may erode the NPT regime.”

The initial indication of the Canada government was positive. It would be keen to engage in civilian nuclear cooperation should the agreement be consummated. It was on 26 September, the Canadian Foreign Minister Pierre Pettigrew also announced that Canada was willing to resume trade with India in dual-use nuclear technologies without infringing on the rules of the NSG or the IAEA. An agreement to cooperate on nuclear safety measures was adopted.

It is worth mentioning for countries that have come out sharply against the ease of restriction to India for the supply of nuclear fuel, reactors, and technology to India is the commitment made by Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh way back in 2004 that, “India is a responsible nuclear power. We are fully conscious of the immense responsibilities that come with the possession of advanced technologies, both civilian and strategic. While we are determined to utilize our indigenous resources and capabilities to fulfill our national interests, we are doing so in a manner that is not contrary to the larger goals of nuclear non-proliferation.” He further added that India would not be the source of proliferation of sensitive technologies. We will also ensure the safeguarding of those technologies that we already possess. We will remain faithful to this approach, as we have been for the last several decades. We have done so despite the well-known glaring examples of proliferation that has directly affected our security interests.¹¹

¹¹ India’s global role, Chinese communist attack Tanvir Sultan, op.cit, p. 80

Outcome of the Civilian Nuclear Cooperation


The outcome of the civilian nuclear cooperation agreement between India and the United States was significant as it opens up opportunities for New Delhi to engage in nuclear dialogues with other countries such as Germany, Russia, France, Australia, Japan, Canada, Kazakhstan, etc. Ever since India had earned the waiver from the Nuclear Supplier's Group (NSGs) on September 2008 to resume the nuclear commerce with the rest of the world, we have seen some unimaginable agreement between India and other countries. India and Kazakhstan signed the civilian nuclear cooperation agreement during the latter's President Visit to India on the eve of republic day on 24 January 2009. The agreement is in consonant with the increasing nuclear fuel demand to meet India's fuel starved nuclear power plants. With this, Kazakhstan would be exporting uranium to India. Kazakhstan became the fourth country with which India had signed the civilian nuclear cooperation agreement. Before this, India had signed the same agreement with the United States, France and Russia. The agreement is significant because Kazakhstan is the third largest producer of uranium, accounting for fifteen per cent of world production. While Canada's Saskatchewan province is also readying a high profile delegation to pitch for nuclear sales to India as well¹².

The successful completion of the historic agreement will only strengthen Indo-Russian cooperation in nuclear related technologies and reactors. India's isolation from nuclear cooperation has handicapped the possibility of cooperation between the two countries. But with this, India can expect to receive critical nuclear related technology from Russia. The U.S. cannot object to Russia supplying fuel and reactors to India. This was even made clear by the U.S. Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, Nicholas Burns, who said that, "We think the proper sequencing would be that if India needs nuclear fuel for its reactors in Tarapur, then the proper way to do this would be to have the US Congress Act, hopefully, change our laws, have the NSG Act and change NSG practices, then countries would be free to engage at that point in civil nuclear trade with India." This is

¹² <http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2011/10/26/the-u-s-nuclear-policy-shift-towards-india/>

one of the strategic advantages for India. This also gives a clear impression that the agreement is not just between India and the U.S.

Once India and the U.S. declare the joint statement for civil nuclear cooperation, Russian President Putin had offered to build four nuclear power plants in India.[8] Then India and Russia entered into a uranium supply agreement for the second time on 11 February 2009, since NSGs lifted curbs on selling some nuclear fuel and equipment to India. The agreement was between Russia's leading nuclear company TVEL and India's Department of Atomic Energy. Both sides signed two contracts for supplying Uranium for Indian nuclear reactors. Under this agreement, TVEL will have a long-term supply of 2,000 tons of natural uranium pellets for India's pressurized heavy water reactors. Another contract was for the supply of about 60 tons of low-enriched uranium pellets for boiling water reactors units at Tarapur. Uranium imported from Russia will be used in the domestic pressurized heavy water reactors under IAEA safeguards.



U.S. –India Economic Ties form aid to Trade and Investment

To assess where the economic engine is taking India-U.S. relations, we look first at the changing focus of U.S.-India economic relations, and then at the issues that dominate relations today trade, investment, information technology and the services economy and the Indian American community.

During the first 25 years India's independence the government dominated the economic relationship. India was one of the largest recipients of international development assistance. According to a formula worked out in the World Bank board. It received 50 percent of the funds dispensed by the World Bank soft-loan wing a percentage that was reduced after 1971. India was by far the largest recipient of food aid from the United States under public law 480 popularly known as the food for peace program and was a major recipient of regular development aid, receiving 12.3% of all U.S. foreign assistance in 1970. Aid represented a relatively small percent of India's total resources, as is often the case in large countries. But there were times, such as the poor crop years of the mid 1960, when U.S. assistance was critical to averting famine. Lyndon Johnson's efforts to increase U.S. leverage by manipulating a "ship to mouth policy" is still remembered in India with details.

U.S. aid to India during this period had two "crown jewels" The first was its contribution to the first Indian green revolution, the expansion of high yielding varieties of grain that given adequate fertilizer and water dramatically increased food production and eventually made India self-sufficient in basic food grains. Besides the increase in production, U.S. scientists like Norman Borlaug and John Mellor created lasting ties with their Indian counterparts. The Indian Council of Agriculture Research. Led by M.S Swaminathan was a major recipient of U.S. support, and remains to this day one of the best known faces of India's efforts to feed its large population.

The second enduring legacy of U.S. aid during the pre-1970 period was its involvement in India's scientific and technological research and training establishments, India encouraged each of its major donors to develop one of the Indian institutes of technology. The United States was deeply involved with the IIT in Kanpur Exchange of professors

went on long after the golden year of U.S. aid. At the same time, the United States funded, initially which surplus rupees generated by sales of its food aid, scientific collaboration in a broad array of fields, creating a remarkable network of professional linkages. These institutional connections had an impact far beyond the dollar value of the assistance involved and are the parents of the scientific cooperation that India and the United States are trying to cultivate today.

The United States cut off development assistance (but not food aid) to India in 1971 over India's intervention in the war that separated Pakistan and Bangladesh. Development aid resumed in 1978, but never regained its former size or high profile. U.S. assistance to India today consists almost entirely of technical assistance and goes primarily to the social sectors, such as family planning and health, and to agriculture. In 2006 India received \$172.8 million in aid, only 0.6 percent of all U.S. economic aid given that year and substantially below aid to such countries as South Africa, Ethiopia, and Colombia. Apart from a new high profile such as HIV AIDS, aid has become a subject for discussion by technical experts rather than one that engages national leaders.

After India launched its economic reforms in 1991, the key elements in U.S.-India economic relations shifted decisively. The main economic story was no longer aid but private transactions, trade, investment, and information technology. Government policy discussions reminded essential to remove obstacles in all these areas, but the prime movers and the result by which success would be measured, were in the private sector. The United States is India's largest trade and investment partner, though both the trade and investment relationships are asymmetrical. India accounts for just over 1 percent of U.S. trade and 0.3 percent of U.S. overseas investment.

India's merchandise trade with the United States increased in line with India's overall trade: its imports from the United States nearly quadrupled in value (to \$11.7 billion) and its U.S. exports doubled (to 18.8 billion) between 2001 and 2007. The United States remains India's largest export market, with 15 percent of India's exports in 2007. All these figures represent a much larger share of India's GDP than they did in the past and trade counts for more in India's foreign policy as well. China passed the United States as India's largest merchandise trade partner in 2006 but patterns of trade are quite different.

India runs a substantial deficit with China, and its exports are heavily concentrated in unprocessed products, chiefly iron ore. By contrast, India's trade with the United States is in 2-to-1 surplus, and more than half its export is manufactured goods, including some of Indian's most sophisticated products. The United State is Indian's largest market by far 96 percent of India's export to the United States. These figure do not include information technology and related exports, which add another \$20 billion in foreign exchange to the total above the United State buys 67 percent of India IT-related export.

In general discussion in economic issue s are harder and the multilateral is the most difficult aspect of U.S. trade official commended. "Nothing ever goes away" two examples-intellectual property and the Doha Round, in particular the issue of agriculture trade illustrate the kind of issues that have been regular bones of contention, and also the way India's trade policy is and is not changing as its economy policy.

During this period, India began to produce and export more products with significant intellectual property, such as pharmaceutical. This didn't instantly transform India's policy but it led a more pragmatic India approach to intellectual property issues. Today U.S. India intellectual property discussions are aimed preventing future problems more than rehashing old ones.

The second issue the Doha Round of trade negotiations has been a highly emotive bone of contention. A full review of the issue in play goes beyond the scope of this book the issue of agriculture trade illustrate the limitations on U.S. and India cooperation, especially when dealing with politically sensitive. On trade issue, operating in a multilateral arena seems to intensify U.S. problems.

In previous trade round agriculture trade negotiation was generally a duel among developed countries with important agriculture exports, pitting those that explicitly subsidize export (principally the European Union) against those that did not, including the United States. The fact is trade partners regard U.S. farm program as a thinly veiled made the dispute nastier. For decades of the developing countries sat on the sidelines, recognizing that both sets of developing-country farm policies made cheap and more available.

In the Doha Round formally launched in 2001 the United States sought a grand bargain: better access for its key export especially agriculture. Which had benefited little from previous trade rounds, in exchange for future U.S. liberalization of imports developing countries some of them politically in the United States? The actual negotiating structure was more complex and included many non-agriculture market access issues, but agriculture was key. The United States had more ambitious goals for agriculture than most of its negotiating partners. This time the United States had reached an accommodation with the EU regarding the level of cuts in farm programs, and the main negotiations were with developing countries. India took up the cudgels on behalf of its own large agriculture population. It also saw in the trade round an opportunity to assert effective leadership of the developing countries on an issue of great political salience.

India's objective in the Doha Round was quite different from those of the United States: to gain better access to developed country market for its products that faced peak tariffs, such as textiles and to liberalize movement of people, without giving up key protection for its own market. On agriculture India's approach was mainly defensive. It had few exports that would be directly affected by the outcome of agriculture trade talks. Its largest agriculture commodity export is cotton. Which accounted for about \$4 billion or 3% of total export in 2007. The key issues were food security and the all important farm vote that accounts for more than half of India's electorate India defended its rights to restrict access to its market even for agriculture products it does not produce. It would be almost impossible for any Indian leader to move away from the traditional approach to agriculture trade, and the Doha Round did appear to offer sufficient benefits on India's other key issues for the government to take that risk.

The political of multilateral trade, as perceived in India, made this issue harder to resolve. Especially at the WTO, economic issues become political statements. India's commitment to strategic autonomy means that India politicians find it useful to show that they have resisted American pressure. In this case the commerce minister who led the negotiations, Kamal Nath, reaped the domestic political benefit of showing that they had been leading the developing countries.

Both the intellectual property dispute and the disagreement over agricultural trade and the Doha Round have their roots in the India government's long-standing "export pessimism" India recognize that services export are one of its biggest success, and it is gradually coming to see expanded trade as an opportunity with respect to knowledge intensive manufactured goods. Other manufactures and agriculture trade however are not yet viewed in that light. India's industrialists have not yet entered domestic debate on agriculture policy, unlike in the United States for example where representatives of export-oriented industries argue against restrictive policies on the grounds that these cut off opportunities for new export. The changing structure of India's economy will eventually help shift the official attitude from its current defensive stance. But this process and the policies that go with it, will lag behind the objective indicators, and multilateral trade is likely to remain a thorny issue for the United States and India.

Services IT related investments and telecommunications together accounted for the lion's share of incoming investment 38% of FDI in India in 2007/2008. Manufacturing and petroleum related investment have been increasing. The liberalization of ceilings on foreign investment in sectors such as insurance and banking has made it easier for foreign companies to invest in these industries. The Indian government relaxed restrictions in several sectors including sectors, including civil aviation, construction, and petroleum and natural gas.

The United States is also the main destination for India's increased investment overseas. Several of India's blue-chip companies including Tata Motors, Infosys and Wipro, are today listed on stock exchange in the United States. The investment surge by Indian companies started in the IT sector but has spread to industry as diverse as pharmaceutical and auto parts. Some Indian companies are significant employers in the United States. Tata for example initially came to the United States in 1945 as a steel company, and now has 16000 employees representing 16 Tata Group companies in 80 locations across the country.

As with trade investment has also generated disagreements that have had to be resolved at the government level. The issue of investment access to industries traditionally restricted

in India illustrates both the difficulties and be the change that have place on the Indian scene.

India history limited a number of major sectors of the economy either to the public sector or to domestic investor, with FDI either banned or restricted. The United States made liberalized investment into a major campaign. Two of the lead sector of this campaign were life insurance, long limited to one public sector provider, and retail trade, traditional restricted to small business in both case foreign companies sought to enter a market where even domestic participation was restricted.

The driving force for both issues was the interest of the major U.S. companies, including New York Life and the American International Group in the insurance industry and Wal-Mart among retailers. In both cases. India changed its policy, but less completely and more slowly than had been hoped.


With retail the issue was the impact of foreign retail giants on India's small outlets. The Indian government moved ahead in stages in 2006 by permitting foreign to enter the retail sector only for stores that sold a single brand, in which they were permitted to own up to 51 percent. Large Indian corporation have been out in front of their foreign competitors in the efforts to open up retails. This follows the classic pattern followed by the Indian government when it wants to change the system: rather than abolish regulation that have been in place for decades, it may be pick out a specialized segment of the market and allow new players to enter it. In telecommunications and air travels, the result was a market revolution in fairly short order. The political of retail are more complicated, so the market will be slower to transform. Wal-Mart, one of the first to urge the opening of the retail market, got no benefit from early liberalization measure. Their presences in India remain focused on buying, and it hopes for future breakthrough on retail market.

Americans are accustomed to this kind of hybrid group, but it is a new experience for India. Economic relationship with India's other major partners tend to be more government-oriented. With China for example it is routine for official visit to conclude with a promise to double the value of trade within a set number of years and even with Japan, the focus is more on government encouragement for economic relations and on

official financing for major projects. The more private orientation of economic ties with the United States is one of the strengths of the U.S. connection. As long as trade and investment continue to move forward on their own momentum, some of that momentum will extend to official as well.

India's Confidence in Obama Rises

How much confidence do you have in President Obama to do the right thing regarding world affairs?



Source: Spring 2015 Global Attitudes survey.

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

Defining Interests:

In the course of meetings between Presidents Clinton, Bush, and Obama and prime ministers Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Manmohan Singh, the United States and India have developed a framework for their burgeoning relationship. This agenda is now structured in the U.S.–India Strategic Dialogue. The present essay analyzes the two states' interests in several of the most important areas of their engagement, taking the liberty to conceptualize the issues a bit more broadly than they are in the bureaucratic categories of the Strategic Dialogue:

1. Democracy and values
2. Vital issues of global governance
3. Nuclear cooperation and nonproliferation Democracy

American policy makers ritualistically incant that India is the world's largest democracy and is therefore the natural partner of the greatest democracy, the United States. Democracy clearly is one of India's outstanding features. Its maintenance by a population of 1.1 billion people who speak hundreds of languages, practice six established religions, and live on per capita GDP of \$1,122 marks one of humankind's greatest achievements. India is simply an amazing place and polity.

Yet, while India's democratic character is intrinsically of tremendous value, it serves little instrumental purpose for U.S. interests. The United States traditionally proselytizes democracy around the world and would very much welcome the credibility that Indian leaders could give it in developing countries if they teamed up. But Indian leaders do not try to convert others to democracy. Promoting democracy is too redolent of the missionary colonialism that Indians still culturally resist, and it is anathema to the state sovereignty that India still prioritizes. India's admirable long-term struggle to perfect its own democracy is the most important contribution it can make to the larger cause of democracy promotion around the world. Washington should not disappoint itself by trying to enlist India in larger American projects to reform the world.

In fact, the best way for the United States and India to advance their relationship and strengthen their shared influence on the world would be to perfect their own unions, to paraphrase the U.S. Constitution. India's democratic structure provides the means for citizens to organize in parties and NGOs to advance their interests and aspirations for justice. This political liberty is inherently valuable and also instrumentally useful as a pressure-relief valve. India's legal system also has much to recommend it. Nevertheless, India's size, diversity, and backwardness continue to be overwhelming. Governance and the administration of justice remain spotty. Major examples of problems abound: the Naxalite insurgency in one-third of Indian districts, a surging intifada in the Kashmir Valley, communal violence such as in the Gujarat pogrom of 2002, caste discrimination

and violence, and urban near-lawlessness such as one finds in Mumbai. The marvel is that India has not discarded democracy to meet these challenges.

The contradictions between India's realities and its ideals mark the gap between its current power and its potential. India must mobilize its own citizenry to build social and physical infrastructure, provide widespread access to health care and education, and secure its own territory before it can ever hope to move others by example. These are core governmental functions, whatever the nature of the state. The virtue of being a democracy does not compensate for the pain and lost opportunities of failing to improve these functions. "China remains better organized and more efficiently governed than India," Robert Kaplan writes, "despite China's lack of democracy."

When India most dramatically falls short in democratic justice—for example, in protecting the human rights of Muslims in the Kashmir Valley, or in responding to the Gujarat pogrom—it is not clear what the United States should do. When such atrocities occur in adversary countries, U.S. officials condemn them with varying degrees of intensity. In friendly states such as India, quietude is common and understandable. In the case of India, as distinct from, say, contemporary Iran, democracy and a robust NGO community offer internal means to investigate, expose, and punish wrongdoers. The Indian polity, like that of the United States, would reject vocal public denunciations of their government by a foreign state that is guilty of its own transgressions. But there should be room for friendly American peers, be they NGOs or officials, to applaud the existence of democracy and rule of law in India and to state that its influence will wax and wane to the degree that India addresses politically related injustice. India should know that the United States would say "yes" to requests for expertise and for technical and financial resources to help India improve its administration of justice and internal security.

Less controversial would be American encouragement of India to make its unique forms of "soft power" more available to others. As Itty Abraham has emphasized, India possesses a unique ability to run railways, manage huge crowds, provide short-term humanitarian relief, and conduct safe and fair elections. Such governance skills are much needed around the world. Indians have created thousands of effective nongovernmental

organizations that can be a model for other developing countries seeking to address the core problems of human well-being. India could be encouraged to create an analogue to the U.S. Peace Corps to facilitate India's talented youth to transfer their skills in alternative technologies, literacy, and mass communications to less advanced states.

As the predominant military power in the world, the United States perhaps naturally encourages Indian accretion of military muscle (and U.S. defense imports). The Indian national security establishment, long dismissed as presiding over a "soft" state, welcomes growing respect as a "hard" power. But it would be an ironic form of mental colonialism for India and the United States to collude in undervaluing India's unique, indigenous attributes. As Abraham writes, "The tremendous impact of soft power in shaping how we all live, especially as the world becomes more globalised, carries the message and promise of India in ways that a traditional foreign policy built around force and finance can only dream of doing."

In sum, India and the United States share the virtue of being democracies, but this may be more its own reward than a source of abiding friendship or useful cooperation. India and the United States are both too imperfect to get away with telling themselves or even other states how to govern. The more that leaders and pundits focus on living up to their own country's principles and leading by example, the more powerful each country will become and the stronger the bonds between them will be.

Development and Poverty Reduction:

India's greatest national challenge is to "to turn the historic economic gains of the last twenty years into inclusive growth that lifts millions more out of poverty, that revitalizes rural India, and that creates a future of possibility for more and more Indians." These eloquent words were spoken by U.S. Under Secretary of State William Burns, but they effectively paraphrase the repeated statements of Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. Success in political-economic development will determine whether India is strong or weak, secure or vulnerable, an influence of global trends or influenced by them.

There is no reason to think that India's rise will occur differently, or that intentional policies by the United States would provide a major lift. India's domestic politics and

policies will enable or retard its economic progress. India needs all kinds of infrastructure; American actors will eagerly provide the technology and know-how that will help build it if India adopts the policies that invite this participation. There is not much for the U.S. government to do here. As the New York Times recently reported, India's quest to build roads, bridges, and electricity stations and grids to sustain its modernization is impeded by a severe shortage of competent civil engineers. Building such infrastructure has been one of China's signal accomplishments. According to Robert Kaplan, "China adds more miles of highway per year than India has in total." It is reasonable to imagine India could learn from China in this domain.

Various aspects of India's democratic political system may comparatively complicate and slow its progress. It will be up to Indian leaders to determine whether and how the United States and other outside actors—governmental and private—can speed their progress.

Nuclear Cooperation and Non proliferation:

Strategies toward China, India, and Pakistan intersect in the field of nuclear nonproliferation, which also bears on economic development and climate change. The single most important policy change in this area was the Bush administration's initiative to exempt India from global Nonproliferation rules that had prevented the United States and other states from doing nuclear commerce with it. Indian officials have for decades insisted that Washington must lift nuclear cooperation restrictions if it wishes to transform relations with India. The Bush administration acceded to this demand in 2005 and subsequently lobbied the U.S. Congress, the 45-nation Nuclear Suppliers Group, and the International Atomic Energy Agency to follow suit. As a result, Russia, France, and other countries are now doing nuclear business with India. American firms had been kept on the sidelines awaiting the balky Indian Parliament's passage of legislation limiting liability for nuclear accidents, without which U.S. companies cannot risk building nuclear power plants in India. A bill was finally pushed through Parliament on August 30 to create a more propitious climate for President Obama's visit, but its terms fall short of the benchmark international liability conventions. American companies, unlike those whose home governments will insure them, are still unable to risk building in India.

The nuclear deal provided benefits to India and potentially to foreign exporters of nuclear power plants, but on balance it has harmed the nuclear nonproliferation regime and the United States' credibility as its leader. The nuclear deal exemplifies the liabilities of a strategy to privilege India in policy domains that lie at the core of global governance. The latter are too important to sacrifice for the purpose of satisfying India when its positions are at variance with the legitimate interests of the broader international system.

Advocates of the deal—from President Bush to congressional Republicans and Democrats claimed it would strengthen nonproliferation. India would have to designate each of its nuclear power plants and other facilities as either military or civilian and put civilian facilities under IAEA safeguards. However, India designated only 14 of 22 power plants as civilian and put its plutonium Fast Breeder Reactor program in the military category. India thereby added vastly to

the potential stock of plutonium that it could separate from spent fuel and use for weapons, even if it is unlikely to do so. India's electricity-producing plants and breeder program had previously been perceived as civilian. India also promised to adopt tight nonproliferation controls on nuclear exports. Yet the legally binding UN Security Council Resolution 1540 already obligated India and all other states to implement strong export controls.

The nuclear deal did not obligate India to sign the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty or put a moratorium on further production of fissile materials for weapons. These are two key measures of commitment to the global nuclear nonproliferation and arms control agenda favored by the vast majority of states. This position stemmed from the Bush administration's "antipathy to nuclear arms control," in Ashley Tellis's words, and its desire, shared by New Delhi, to see India expand its capacity to balance China's nuclear weapon capabilities.

Devaluation of America's currency as leader of the rule-based nonproliferation system has had U.N welcome consequences. Brazil had been on the verge of agreeing to accept stronger IAEA safeguards on its nuclear program under the so-called Additional Protocol, but it later refused, expressing its anger that the United States was rewarding a state that

had acquired nuclear weapons. Other developing countries and China became more reluctant to join the United States in sanctioning Iran for its noncompliance with nonproliferation rules, citing the India deal as evidence of a double standard.

The U.S. move to privilege India's nuclear program and balance China deepened Pakistan's determination to resist negotiations to ban further production of fissile materials for military purposes. China, which could have used the Nuclear Suppliers Group's (NSG) consensus decision-making process to block the India deal, is now less susceptible to international pressure to refrain from similar cooperation with Pakistan. The United States and others in the NSG think nuclear cooperation with Pakistan is premature given Pakistan's past proliferation activities, its fiscal and security crises, and the corruption and inefficiency of its energy pricing and regulation practices. The NSG is a voluntary arrangement, so China could choose to cooperate with Pakistan without NSG approval. From an international security perspective, it would be better if China sought NSG permission, much as India did. But if Beijing knew that the United States and others would block it despite China's reluctant acceptance of the U.S.–India deal, it would have little incentive to uphold the NSG's standing. A better alternative would be to work with China, Pakistan, and other NSG members to identify criteria that Pakistan could meet over time to warrant approval of nuclear cooperation with it. Such an approach would ameliorate some of the damage done by the original deal with India.

Especially damaging is the permission that Washington granted to India to reprocess spent-fuel derived from fuel and reactors supplied by the United States and other foreign partners of India. The United States, including even the Bush administration, has long led international efforts to prevent additional states from enriching uranium and separating plutonium. By exempting India from this policy, the United States has emboldened non-nuclear-weapon states such as Egypt, Jordan, Turkey, South Korea, and Vietnam to resist rules that would restrict their options to engage in enrichment and reprocessing. These capabilities are not necessary at the national level to fuel nuclear power plants, but they are vital to producing nuclear weapons. Turkey, motivated in part by its sense that the United States, France, and Russia have double standards in enforcing rules on nuclear trade and nonproliferation, is holding up efforts by the NSG to establish criteria for

limiting trade in enrichment and reprocessing capabilities. South Korea is lobbying hard to persuade Washington to renegotiate its nuclear cooperation agreement to allow it to develop reprocessing and enrichment techniques. Seoul argues that its stalwart alliance with the United States makes it at least as worthy as India to receive this approval.

The involvement of foreign nuclear technology providers may help raise the competence and efficiency of India's indigenous nuclear sector, and it may help win much-needed authority for India's Atomic Energy Regulatory Board, which is charged with ensuring the safety of India's civilian nuclear complex but has always been under the thumb of the Department of Atomic Energy's leadership. Yet these marginal gains are small compared with the loss of confidence in the global nonproliferation regime and America's leadership of it. Moreover, if U.S. cheerleading for the Indian nuclear program obscures the need to strengthen truly independent oversight of safety in the Indian nuclear establishment, a future accident would harm not only India and America's reputation; it would also imperil the global nuclear industry's prospects for growth.

Meanwhile, in Washington the deal raised expectations that India now would move to accommodate U.S. interests, for example, in sanctioning Iran for its illicit nuclear activities. But India has refused to cooperate with recently passed congressional sanctions to block exports of refined petroleum products to Iran and investment in Iran's energy sector. In effect India is daring the United States to apply extraterritorial sanctions on its companies. Whether or not the congressionally driven extraterritorial sanctions are wise or effective, pressuring Iran to comply with IAEA and UN Security Council demands is one of America's highest international security priorities. The much-vaunted nuclear deal did not win India's cooperation on this issue, but instead emboldened Iran and made other states less inclined to support the United States in isolating Iran. The deal provides an object lesson in the pitfalls of distorting the rule-based elements of the international system to privilege a friend.

The bilateral civil nuclear cooperation agreement was finalized in July 2007 and signed in October 2008. During Prime Minister Modi's visit to the US in September 2014, the two sides set up a Contact Group for advancing the full and timely implementation of the India-US Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, and to resolve pending issues. The

Group has held five meetings so far, and reached agreement on the compatibility of India's nuclear liability law with relevant international conventions and creation of an insurance pool drawing experience of best practices to take care of nuclear liability risk. Currently, company-level discussions are on with two U.S. companies --- M/s Westinghouse and GE Hitachi --- regarding techno-commercial viability of their reactors in sites in Gujarat and Andhra Pradesh respectively.

Environment:

Climate change is perhaps the most globally important environmental threat to economic development and security. To the extent that volatile, extreme weather reduces agricultural productivity and increases migration pressures, India could be especially susceptible to its effects. The August floods in Pakistan are an overwhelming example of the sorts of effects climate change models predict.

Indian representatives correctly note that the rich countries led by the United States are responsible for most of the carbon now in the atmosphere. It follows, Indians say, that this rich minority should bear the bulk of the burden of reducing rates of emissions and abating the effects. Indian officials also point toward their low emissions per capita as another reason they should be exempt from pressure. In 2007 India produced only 1.38 tons of carbon dioxide per capita, compared with 18.91 tons per capita from the United States.

However, to the extent that India's economy will grow, its 1 billion-plus citizens will emit more and more carbon into the atmosphere. Thus, India is simultaneously a potential major "victim" of the effects of climate change caused largely by others and a potential major exacerbate of the problem.

The United States is looking to reach a global agreement on binding emissions targets where developing countries such as India are tied to specific requirements on emissions with strong measurement, review, and verification (MRV) protocols to ensure compliance .India is

looking toward increasing energy efficiency per unit of GDP and, at the recent Copenhagen conference, it articulated a nonbinding ambition to cut domestic emissions intensity 20 to 25 percent by 2020, excluding agriculture. Although India has been open to some discussion of MRV, it believes that developed countries must be subject to similar verification of their targets, and that equity between developed and developing powers is key. India understandably cares deeply about ensuring that any movement toward cutting emissions does not unduly harm its economic growth and potential. The United States is more focused on wringing concessions from developing countries both to pursue a policy of reducing carbon emissions globally and to aid in the passage of domestic climate change legislation by reducing the perceived competitive disadvantage that might result.

Critics of the Obama administration's policy toward India do not engage the particulars of the climate change issue. Rather, they argue it should not be given the importance that Obama has given it, notwithstanding the object lesson of the floods in nearby Pakistan. Mohan, for example, derides "henpecking about global warming" as an example of Obama's losing "sight of the strategic possibilities that are at hand with India." It would be better, such critics argue, to focus on defense cooperation to balance China. This is another example of the atavism of these critics' trilateral balance-of-power focus.

India and the US are advancing cooperation and dialogue on climate change through a high-level Climate Change Working Group and a Joint Working Group on Hydrofluorocarbon. In November 2014, an MOU between US EXIM Bank and Indian Renewable Energy Development Agency (IREDA) was concluded to provide US\$ 1 billion in financing for India's transition to a low-carbon economy. A new U.S.-India Partnership for Climate Resilience has been agreed to, in order to advance capacity for climate adaptation planning, as also a new U.S.-India Climate Fellowship Program to build long-term capacity to address climate change-related issue

The Current Situation in India

Starting in 1991, leaders in New Delhi -- including Manmohan Singh, then India's finance minister and now its prime minister -- pursued policies of economic liberalization

that opened the country to foreign investment and yielded rapid growth. India is now an important economic power, on track (according to Goldman Sachs and others) to become a top-five global economy by 2030. It is a player in global economic decisions as part of both the G-20 and the G-8 + 5 (the G-8 plus the five leading emerging economies) and may ultimately attain a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. India's trajectory has diverged sharply from that of Pakistan. With economic growth, India acquired the capacity to act on issues of primary strategic and economic concern to the United States. The United States, in turn, has developed a growing stake in continued Indian reform and success -- especially as they contribute to global growth, promote market-based economic policies, help secure the global commons, and maintain a mutually favorable balance of power in Asia. For its part, New Delhi seeks a United States that will help facilitate India's rise as a major power (Feigenbaum)"

In addition to being one of the world's largest and fastest growing economies, India is also obviously one of the world's most populous nations, ranking 2nd, behind only China, with over 1.1 billion people. The population of the "world's most populous democracy" is expected to overtake that of China by 2050 (The Hindu)." As a result, India has many population-related problems, as well as others that are a result of the political and economic transitions the country has undergone since 1947. To wit:

"India has been in the midst of major and rapid economic expansion. Many U.S. business interests view India as a lucrative market and candidate for foreign investment. The United States supports India's efforts to transform its once quasisocialist economy through fiscal reform and market opening. Since 1991, India has taken major steps in this direction and coalition governments have kept the country on a general path of reform, yet there is U.S. concern that such movement is slow and inconsistent. India is the world's fourth-largest emitter of greenhouse gases. Congress also continues to have concerns about abuses of human rights, including caste- and gender-based discrimination, and religious freedoms in India. Moreover, the spread of HIV/AIDS in India has been identified as a serious development (Kronstadt)"

Although India is the most stable country in South Asia, events in less stable neighboring countries threaten to occupy its attention and derail its aspirations: Pakistan is confronting

institutional weakness and growing extremism; Nepal may fail as its elites jockey for power and struggle to integrate former Maoist insurgents into the political mainstream; Sri Lanka is struggling with ethnic and constitutional challenges; and Bangladesh and Myanmar (also known as Burma) are yielding unwelcome exports, such as economic migrants, refugees, and extremists. India's relationship with Pakistan is particularly worrying, as it has deteriorated significantly in recent years, and the two nuclear nations have a history of bitter relations and conflicts. Relations were further soured by the terrorist attacks on Mumbai in November 2008, which were carried out by Pakistani nationals and possibly planned by elements of the Pakistani military and intelligence services (Feigenbaum). Despite these issues, the United States is relying more and more on India to become a strategic partner, one that can be a long-run force for stability in Afghanistan, as well as a counterweight to China's growing influence in world affairs.

India's Emerging Global Role: Opportunities – and Friction

India's policy with respect to global governance is not likely to change much. It will pay considerable deference to the United Nations – except when India's specific interests are engaged (e.g. Kashmir). India will be active in the G-20, especially on financial issues. It is likely to join the U.N. Security Council (UNSC) in a non-permanent seat in January 2011. After this term ends, it will continue to try to enhance its leadership role, including seeking a permanent UNSC seat. Each step up the leadership ladder will bring some level of anxiety about the price India will pay for offending its international friends by taking a stand on international issues. India will become more comfortable with this exposure, but for much if not all of the next decade, this ambivalence will exert a drag on India's willingness to work with the United States on the global stage. A final area of continuity lies in India's foreign policy philosophy. The concept of “strategic autonomy” – the idea that India must not allow any other country excessive influence over its foreign policy, and that it seeks a global role balancing major power centers – will remain a matter of strong consensus among India's political and policy elites. Even those most committed to international economic integration and to partnership with the United States are also strongly attached to Indian exceptionalism. Examples of the latter include both broad policy issues (such as India's interests in Iran) and India's discomfort with defense sales

provisions that the United States considers routine procedural matters (e.g. the question of end-use monitoring of military purchases). This means that there will continue to be a prickly quality to U.S.-India relations beyond the bilateral realm.

Foreign assistance/aid:

¹³The United States acts to advance U.S. foreign policy and national security goals and respond to global development and humanitarian needs through its foreign assistance programs. Following the September 2001 terrorist attacks, foreign aid gained importance as a “vital cornerstone,” along with diplomacy and defense, in U.S. national security strategy. The Bush Administration reoriented foreign assistance programs, particularly to “front line” states in the war on terrorism. For many countries, the U.S. government directed not only increased security and military assistance but also development aid for counterterrorism efforts, including programs aimed at mitigating conditions that may make radical ideologies and religious extremism attractive, such as cycles of violence, poverty, limited educational opportunities, and ineffective or unaccountable governance. In 2007, the Bush Administration restructured U.S. foreign aid programs to better serve the goal of transformational development, which places greater emphasis on U.S. security and democracy building as the principal goals of foreign aid. Toward these ends, the new Strategic Framework for U.S. Foreign Assistance divides aid programming among five objectives: peace and security; governing justly and democratically; investing in people; economic growth; and humanitarian assistance. The Millennium Challenge Account (MCA), established in 2004, promotes these objectives by rewarding countries that demonstrate good governance, investment in health and education, and sound economic policies."

: "Key U.S. foreign aid objectives in South Asia include combating terrorism, developing bilateral military ties, and reducing the social and economic sources of political instability and extremist religious and political thinking. These causes include lack of accountable governance, inter-ethnic conflict, poverty, disease, and illiteracy. Prior to

¹³ Thomas Lum, specialist in Asian Affairs, Congressional Research Service, October 8, 2008 (U.S. Foreign Aid to East and South Asia: Selected Recipients, CRS Report RL31362):

September 2001, South Asia was the smallest regional recipient of U.S. non-food assistance. Since the war on terrorism began counterterrorism and related funding for South Asia, especially Afghanistan and Pakistan have made the region a relatively large recipient of humanitarian, development, and economic assistance and the second-largest beneficiary of military assistance after the Middle East¹⁴."

: "The United States significantly increased bilateral aid to India in FY2002 10 and FY2003, largely as part of its counterterrorism efforts in the region. The current aid program aims to further Indian economic development in order to enhance the country's rise as "an influential U.S. partner in the international system." Furthermore, U.S. assistance serves the poorest segments of the population in order to mitigate economic and social conditions that may give rise to political extremism. For FY2008, the largest portion of U.S. assistance to India funds public health and HIV/AIDS care, treatment, and prevention. Security and military assistance supports programs related to military professionalism, counterterrorism, counternarcotics, and border security. Economic Support Funds are to promote the private agricultural sector."¹⁵

Export Restrictions/Controls:

"After many months of pressing its case with the Obama administration, the Government of India can finally hope to get some good news regarding export control restrictions imposed by the United States on sensitive, dual-use items of high-tech trade and on legitimate government institutions such as the Indian Space Research Organization. "I expect that there will be some positive announcements to be made before the President's visit — hopefully well before [that]," said Robert Blake, Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asia, addressing media here close on the heels of the U.S.- India Strategic Dialogue. His comments also follow statements made by Nirupama Rao, India's Foreign Secretary, who said after the close of the Strategic Dialogue that an important element with regard to ongoing U.S.-India partnerships in defense modernization would

¹⁴Thomas Lum, specialist in Asian Affairs, Congressional Research Service, October 8, 2008 (U.S. Foreign Aid to East and South Asia: Selected Recipients, CRS Report RL31362)

¹⁵Thomas Lum, specialist in Asian Affairs, Congressional Research Service, October 8, 2008 (U.S. Foreign Aid to East and South Asia: Selected Recipients, CRS Report RL31362)

be “progress on the easing of U.S. export control restrictions as they apply to India.” Ms. Rao noted that this would not only be a logical outcome of the civil nuclear initiative, but would also be a catalyst for promoting trading and cooperation in high technology, defense and the space sectors.¹⁶

"Washington restricts the export of a variety of technology and equipment out of fear that the goods could be used against the United States, particularly if they are obtained by third parties. The Obama administration last year launched a wide-ranging review to modernize export controls, which critics say have become so cumbersome that they have impeded US relationships with allies. Robert Blake, the assistant secretary of state for South Asia, said earlier this month that the administration would likely "split off" its work and conduct a separate review just on controls for India. Blake said that the United States has been steadily reducing restrictions to India and now only imposes controls on fewer than 0.5 percent of exports to the emerging economy.¹⁷"

Criteria for Resolutions:

Timeliness:

US foreign policy towards India is a very timely issue. India is the most populous democracy in the world, with a growing economy, and growing importance in international commerce and as a regional and world power. Over the next few decades, India can affect the world's balance of power by becoming more aligned with the United States, or with China. Many lines of communication and cooperation have recently been opened with India, but further progress requires immediate action.

Scope:

US relations with India touch on a broad range of issues, including nonproliferation, climate change, economic development, human rights, global health, and conflicts in

¹⁶ Radio Netherlands Worldwide, June 24, 2010 (retrieved from <http://www.rnw.nl/english/bulletin/indiaurges-us-ease-export-controls>):

¹⁷ Narayan Lakshman, staff writer, The Hindu, June 9, 2010 (retrieved from <http://www.hinduonnet.com/thehindu/2010/06/09/stories/2010060961551200.htm>):

South Asia and greater Asia. US policies may also have an effect on US alliances, globalization and on domestic issues such as the economy and the federal budget.

Range:

India is a very good topic for both novice and varsity debaters. The issues involved are interesting without being incomprehensible for young debaters, and the literature is deep enough to satisfy varsity debaters.

Quality:

Given the sophisticated nature of the issues involved, especially the effect of increasing US assistance to a non-signatory of the NPT, high quality debates will take place on this topic.

Material:

Research material is plentiful and easily available. While debaters will need access to foreign policy journals, the accessibility of the material shouldn't pose any challenges different from those involved in debating any other foreign policy topic. Think tanks and individual authors have published a great deal of material on US-Indian relations, which have also been the subject of Congressional hearings and debate.

Interest:

India is a major foreign policy issue, and these generally grab student interest. Given the range of issues affected by US-Indian relations, and the wide variety of possible policy approaches, it should be possible to maintain student interest over the course of the entire competitive year.

Balance:

Depending on the topic wording eventually selected, Affirmatives will have a range of policy options and potential advantages to defend. Negatives will be able to debate the solvency of any of the potential policies, and will have disadvantages both to specific actions as well as to upsetting the contentious relations between India and Pakistan, as

well as bringing about potential conflicts with China. Critical ground will certainly be present, as will negative counterplan options.

U.S.-India Bilateral Issues:

1. U.S.-India Economic and Trade Relations:

As one of India's leading trade and investment partners, the United States strongly supports New Delhi's continuing economic reform policies. A U.S.-India Trade Policy Forum was created in 2005 to expand bilateral economic engagement and provide a venue for discussing multilateral trade issues. According to U.S. trade statistics, U.S. exports to India in 2009 totaled \$16.46 billion and imports from India totaled \$21.18 billion, for a bilateral trade deficit of \$4.71 billion.²¹⁵ With a total trade of \$37.64 billion, India was the 14th largest trading partner for the United States in 2009.¹⁸

The leading U.S. exports to India in 2009 were (in order): Natural or cultured pearls, precious or semi-precious stones, precious metals, metals clad with precious metal and articles thereof and imitation jewelry (chapter 71)—\$2.339 billion; nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery, and mechanical appliances, or parts thereof (chapter 84)—\$ 2.325 billion; and aircraft, spacecraft, and parts thereof (chapter 88)—\$2.254 billion. The top imports from India were (in order): Natural or cultured pearls, precious or semi-precious stones, precious metals, metals clad with precious metal and articles thereof and imitation jewelry (chapter 71)—\$4.558 billion; pharmaceutical products (chapter 30)—\$1.660 billion; and articles of apparel and clothing accessories, not knitted or crocheted (chapter 62)—\$1.649 billion. The cross-trade in items under chapter 71 reflects a strong interrelationship for the industries in both nations. India is a major global¹⁹

supplier of precious gems and stones, whereas the United States is a major supplier of finished jewelry.²¹⁶ In addition to their merchandise trade flows, India and the United States have significant service trade relations. In 2008 (latest available figures)²⁰, U.S.

¹⁸ Trade statistics from the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC).

¹⁹ Data from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA)

²⁰²⁰ For more information on bilateral trade in jewelry, see CRS Report RL34161, *India-U.S. Economic and Trade Relations*, by Michael F. Martin and K. Alan Kronstadt.

private services exports to India totaled \$10.532 billion, and imports from India totaled \$12.123 billion.²¹⁷ Total bilateral trade in financial services in 2008 was \$755 million. Most of the services trade was in business, professional, and technical services, which include information technology²¹.

Annual inward foreign direct investment (FDI) to India from all countries rose from about \$100 million in FY1990/91 to nearly \$3 billion in FY2000/01 and \$27 billion in FY2008/09. According to the Indian Ministry of Commerce and Industry, about 7.5% of FDI in India since 2000 has come from U.S. firms; in recent years, the major U.S.-based companies Microsoft, Dell, Oracle, and IBM have made multi-billion-dollar investments in India. The stock of U.S. FDI in India currently stands at about \$9 billion²².

2. U.S.-India Economic Issues:

While bilateral relations are generally good, there are a number of economic and trade issues between India and the United States of varying degrees of importance. For the United States, the more pressing issues are intellectual property rights protection, trade in dual-use technology, access to selective Indian markets, and India's participation in the U.S. Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) program. For India, the key issues are negotiations of a bilateral investment treaty (BIT), U.S. restrictions on the trade in services (including the limited supply of H1-B visas), high-technology export controls, and the U.S. farm subsidy program. In July 2010, Indian Commerce Minister Anand Sharma protested the legislation in a letter to the U.S. Trade Representative Ron Kirk, saying it could cost Indian firms an extra \$200 million per year in visa fees. New Delhi called the bill "discriminatory" because its primary impact would be on Indian firms. While in Washington, DC, for a September 2010 round of bilateral Trade Policy Forum talks, Sharma expressed to the USTR India's further concerns about "the trade restrictive and protectionist policies adopted by the United States in recent times."

²¹ http://www.dipp.nic.in/fdi_statistics/india_fdi_index.htm.

²² See the Ministry's Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion data at




SECTOR WISE CONTRIBUTION IN GDP

SECTORAL COMPOSITION
OF GDP (2012)

AGRICULTURAL

INDUSTRIAL

SERVICE



Trade in Dual-Use Technology²³

The year 2003 saw the inaugural session of the U.S.-India High-Technology Cooperation Group (HTCG), a forum in which officials can discuss a wide range of issues relevant to creating the conditions for more robust bilateral high technology commerce. The seventh HTCG meeting was held in Washington, DC, in March 2010. In 2007, India and the United States concluded a bilateral 123 Agreement on civil nuclear cooperation. While the accord addressed many concerns about India's nuclear program and trade in dual-use technology, there remain concerns in the United States about India's ability to prevent the distribution of potentially dangerous technology and equipment to undesirable recipients. Also in 2007, the United States developed a validated end-users (VEU) program that permits designated Indian companies expedited review of their applications to trade in dual-use or restricted technology. India had commented on the slow implementation of this program, pointing out that the first Indian company was accepted by the VEU program in June 2009, two years after the program was created.

²³ "India Protests 'Discriminatory' U.S. Border Bill," Reuters, August 10, 2010; Sharma quote at <http://www.indianembassy.org/prdetail1582/indo-us-trade-policy-forum-discusses-trade-and-investment-relations>.

Since 1998, a number of Indian entities have been subjected to case-by-case licensing requirements and appear on the U.S. export control “Entity List” of foreign end users involved in weapons proliferation activities. In 2004, as part of NSSP implementation, the United States modified some export licensing policies and removed the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) headquarters from the Entity List. Further adjustments came in 2005 when six more subordinate entities were removed. Indian entities remaining on the Entity List are four subordinates of the ISRO, four subordinates of the Defense Research and Development Organization, three Department of Atomic Energy entities, and Bharat Dynamics Limited, a missile production agency²⁴.

The Future of U.S.-Indian Bilateral Relations:

The Bush Administration took a number of steps to bring about greater cooperation between the United States and India, as Alan Kronstadt described for the Congressional Research Service:

The now-concluded Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP) initiative of the Bush Administration encompassed several major issues in U.S.-India relations. New Delhi has long pressed Washington to ease restrictions on the export to India of dual-use high-technology goods (those with military applications), as well as to increase civilian nuclear and civilian space cooperation. These three key issues came to be known as the “trinity,” and top Indian officials insisted that progress in these areas was necessary to provide tangible evidence of a changed U.S.-India relationship. There were later references to a “quartet” when the issue of missile defense was included. In January 2004, President Bush and Prime Minister Vajpayee issued a joint statement declaring that the U.S.-India “strategic partnership” included expanding cooperation in the “trinity” areas, as well as expanding dialogue on missile defense. This initiative was dubbed as the NSSP and involved a series of reciprocal steps. In July 2005, the State Department announced successful completion of the NSSP, allowing for expanded bilateral commercial satellite cooperation, and removal/revision of some U.S. export license requirements for certain dual-use and civil nuclear items. Taken together, the July 2005

²⁴ <http://www.iipa.com/rbc/2010/2010SPEC301INDIA.pdf>.

U.S.-India Joint Statement and a June 2005 U.S.-India Defense Framework Agreement include provisions for moving forward in all four NSSP issue-areas.”

In fact, in the CRS report, Kronstadt lists and describes a menu consisting of potential actions in several different policy areas:

1. “The Trinity” Issues
2. Civil Nuclear Cooperation
3. Civil Space Cooperation
4. High-Technology Trade
5. Security Issues
6. U.S.-India Security Cooperation
7. Nuclear Weapons and Missile Proliferation
8. U.S. Nonproliferation Efforts and Congressional Action
9. India’s Economy and U.S. Interests
10. Trade and Investment
11. Special Economic Zones (SEZs)
12. Multilateral Trade Negotiations
13. The Energy Sector and Climate Change

Regional Issues

1. The Kashmir Issue
2. The Northeast
3. Maoist Insurgency
4. Communal Tensions and Conflict
5. Human Rights Issues
6. Human Trafficking Religious
7. Freedom Caste-Based Discrimination
8. Female Infanticide and Feticide
9. HIV/AIDS
10. U.S. Assistance
11. Economic
12. Security

Many of these areas will have to be dealt with by India, but the United States may be able to influence Indian actions through direct financial assistance, the application of political pressure, or the repeal or waiver of current restrictions on trade and cooperation, with the primary example of the latter being the Bush administration's civil nuclear deal. This policy, which continues to be endorsed and followed by President Obama, was controversial at the time of its announcement and remains so today. As Paul Kerr of the Congressional Research Service explained

“India’s status outside the nonproliferation regime raises possible concerns that the nuclear agreement could negatively affect nuclear nonproliferation efforts. Some considerations include cohesion within the NSG, effect on non-nuclear-weapon member states of the NPT, potential missed opportunities to strengthen the nuclear nonproliferation regime, and whether U.S. nuclear cooperation might in any way assist,

encourage, or induce India to manufacture nuclear weapons, in possible violation of our Article I obligation under the NPT.”

Among the recent proposals for U.S. action in some of the most important areas of concern for India are the following:

Reduce restrictions on India involving the civil nuclear agreements between the two countries.

- Promote cooperation between the US and India in the area of civilian space programs.
- Reduce, waive or eliminate restrictions on high technology transfer and commerce with India
- Increase arms sales to India, including reducing restrictions placed on India in receiving arms sales from the US.
- Increase counter terrorism cooperation with India; increase foreign assistance to India for the purpose of increasing its counterterrorism capability.
- Reach agreement with India on a bilateral trade treaty.
- Increase cooperation between the US and India in the area of renewable energy and greenhouse gas reduction.
- Express concern on behalf of the United States towards India's policies regarding the Kashmir, and poor human rights conditions in India.
- Increase foreign assistance to India for the purpose of reducing the spread of HIV/AIDs.
- Support and promote India's efforts to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council

While this list is certainly only the beginning of what could be considered as possible policy options regarding foreign policy towards India, it could serve as the starting point for a discussion of the various issues facing both nations. Given the rising importance of India to the US, now is a perfect time to have that discussion.

Drives of Indian and US policy

India's need for continued economic growth and energy security;

Its quest for a leading role in a nonthreatening world;

Its determination to be secure in its region, and to remain the primary arbiter of South Asian security: and Its commitment to international freedom of action, or strategic autonomy.

At least for the next decade, the first two goals depend on a strong relationship with the United States. On the third, the United States is currently seen as a reasonably positive factor except for differences over Pakistan and the fourth often manifests itself in opposition to the United states.

The United States will base its policy toward India on four different objectives;

The imperative of avoiding nuclear war in South Asia:

India's role in the larger Asian balance of power:

India's trade and investment potential; and

The impossibility of addressing some of tomorrow's global issues. Such as climate change and international finance, without a fully engaged and participating India.

India's Importance to U.S. Grand Strategy

There is a compelling U.S. vital interest in a full strategic partnership with India. This vital interest derives from several observations. The transition to a more multiapolar global order is occurring more rapidly and posing greater risks to U.S. interests than was earlier anticipated by many observers. The rising influence of new powers and the relative lessening of the United States' ability to achieve its international goals acting alone and developments now underway. The central geostrategic trend today and in the decades ahead is the tectonic shift of global economic gravity and geopolitical influence to the Asian region. Spurred by the rise of China, this trend, if not managed successfully, will eventually alter the global balance of power, influence and values in ways not favorable to American interests. While U.S. policy attention and resources are now

concentrated on the greater Middle East, the larger, longer-term challenge to U.S. global preeminence is centered in Asia. In the near term, the principal international threats to the United States are centered to India's west – the interrelated challenges of terrorism, nuclear proliferation, instability and conflict in the arc from North and East Africa through Pakistan. It will be increasingly difficult for the United States to sustain the kind of commitment it has made to counter these threats over the last decade. Even with sustained U.S. involvement, the entire region will remain volatile and dangerous for years, if not decades, to come.

India is a critically important long-term actor in the regions to its east and to its west, and has the potential to be a powerful partner of the United States in addressing challenges and opportunities in both arenas. India is a rising power but does not seek to alter the international system in ways fundamentally detrimental to continued overall U.S. global preeminence. Rather, it is a source of stability and strength on the South Asian end of the greater Middle Eastern arc of crisis and a critical player in the evolution of the Asian balance of power and values, both objectives critical to the preservation of U.S. influence. Given that the United States and India share the values of pluralism, liberalism and democracy, India's potential to be a major power and partner of the United States in Asia and globally will weigh heavily in forming the multicolor world order now taking shape.

Overall, U.S. and Indian security, political and economic interests have been converging since the end of the Cold War. These shared interests include peace and stability in South Asia, the defeat of regional and global terrorism, the normalization of relations in Asia as a whole and global economic growth. However, this trend of convergence and the trust it has engendered between the two countries are potentially wasting assets and must be reinforced and expanded if they are to be sustained. "Strategic pause" is not an option in U.S. policy toward India. Despite the progress of the last decade, the foundations of U.S.-India partnership are not yet broad enough (regional security interests being the key missing component) and firmly cemented enough by trust and habits of cooperation to surely withstand potential shocks.

Realizing the potential of the U.S.-India partnership will require resolving contradictions between some near-term U.S. interests and policies in the greater Middle East and in Asia and longer-term U.S. interests in India, as well as overcoming asymmetries in U.S. and Indian approaches and capabilities. It is important remember that the two “new” U.S.-India relationship is only a decade old and, measured against the usual pace of change in interstate relations, progress has been rapid. Most importantly, one of the major obstacles to improving the relationship, differences over India’s nuclear status, was removed by the civil nuclear agreement..

The Security Imperative:

The most important interests of the United States in its relationship with India lie in the security realm. At present the most pressing U.S. concerns are in South Asia itself – combating terrorism, preventing interstate conflict and enhancing stability. The longer-term but equally critical interest of the United States is India’s role in maintaining a stable balance of power in Asia that is not inimical to U.S. interests. The United States and India share security interests in a stable and prosperous South Asia free of conflict, in an Asia not dominated by a single power, and in a secure, orderly and accessible global commons (maritime, air, space and cyberspace). Yet the two countries have important differences on priorities and the means for achieving these goals, such as the shape of an Afghan settlement that would serve both U.S. and Indian interests. But the degree to which past differences on South Asian security have been reduced is best exemplified by India’s support for the U.S. military effort in Afghanistan (which has included, among other things, over 1 billion dollars in development assistance to Afghanistan). Only 15 or 20 years ago, U.S. military intervention in any part of South Asia would have been anathema to India.

In South Asia, the most immediately compelling U.S. interest is preventing terrorist attacks on the U.S. homeland originating in or facilitated by actors in South Asia, particularly in Afghanistan and Pakistan. To avert that possibility, the United States also has an interest in the stability and Development of both countries. At the same time, the United States has a vital interest in preventing Conflict between Pakistan and India, immediately because such a conflict would do great damage to U.S. efforts in

Afghanistan and Pakistan (such as the diversion of Pakistani military attention away from the insurgency) and because it would pose the severe risk of nuclear escalation. Finally, the United States has an interest in peace and stability in South Asia as a whole. Instability and violence in nearly every one of India's neighbors, not to mention in India itself, could, if unchecked, under-mine economic and political progress, potentially destabilizing the entire region. At present, a South Asia dominated by a politically stable and economically dynamic India is a hugely important counterweight to the prevalent instability and conflict all around India's periphery. Imagining the counterfactual scenario, a South Asian region, including India, that is failing economically and stumbling politically, is to imagine instability on a scale that would have global consequences, including damage to the global economy, huge dislocations of people and humanitarian crisis, increasing extremism and terrorism, and much greater potential for unchecked interstate and civil conflict.

Any lasting disruption and defeat of terrorist groups threatening the United States and the eventual pacification of Afghanistan will require active Indian support, Pakistan's concerns about India involvement in Afghanistan notwithstanding. By virtue of geography and history, India has a legitimate interest in Afghanistan not again becoming either a base from which terrorist actions against India are directed or mounted, or an extraterritorial strategic asset for Pakistan that emboldens it to challenge India. A strong, stable Pakistan is inconceivable if an Afghan settlement does not meet both U.S. and Indian goals.

The good news is that today the United States and India share these aims. The concern is that how and when they are achieved remain points at issue in the U.S.-India relationship. A starting point could be for the United States and India to actively promote and pursue a broader regional approach to achieve long-term stability and security for Afghanistan. That approach would be focused on bringing together Afghanistan's neighbors (e.g. Pakistan, Iran and China) and others in the extended neighborhood (e.g. India, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Russia) that have a stake and an important role to play in the outcome.

In the Indian Ocean region, the United States has a vital interest in India becoming a more potent Security provider and partner. The Indian Ocean sea lines of communication are the energy and trade lifelines for all of South and East Asia, and their disruption or their dominance by a single power would have disastrous consequences for the global economy and potentially lead to great power confrontation. The rapid increase in U.S.-India joint naval exercises and interoperability in the Indian Ocean has already demonstrated the potential for security burden-sharing. At a time when maritime boundary and resource disputes between China on the one hand and Japan and Southeast Asian states on the other appear to be escalating once again, the United States needs the partnership with a more capable India in the waters from East Africa to the Straits of Malacca. Furthermore, as C. Raja Mohan, a respected Indian journalist, has written, deepening maritime cooperation “might lead naturally toward a partnership between the two nations in other commons such as outer space and cyberspace.”

Political Engagement:

The United States has an interest in strengthening the political foundations of its relationship with India. Deepening political engagement with India is critical to both an enhanced security partnership and to India’s ability to play the regional and global roles that the United States seeks. The distrust that characterized U.S.-India relations from 1970 to 2000 has been reduced, but it has not yet been replaced by the level of trust necessary for a sustainably broad and robust partnership.

Indian foreign policy has traditionally centered on its regional interests, while the United States has pursued global interests. But over the last decade, as India has pursued global economic integration and widened the aims of its foreign policy and the United States has come to view South Asia as both a source of critical threats, the two nations have found greater common ground. Increasingly, too, India and the United States cannot separate their most important concerns into regional and global interests. Terrorism and nuclear proliferation are inherently global phenomena that profoundly affect South Asia and U.S. interests there, for instance. Thus, while India and the United States continue to have different priorities and strategies for dealing with these challenges, their perceptions of threat increasingly converge.

It is in the United States' interest to take advantage of and accelerate these trends of convergence in U.S.-Indian outlooks and priorities, even if these efforts do not always promise rapid returns. For instance, supporting greater Indian involvement in international organizations and negotiations, even when India may be not fully ready to participate effectively, will over time foster the development of India's capacity to shoulder these responsibilities. The longer-term gains to the United States from the investment in closer political engagement with India will be substantial and increasingly relevant to U.S. interests.

A frequent complaint in Washington and other capitals is that India's capacity to make and execute foreign policy often falls short of its ambitions to be a recognized global player. This criticism is well-founded, but India's limitations are to be expected given India's stage of development. If one considers how much Indian foreign policy goals and behavior have changed over the last 10 to 15 years, it is reasonable to conclude that they will in due course be matched by increasing capabilities. That will be all the more likely if the United States expands and sustains its political engagement with India. The deepening of political engagement with India should be pursued in the bilateral, Asian regional and global arenas. For instance, in the bilateral arena the habit of U.S.-India cabinet-level interactions developed over the last decade should be continued and intensified. The U.S.-India strategic dialogue launched in June 2010 by the Obama administration is an important step in this direction, but the topics for discussion in these and other bilateral meetings should be broadened to include other regional and global issues, including the Middle East and Central Asia, on a regular basis. In the regional arena, the United States should continue to push for India's fuller inclusion in the various Asia-wide groupings such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum. At the global level, India's membership in the G-20 is a critically important change. The United States should now ensure India's participation in the reform of World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) governance and Indian involvement in International Energy Agency (IEA) deliberations. Sooner rather than later the United States should declare its support for India's permanent membership in the UN Security Council.

Economic Interaction:

The United States has an over-arching interest in India's rapid, inclusive and sustained economic growth and development. India's continued economic progress will be essential to its emergence as a major power and partner to the United States, its central role in bringing peace and prosperity to South Asia and its ability to help shape a durable Asian balance of power. The economic reforms Instituted by India over the last two decades have created a private-sector-led development alternative to China's state-led model. If India is successful in expanding steadily the economic growth process to benefit its very large population of poor people, it will be a powerful counterexample to China's approach in the global debate over which economic development model – liberal or authoritarian – delivers the greatest overall benefit for its people. India's expanding commitment to open markets at home and its increasing integration into the global

Economy will give it an ever-deepening stake in an open global economy. India's economic growth will also be directly important to U.S. economic growth and prosperity in the decades ahead. Among the benefits of that growth will be:

- India is one of the few major economies in the world, along with China and Brazil, that is Fueling global economic growth during a likely prolonged period of slow growth in the United States, Europe and Japan. In the years ahead, U.S. economic recovery will depend on rapid growth Outside the United States. India's consumption-led growth will help take up the slack in global Demand created by the recession and sluggish recovery in the industrialized countries.
- India's growth will also continue to provide important trade and investment opportunities for U.S. companies and investors with potentially high and sustained returns. China's turn toward Favoring domestic over foreign companies for new investments and market access will make the opportunities in India even more attractive. As India improves its infrastructure and regulatory environment, it will become, over time, a new low-cost global manufacturing center as China's cost structures increase and offer new opportunities for American private

investment. Similarly, agricultural reform in India would create new avenues for U.S. investment.

- With its high-skilled workforce and successful technology companies, India is emerging as an advantageous location for research and innovation by U.S. firms and/or their Indian partners.
- The trend toward partnering with Indian companies for globally applicable research and Development is already evident in the information technology and pharmaceutical sectors. Indian reform of its education sector would provide additional opportunities for U.S. involvement in India's economy.
- Major Indian Companies are increasingly investing in the United States, offsetting in part declines

In investment from European and Japanese companies. Unlike China's state-controlled enterprises, India's major companies know how to operate in the U.S. market, and will generate jobs and joint ventures in the United States²⁵.

²⁵ India and the united states in the 21st century by Teresita C. Schaffer published:2009

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS PAKISTAN



Written by:
SHAZIA NAQVI AND GUL SANOBER

US FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS PAKISTAN

DEFINITION OF FOREIGN POLICY

Foreign policy can be defined as:

Relationship between sovereign states. It is the reflection of domestic politics and an interaction among sovereign states it indicates the principle and preferences on which a country quant to establish relations with another country.

Introduction

Every state has its own way of dealing the world and defining its particular role. The foreign policy of a state is formulated according to its regional environment, national interest, capabilities, and ideologies. As “no nation can have a sure guide as to what it must do and what it need not do in foreign policy without accepting the national interests as that guide” (Morgenthau,1951). America has its own ways and policies in flounced by its geographical location, historic experiences and political values and Pakistan’s external relations especially in the early years were founded on the geo-strategic realities and compulsions of the South Asian region. The basic contour of Pakistan’s policy was shaped by the Indian factor. Foreign policy was crafted with the aim of acquiring a bulwark against this giant neighbor. India remained the ‘arch-enemy.’ The situation remained same despite passing of six decades. After the World War II, the US confronted with the formidable threat of Soviet communism and designed a global strategy to deter its expansion. During this period, Soviet communism was the dominant factor in formulation of American policy towards other states. This brought additional tension between the Soviet Union and the US. Both countries felt a higher degree of insecurity and both regarded one another as potential adversaries threatening territorial integrity and political independence. A bipolarization of the world led to a lengthy Cold War.

History

Pakistan United States of America remains one of the first countries to have established diplomatic ties with. Although the relationship dates back to October 20, 1947, it can be extrapolated that the relations have been based strictly on military and economic support.

During the initial years of Pakistan, the country had the options of building allegiance with Soviet Union or United States; however, Pakistan opted for the latter.

US –Pakistan Relations in historical Perspective

Over the last six decades relation between Pakistan and us have seen many ups and down punctuated by instance engagement strong distinct each county has tried to influence other with the own peculiar needs. Pakistan and once viewed as the most allied ally when suited to its interest in 1950s become the most sectioned ally of the us in 90s . the intensity of relations varied from one extreme to that of completely ignoring the other as in 1971 to that of urgent action as was seen immediately after the invasion of Afghanistan by the soviet union in December 1979 or during the war on terrorism after 9/11 a new era of us Pakistan relations started after the event of 9/11 Pakistan took us turn to Afghanistan.

Overview of US - Pak Relation

Pakistan was founded on 14 August, 1947 along with India when the two nations achieved independence from the British Colonial Empire. The partition of the sub-continent along ethnic religious lines with Pakistan created in those adjoining territories that had majority Muslim populations. Thus the country of Pakistan with seventy million people had above 90% Muslim population. The main challenges that Pakistan faced at the time of its independence were its security fears, lack of infrastructure in the country and limited financial resources.

Although Pakistan's foreign policy has been dominated by problems with India as well as by efforts to maximize its own external support, its relationship with the West,

particularly Britain and the United States, was of major importance. At independence in 1947, Pakistan became a member of the British Commonwealth of Nations.

After Pakistan's independence by the partitioning of the British Raj, Pakistan followed a pro-western policy. Pakistan was seeking strong alliances to counter its neighbor, India. The first government of Pakistan was headed by Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan and it chose the seaport of Karachi as its capital. Jinnah considered the founder of Pakistan and hailed as the Quaid-e-Azam (Great Leader), became head of state as governor-general. The government faced many challenges in setting up new economic, judicial, and political structures.

In foreign policy, Liaquat established friendly relations with the United States when he visited President Harry S. Truman in 1950. Pakistan's early foreign policy was one of nonalignment, with no formal commitment to either the United States or the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), the two major adversaries in the Cold War. In 1953, however, Pakistan aligned itself with the United States and accepted military and economic assistance. Pakistan's relations with the United States developed against the backdrop of the Cold War.

Pakistan's strategic geographic position made it a valuable partner in Western alliance systems to contain the spread of communism. In 1954 Pakistan signed a Mutual Defense Agreement with the United States and subsequently became a member of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and CENTO. These agreements placed Pakistan in the United States sphere of influence. Pakistan was also used as a base for United States military reconnaissance flights over Soviet territory. During the Cold War years, Pakistan was considered one of Washington's Closest allies in Asia. Pakistan, in return, received large amounts of economic and military assistance. The program of military assistance continued until the 1965 Indo-Pakistani War when President Lyndon B. Johnson placed an embargo on arms shipments to Pakistan and India. The United States embargo on arms shipments to Pakistan remained in place during the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 and was not lifted until 1975, during the administration of President Gerald R. Ford.

Relationship in Early years 1947 -1952



Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan s visited to the United States from 3 may to 26 may in 1950

After the creation of the two countries, Pakistan followed a more pro-western policy whereas the Indian government defined its foreign policy with a more leftist to nonaligned stance. Pakistan was looking for strong friends in order to persuade its bigger and much stronger neighbor India to give in to its claims over the territory of Kashmir. Pakistan also needed financial support for its infrastructure development and modernization of its armed forces. Right from the beginning the founder father of Pakistan sent its representative to the US government for financial and Military assistance. Pakistan based its case on the post-World War scenario of confrontation between the Soviet Union and the West. Pakistan contented that the Soviet Union wanted to get access to the Arabian Sea and to increase its influence in the Middle East. Pakistan was a nation beyond Afghanistan that could avert such Soviet designs. Pakistan as a Muslim state had no affiliations with the communists and was a natural regional ally for the United States.

As a US ally in the region, Pakistan could provide a foot hold for the US in the region against any Soviet expansionist efforts in South Asia. From the US perspective, the United States was more occupied in the post war reconstruction in Western Europe and Japan, its containment efforts in South East Asia and the Middle East. The United States in the initial years of Pakistan was less interested in getting involved in the emerging conflicts of South Asia. The Pakistanis wanted to strengthen their relations with the US so as to get an advantage in their confrontation with India over Kashmir. On the other hand, the US did not see the usefulness of a strong relationship with Pakistan and US interests in Pakistan were limited.

South East Asian treaty organization (1950)

The idea to secure Southeast Asia from the threat of communism came after the French defeat in Indochina in 1954. September, 1954, the representative of 8 governments met at Manila Philippines and formed an alliance for peace in South East Asia, since East Pakistan was located in this region; Pakistan signed the East Asia defense treaty in Manila on 8 September 1954. The treaty was designed to maintain peace in the region and to facilitate regional economic cooperation Singh (1985:15). Pakistan joined the pact since it was against aggression in general. But the US limited its commitment to act only against communist aggression. During Manila conference, Pakistan's FOREIGN Minister Zafarullah Khan strongly opposed it on the plea that the treaty was not applicable only to communist aggression (Washington Post, September 7, 1956). Pakistan threatened to leave the treaty if the US refused to apply it to conflict between India and Pakistan. Prime Minister Mohammad Ali also indicated that Pakistan had joined SEATO in order to resolve its disputes with India. India viewed Pakistan inclusion to the pact irrelevant since East Pakistan was never in danger from international communism or from Chinese communist. Washington rejected Pakistan's play because it was not interested to support Pakistan in case of war with India.

Baghdad Pact or Central Treaty Organization 1955.

¹The US was willing to assist any nation or group of nations in the Middle East having the history of Russian drives in the region. The Baghdad pact was designed to strengthen the nation in the region and to fill the power vacuum left in the wake of the crises over the Suez canal and the resultant animosity toward Western European countries (Department of state Bulletin may 1957:728). Turkey and Iraq laid the foundation of the Baghdad pact for mutual defense that was signed on 26 February 1955. They invited Pakistan to join but Pakistan was reluctant to do so without the inclusion of the United States and its military might. But mounting pressure from Britain and the US was sufficient impetus for Pakistan to sign the agreement on 23 September 1955 along with Britain and Iraq. The Baghdad pact provided a frame work upon which a program could be built around military and economic assistance.

The evolving relations & Ayyub Era 1952-1969



¹ Pakistan economic and social review volume 49 no .1 (summer 2011) pp 109- 132 (Mussaratjabeen and mohammad saleem mazhar)

U-2 Incident in 1962

U-2 Incident In, 1952 Pakistan provided bases to America in Peshawar for intelligence and surveillance purpose. The consequence of which resulted in “U -2 incident,” which brought Pakistan in direct confrontation with the Soviet Union. The spy plane was shot down by Russian and its pilot Francis Gray was arrested. The spy plane took photograph of soviet atomic installation using Peshawar airfield. The Soviet Premier Khrushchev warned Pakistan of dire consequences (Pasha 1985 221) a diplomatic row erupted between the two countries. The US called this base as communication center and did not disclosed its purpose and even no Pakistani person was admitted to the base In later years, it was come to be none that this facility was also used against China (Sattar,2007:50). The base was closed in 1968 after Pakistan refused to extend the contract for another decade. In spite of providing the base for US operation, Pakistan got no American support on the issue of Kashmir. None of the allies gave substantial support while Pakistan had to pay heavily for taking these risks.

Prospects for Pakistan’s relations with US improved after Republican Eisenhower came to power in 1952 in the White House. Pakistan pushed its case as an ally that could provide support for Middle East security and in return it asked for military and economic support for its flail economy. Unstable domestic politics had led to political and economic distress while the bureaucratic and military officers were getting stronger in the country. The Republican government was more receptive of the Pakistani position and its claims of anticommunist stand and an available allied state. Pakistan joined with Turkey as member of the Middle East Defense Organization (MEDO) in 1954. This allowed Pakistan to formally seek aid as a regional ally of the US. In January 1955, Pakistan joined South East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) with a view to adding security to the East Asian flank of anti-communist alignment. However, it was not clear how Pakistan’s role in both these organizations would actually materialize in the case of an actual conflict. However, for the Pakistanis, becoming part of these alliances allowed the country to create stronger links with the US administration and seek increasing aid.


In September 1955, Pakistan became a member of the Baghdad Pact organization which later became known as CENTO. Turkey, Iran and Iraq were its earlier members with the US as the backer of the security arrangement. The role of this organization was similar to the earlier MEDO as a northern-tier defense arrangement against communist influence in the Middle East.

"In the end, neither the Baghdad Pact nor SEATO amounted to much militarily. ...Joining the Baghdad Pact and SEATO gave Pakistan a strengthened claim on US resources and, in turn, the US acquired an even larger stake in Pakistan's well-being. As Pakistan's president Ayyub Khan put it in his biography, "Friends Not Masters", Pakistan had become America's "most allied ally in Asia"

A key development from Pakistan's perspective was the amount of development and military aid that started in 1954 and increased to \$500 million by 1957 as a result of Pakistan's joining the regional defense organizations and allying with the USA. During the second Eisenhower term, the relations between the two countries became even stronger. Pakistan's Army Chief staged a military coup in 1958 and later became the President of Pakistan. Field Marshal Ayyub Khan had developed strong relations with the Americans and his era from 1958 to 1969 turned out to be a strong era of US- Pakistan relations. In 1959, Ayyub government allowed the US to set up an intelligence facility in Badaber, NWFP province and operate U2 surveillance flights over the Soviet Union from its Peshawar Airport. This arrangement and the closer relationship of the Pakistani government with the US administration allowed it to acquire increasing military hardware and arms for its defense services. The issue troubling the US was Pakistan's closer relations with China. The Indians and Chinese had fought a war in 1962 in which China had given India a bloody nose. As a result Pakistan moved to improve and strengthen its relations with China in order to position itself as a stronger foe for India. However, Pakistan's growing friendship with communist China irked the US who was facing a proxy war against the communists in Vietnam. Pakistan and India fought a war in 1965 that was an ill-fated affair started by a limited guerilla war in Kashmir that Ayyub started in order to pressurize India to come to the negotiating table over Kashmir.

However, as the war spread, Pakistan could not sustain a long term conflict and asked for a truce and both forces moved back to their previous borders².

Formation of Bangladesh 1969 – 1972



Army Chief General Yahya took over power from President Ayyub Khan in March 1969. The country had been in a pseudo military rule since 1958. Political representation had been insufficient and regional succession movements were strengthening in the country especially in the eastern Pakistan province of Bengal. Elections were held in the country in 1970 with the East Pakistani party Awami League taking majority in the elections. The military government did not hand over power to the winning party and in a political deadlock, unleashed a crackdown against the East Pakistan population. This led to a limited civil war in 1971 and India siding with the dissidents launched a war in December 1971. After a fortnight of fighting, the Pakistani forces in East Pakistan accepted default and the state of Bangladesh was established. The US Policy in this

² Pakistan economic and social review volume 49 no 1 (summer 2011) pp 109- 132 (Mussaratjabeen and mohammad saleem mazhar)

debacle was aligned with the military establishment of Pakistan due to its earlier links and defense relationships.

On the other hand, President Nixon used the Pakistani links with China to start a secret diplomacy with China which culminated with Henry Kissinger's secret visit to China in July 1971 while he was visiting Pakistan. The Chinese relationship was vital for the US as it was trying to fix the mess in its Vietnam policy. With these concerns, the US administration neglected the internal domestic issues of Pakistan and allowed the dictator to have its way in East Pakistan. "The opening to China was an essential element in Nixon's strategy of creating a new global balance of power. His aim was to bring China into the family of nations – reversing two decades of US efforts to isolate Beijing – and to use an improved US-Chinese relationship as a lever with Moscow to press for US-Soviet Union.

Rather than focusing on their domestic problems and working effectively to find solutions, the military rulers in Pakistan had been focusing in international affairs and the Great Game and considered the close relationship with the US as a guarantee for their own domestic survival. However, this proved to be a false notion and Pakistani military lost big time in the war with India in 1971. Over 90,000 soldiers were taken as prisoners of war by India and East Pakistan declared its independence. With this large defeat, the military finally gave in and handed over power in the remaining country of West Pakistan to Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who took over as the first elected Prime Minister of the country.

President Richard Nixon used Pakistan's relationship with China to start secret contacts with China which resulted with Henry Kissinger's secret visit to China in July 1971 while visiting Pakistan. America supported Pakistan throughout the war and supplied weapons to West Pakistan although Congress had passed a bill suspending exporting weapons to the nation. Near the end of the war and fearing Pakistan's defeat by the joint forces of MuktiBahini and Indian forces, Nixon ordered the USS Enterprise into the Indian Ocean, although it was never used for actual combat. United States-Pakistani relations preceding the 1971 war were characterized by poor communication and much confusion. The administration of President Richard M. Nixon was forced to formulate a public stance on

the brutal crackdown on East Pakistanis by West Pakistani troops that began in March 25, 1971, and it maintained that the crackdown was essentially an internal affair of Pakistan in which direct intervention of outside powers was to be avoided. The Nixon administration expressed its concern about human rights violations to Pakistan and restricted the flow of assistance--yet it stopped short of an open condemnation.

Despite the United States widely publicized "tilt" toward Pakistan during the 1971 war, Pakistan's new leader, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, felt betrayed. In his opinion, the United States could have prevented India from intervening in Pakistan's civil war, thereby saving his country the trauma of defeat and dismemberment. Bhutto now strove to lessen Pakistan's dependence on the United States.

The foreign policy Bhutto envisioned would place Pakistan at the forefront of Islamic nations. Issues central to the developing world would take precedence in foreign affairs over those of the superpowers. Bhutto called this policy "bilateralism," which implied neutrality in the Cold War with equal treatment accorded both superpowers. Bhutto's distancing of Islamabad from Washington and other Western links was accompanied by Pakistan's renewed bid for leadership in the developing world.

General Zia initially promised elections but later firmed his grip on the government and started a murder trial against Bhutto which eventually led to Bhutto's hanging for the alleged crime in 1979.

Bhutto Years (1972 – 1977)




(SEATO - CENTO) Isolation Period

Prime Minister Bhutto initially focused his attention with normalizing the domestic situation in the country. The Government of Pakistan signed a truce with India, recognized the government of Bangladesh and eventually the 90,000 prisoners were returned by India. The major challenge for the new government came in May, 1974 when India executed an underground nuclear test. This forced the Pakistanis to also seek a nuclear weapons program to match India's capabilities. This became a major cause for concern for the US administration. Pakistan started efforts to acquire a nuclear fuel reprocessing plant from France and a heavy water facility from West Germany. During Bhutto's government Pakistan's foreign policy was aligned to see a balance between its relations with China, Russia and the USA. Pakistan placed a special emphasis on its relations with the Arab countries in the Middle East. During Ford and later Jimmy Carter's administration, sanctions were placed on Pakistan related to export control and restriction of aid grants. Prime Minister Bhutto called elections in March 1977 from which he gained a landslide victory. However, the opposition blamed it on massive rigging and started a public campaign to oust Bhutto. Prime Minister Bhutto claimed in public rhetoric that the Americans were behind the opposition movement and wanted to

punish his government for its nuclear weapons program and alignment with the Arabs. In July 1977, the Army seized power in a coup for the third time in the country.

Zia Years 1977 – 1988



After hanging the former Prime Minister, Zia strengthened his hold on the government and used a cover of Islamic reforms to give credibility to his government. Jimmy Carter's administration developed closer relations with India while Pakistan was more or less isolated due to its new military dictators. On the nuclear front, General Zia continued the previous policy of Bhutto in acquiring and developing capabilities for nuclear weapons. The chilling relations between the US and Pakistan took another a U-turn when the Soviet Army entered neighboring Afghanistan in December 1979 to support the local communist government. "Just four days after the Soviet invasion, On December 29, 1979, Jimmy Carter approved a broader covert action program that instructed the CIA to provide military weapons and ammunition ...for the Afghan anticommunist fighters, who soon became widely known as "mujahedeen"...At Pakistan's insistence, the CIA funneled all aid through the Pakistani intelligence service ISI, which in turn handed over supplies to Afghans.

With the Reagan Administration in the White House, the support for the covert war in Afghanistan increased along with the value of the Pakistani cooperation. Pakistan was rewarded with a \$3.2 billion aid package for the next six years. As the Afghan war progressed more than three million refugees entered Pakistan. During this period, Pakistan was considered a valuable ally and the US ignored the increasing developments on the nuclear front as well as the human rights abuses by the Zia regime. The success of the Afghan war effort was crucial for the American Administration as it was bled the Soviet Government and placed huge pressure in terms of resources. Fed up with the costs of the war and covert operations by the mujahideen, supported by the CIA and the Pakistani ISI, by 1988, the Russians had had enough and were ready for a respectable evacuation from Afghanistan. The usefulness of Pakistan for the USA with respect to Afghanistan, thus, ended when Mikhail Gorbachev agreed to a retreat in April 1988. General Zia died in a mysterious plane crash months later in August 1988 and political elections were held in Pakistan.

In 1979, a group of Pakistani students burned the American embassy in Islamabad to the ground killing two Americans.

In the 1980s, Pakistan agreed to pay \$658 million for 28 F-16 fighter jets from the United States; however the American congress froze the deal citing objections to Pakistani nuclear ambitions. Under the terms of the American cancellation, they kept both the money and the planes, leading to angry claims of theft by Pakistanis.

In 1979, Pakistani students, enraged by a radio report claiming that the United States had bombed the Masjid al-Haram, Islam's holy site at Mecca, stormed the U.S. embassy in Islamabad, and burned it to the ground. There actually had been a terrorist attack there, but the U.S. was not involved. The diplomats survived by hiding in a reinforced area, though Marine Security Guard Steve Crowley and another American was killed in the attack.

The event started as a small, peaceful protest against U.S. policies in Cambodia, as well as suspected U.S. involvement surrounding the military coup d'état of Zulfikar Bhutto in 1977. The protesters shouted anti-American slogans. Although, at first glance it seemed

to be a small protest outside the embassy's walls, buses later started pulling up filled with far-right Jamaat-e- Islami supporters in front of the main gates. Hundreds of people began climbing over the walls and trying to pull them down using ropes. According to an American investigation, after a bullet was fired at the gate's lock by one rioter ricocheted and struck protesters, the protestors opened fire believing that an American marine on the roof of the embassy had fired first. Who actually fired first cannot be confirmed one way or another. Twenty-year-old Marine Stephen Crowley was struck by a bullet and transported to the embassy's secure communication vault along with the rest of personnel serving in the embassy. Locked behind steel-reinforced doors the Americans waited for help to come and rescue them from a smoke-filled building. Unstable democratic governments 1988 – 1998

After the 1988 elections, Benazir Bhutto, the daughter of former Prime Minister Bhutto, came into power. Until 1990, the \$600 million military and economic aid that had started after the Afghan War effort by the US had continued. However, every year, the US president had to certify under the Pressler Amendment, enacted in 1984, that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear device. "After October 1, 1990, passed without certification, the \$564 million economic and military aid program approved for fiscal year 1991 was frozen. At the time, Pakistan was the third-highest recipient of US aid; only Israel and Egypt received more assistance.

At this point the main occupation of the Pakistan government was to try to create a friendly mujahedeen regime in Afghanistan, continue to develop its nuclear and missile program and support the militant insurgency in Kashmir. Since the US and Pakistani interests had diverted at this point, with the Soviets retreating from Afghanistan and the US involved in the Middle East, the Pakistanis felt isolated by their "old friend" and "ally".

Domestic politics, once again, became unstable and four successive governments in Pakistan were dissolved one after another in a matter of 11 years with the Army, as always, the main power broker among the political stalwarts. Benazir held the Prime Minister's office twice from 1988-1990 and from 1993-1996. Her main opponent, Nawaz

Sharif, held office from 1990-1993 and 1996-1999. Gross fiscal mismanagement, political instability and US sanctions created large fiscal deficits and the governments borrowed heavily from international lenders. The Clinton

Administration had a tilt towards the more democratic Indian government during this time. The Pakistanis contented that the Pressler Amendment was specific to Pakistan and the sanctions were unjustified. Additional sanctions were placed after Pakistan acquired M11 missiles and delivery systems technology from China which violated the MTCR regime. By 1996 Pakistan's Afghan efforts were bringing some success and the ISI backed Taliban government was established in Afghanistan.

The US administration initially welcome the prospects of peace in the country but later opposed the Taliban regime based on their extreme fundamentalist views and gross violations of human rights. A new turn of events unfolded in May 1998 when the new Indian government tested several nuclear devices. The Clinton Administration put a lot of pressure on the Pakistani government to refrain from tit for tat nuclear tests. However, Pakistan government came under intense internal pressure and detonated their nuclear devices two weeks later. Although a new nuclear deterrent had been established between India and Pakistan, another wave of international sanctions followed from the international community. This put further pressure on the already weak political economy of Pakistan.

The US had a new interest in Afghanistan by mid-1998 after the terrorist attacks on US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania which killed two hundred people and were carried on by an organization belonging to Osama Bin Ladin, a former Saudi national living in Afghanistan. The US administration wanted Pakistan to use its influence on the Taliban to make them handover the culprit over to the US. However, the Taliban refused and new animosity started in the region.

In early 1999, Pakistan had a spate of diplomatic discussion to improve their relations with India but by mid-1999, a limited war had erupted in Kargil between the two countries which had been covertly engineered by the Pakistani Army. As India increased pressure and an escalating war scenario emerged, the US intervened on the request of Pakistan and the armies retreated to their pre war positions. The main casualty in the war

turned out to the Pakistani Premier Nawaz Sharif who tried to oust the military commander but a military executed a coup and the military came into power for the fourth time led by General Musharraf. The stage was set for a very tumultuous situation; the 1990s was an era of intense upheaval in Pakistan. Pakistan found itself in a state of extremely high insecurity as tensions mounted with India and Afghanistan's infighting continued. Pakistan's alliance with the U.S was strained due to factors such as its support for the Taliban and public distancing of the Pakistani government from the U.S.

US Pak Relation in 90 Decade:

1990: US military aid is again suspended under the provisions of the Pressler Amendment.

1992: The US relaxes sanctions on Pakistan to allow food and economic assistance to non-governmental organizations.

1998: Pakistan conducts its own nuclear tests after India explodes several devices. The US sends Pakistan \$140 in economic and agricultural aid but imposes full restrictions on all non-humanitarian aid because of continuing nuclear tests.

1999: Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif overthrown in military coup led by General Pervez Musharraf. The US sanctions limited aid to countries under coup governments come into effect.

September 2001: President Musharraf President Bush of 'unstinted assures *cooperation* in the fight against terrorism', as Powell asks Pakistan leaders if they were for or against the terrorists and their supporters in Afghanistan. In exchange, the US lifts some sanctions placed on Pakistan after the nuclear tests of 1998 and the coup of 1999. Large amounts of aid begin to flow to Pakistan. Congress grants the president special waivers to coup-related sanctions on Pakistan through 2003.

October 2001: US Under Secretary of State, Alan Larson, offers preferential treatment to some of the Pakistani export items, discuss generous treatment of Pakistani \$3 billion debt at the Paris Club. Promises that the US will not leave Pakistan in a lurch after achieving its objectives in Afghanistan.

2002: The US cobbles together a \$350 million package for Pakistan, earmarking \$512 million for military financing.

2003: President Bush announces a five-year, \$3 billion package for Pakistan. Legislation to both extend and to end the waiver of coup-related sanctions is presented to Congress.

2004: The US declares Pakistan ‘major non-NATO ally’

2005: Following the tragic October earthquake, the US announces a \$510 million commitment for earthquake relief and reconstruction.

2006: Diplomatic ties strengthen as President Bush visits Pakistan in March.

2007: Washington tries to broker a power-sharing arrangement between President Musharraf and opposition leader in exile Benazir Bhutto.

2008: President Musharraf resigns as Washington appears to be distancing itself from him. His resignation signals the end of an important era in US-Pakistan relations.

Musharraf – 9/11 and beyond – partners in the fight against Terrorism



General Musharraf took power at a time when the economic situation of the country was in deep trouble. The rupee was sliding, foreign reserves had been depleted and rampant corruption had messed up the infrastructure of the country. By year 2000, Pakistan after

more than 53 years of independence was still struggling to find a stable political system and an economic infrastructure that would generate sustainable development and improve the quality of life for its people. From the United States perspective, Pakistan was moving closer to a “failed state” case and Its nuclear and missile programs were a constant concern for policy makers in Washington. A failing economy could easily lead to another coup backed by the Islamists and the country could fall in fundamentalist hands along with its arsenal of nuclear weapons. With this scenario in view, the US administration more or less supported the Musharraf regime.

9/11 changed the nature of US – Pakistan relations once again. Terrorists supported by Osama Bin Ladin’s organization had executed successful attacks in New York and Washington in September 2001. The US President George Bush asked the world to make a clear choice to side with the US with the slogan “you are with us or against us”. President Musharraf’s regime, which was previously a supporter and backer of the Taliban regime since its inception, made a U-turn and sided with the US in its war against terrorism. Siding with the US, Musharraf betted that the decision would result in improving foreign aid and support from World Bank and IMF on the one hand and US support for Pakistan’s cause for Kashmir on the other.

After the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States of America, Pakistan became a key ally in the war on terror with the United States. However, US\$5 billion earmarked to train the Pakistani army in counter terrorism were instead spent on unrelated military purposes. On November 6th, 2001, US President George W. Bush declared his policy: "You are either with us or against us". President Musharraf later claimed that the U.S. had made a so-called threat to bomb Pakistan "back to the Stone Age" after the September 11 attacks, if Pakistan refused to aid and help America with its war on terrorism. Pervez Musharraf acknowledges the payments in his book:

We've captured 689 and handed over 369 to the United States. We've earned bounties totaling millions of dollars

—Former President of Pakistan Pervez Musharraf

On 11th June, 2008, a US airstrike on the Afghan-Pakistani border killed 10 members of

the paramilitary Frontier Corps. The Pakistani military condemned the airstrike as an act of aggression, souring the relations between the two countries.

In the November 2008 Mumbai attacks, the United States informed Pakistan that it expected full cooperation in the hunt for the plotters of the attacks.

In the last two years, Pakistan has helped the US capture several hundred operatives of the Al- Qaida organization and has allowed the US to execute military operations from its land, air and sea bases. In return for its cooperation, there has been some economic revival of the Pakistani economy. On the Kashmir front, however, not much progress has been made since India has projected Pakistan as a supporter of terrorism in Kashmir itself, a label vehemently denied by the Pakistanis.

Asif Ali Zardari Era: 2007-2013



Relations between Pakistan and the United States have been cooling recently after the visit of Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari to the United States of America, U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan Anne W. Patterson addressed senior bureaucrats at the National Management College and emphasized that the United States will assist Pakistan's new democratic government in the areas of development, stability, and security. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the United Nations World

Food Program, in Pakistan, officially announced the signing of an agreement valued at \$8.4 million to help ease Pakistan's food crisis.[6] With relations between Pakistan and the United States cooling down, it is expected that Pakistan and the United States could return to being allies again not only in the War on Terror but also in other possible threats to regional and world peace. It is also hoped by the United States that Pakistan under the administration of Asif Ali Zardari would only strengthen relations between Pakistan and the United States.

The CIA believes Osama Bin Laden to be hiding in Pakistan. On September 14, 2009, former president of Pakistan, Pervez Musharraf, admitted that US Foreign Aid to Pakistan (which is substantial) was diverted by the country from its original purpose to fighting the Taliban, to prepare for war against neighboring India. The United States government has responded by stating that they will take these allegations seriously.

“The budget also provides \$859.8 million towards sustaining cooperative relationships with Pakistan,” the State Department said, adding that it was also meant for making progress to “disrupt, dismantle and defeat al Qaeda and its extremist allies.”

The current dynamic of US-Pakistan relations



The US, by deciding to retain its forces in Afghanistan until 2018, is giving a signal that its relationship with Afghanistan and interest in the region is not transactional, but of a more abiding nature. Clearly, the US initially underestimated the strength and staying power of the Taliban. President Obama now realizes that if they prevail, or if civil war erupts on a large scale, the gains that were supposedly made with the support of US and Nato forces in Afghanistan during the last 14 years will be reversed.

Tactical nukes to counter India's cold start doctrine: Aizaz:

The potential of the Islamic State increasing its footprints, particularly in Afghanistan and even in certain Central Asian states, with sprinklings in Pakistan has become a reality. There is a belated appreciation among US policymakers that Pakistan has a strategic importance in its own right and maintaining close relations with it is in the US interest. Moreover, the region's geostrategic significance has enhanced considerably as a consequence of China's deep involvement in the region. The multi-billion dollar China-Pakistan Economic Corridor project is likely to alter the region's potential and dynamics and the US does not want the vacuum to be filled entirely by China.

The US also expects Pakistan to use its influence with the Taliban leadership in bringing them to the negotiating table and persuading them to abandon the insurgency or at least maintain a ceasefire while negotiations are initiated. Nawaz Sharif will try to emphasise that Pakistan's interest in maintaining relations with the Taliban Shura and lethal groups like the Haqqani network is to retain leverage for persuading them to engage in dialogue and stop fighting. Pakistan also wants Washington to realise that taking a very hard position against the Taliban and their affiliates could push them to join forces with the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan.

US exploring deal to limit Pakistan's nuclear arsenal:

Pakistan maintains that the Taliban are a reality with a substantial following and the Afghan government has to find ways of accommodating them in the power structure. There is a genuine realization both within the civil and military elite that it is in Pakistan's vital interest that a peaceful resolution to the Afghanistan conflict is reached. Pakistan has got itself so intractably involved in the quagmire that is Afghanistan that

despite sincere efforts in pursuit of peace, it still comes under severe criticism from the Afghan government and civil society. Apart from doing incalculable damage to Pakistan's economy, internal stability and national cohesion, the Afghan fallout has soiled its reputation. Of course, Pakistan itself is partly to blame for this predicament, having blindly jumped into supporting the Afghan jihad against the Soviets in the late 1970s and then supporting the Taliban government in the 1990s, and later failing to prevent them from carving sanctuaries in certain parts of Fata and Balochistan. But that is history. Pakistan's current leadership, ever since President Ashraf Ghani took over, has been keen to establish a durable and mutually beneficial relationship. Progress, however, has been slow and the temporary seizure of Kunduz by the Taliban has made matters worse. Surely, the prime minister will seek US support in allaying Afghanistan's misgivings and reiterate his government's commitment to make sincere efforts in securing peace.

PM heads to US for talks with Obama on Afghan peace:

Nawaz Sharif is also going to draw President Obama's attention to India's involvement in Balochistan, Fata and Karachi. In all likelihood, Washington's response will be that this matter is taken up bilaterally with the Indian leadership.

The prime minister would be raising the issue of Pakistan's inclusion in Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and other international export control regimes. If this concession is extended to India, it should be similarly relaxed for Pakistan, as its energy deficit is even greater. Moreover, Pakistan is of the view that acceptance of India to the NSG will allow it to divert its indigenous production and build stocks at a faster pace. The chances of this request materialising in the near future, however, are slim going by the statement of the State Department that such a proposal is premature. Lobbies opposed to Pakistan try to keep memories of the AQ Khan episode alive despite our efforts at strengthening the nuclear safety and security regime.

President Obama is likely to press Pakistan on agreeing to the commencement of negotiations on the Fissile Material Cut off Treaty. Pakistan finds it unacceptable to cap its enrichment programmed until it has built sufficient stocks to match India's growing

inventory. On the one hand, the US is counseling nuclear restraint to Pakistan and on the other, selling state-of-the-art conventional weapons to India! The West should know by now that sanctions or the threat of sanctions have not worked in the past and are unlikely to make any significant difference this time either. Facilitating India to build its fissile material stocks is part of the broader US strategy to countervail China's growing power at the regional level, but this has greater relevance for Pakistan's security.

An uncertain future:

The US is also expected to raise its concern regarding Pakistan's development of short-range missiles that it justifies as a riposte to the Cold Start doctrine. Although the military establishment has tried to assure the US that its nuclear assets are safe and secure, the US continues to raise the issue, being fearful of the general security situation in the region.

The previous carrot-and-stick US policy against the middle powers is no more valid in the context of Pakistan. There is, however, now a different geostrategic picture that gives Pakistan other options to counter such pressures. It enjoys extremely close strategic ties with China and is developing relations with Russia that has created political and economic space and injected a sense of confidence in policymakers. Having said that, Washington retains the ability to influence events and harm countries that go against its wishes. We cannot ignore that the US is one of our largest trading partners and accounted for nearly 16 per cent of our total exports and bilateral trade in FY2015. It also remains the most attractive source of sophisticated state-of-the-art weapons and equipment³.

U.S Military pacts and suspension of aid to Pakistan

There have been six instances during the last 63 years since 1954, when the US military aid to Pakistan was suspended by Washington under one pretext or the other, though strings were attached nearly every other time Islamabad found funding parked under this head in its coffers.

Though the US was one of the first countries to recognize Pakistan as an independent state in 1947, it took Washington some seven years to dish out its first military assistance

³ Published in The Express Tribune, October 21st, 2015.

to Islamabad during the Dwight Eisenhower regime. On May 19, 1954, the 'Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement' between the two nations was inked in Karachi.

This pact was helped vastly by the refusal of Pakistan's first Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan to visit Moscow in 1950. Liaquat Ali Khan had toured the US instead to the sheer delight of the Americans, resulting in the arrival of nearly \$700 million military aid to Pakistan between 1954 and 1964. The military aid was dished out in addition to the \$2.5 billion given to Pakistan as economic aid.

Hence, if the widely-expected curbs are imposed on the forthcoming \$680 million US military aid to Islamabad, this would not be anything new for the Pakistan Army equipped today with no fewer than 66 Infantry Brigades, 15 Armored Brigades, 30 Artillery Brigades, eight Air Defense Brigades and 17 Army Aviation Squadrons organized under 19 Division Headquarters and 9 Corps Headquarters, making it the world's 8th largest armed force.

Here follows the chronology of six US military aid suspensions:

1) The first time when the US suspended its military aid to Pakistan was during the 1965 Pak-India War. Even though the United States suspended military assistance to both the neighbors at daggers drawn with each other, the suspension of aid affected Pakistan much more adversely.

Gradually, relations improved and arms sales to Pakistan were renewed in 1975. It is noteworthy that between 1954-1965, Pakistan had managed to receive \$50 million in military grants, \$19 million in defense support assistance and \$5 million in cash or commercial purchases.

2) During the 1971 Pakistan-India War, the US again suspended its military aid to Pakistan, the second time in just six years. In 1972, US President Nixon visited China for the first time, marking the beginning of a process of normalization of the estranged Sino-American relations. Since the historic visit was facilitated by Pakistan, the US resumed limited financial aid to Pakistan as a 'reward.'

3) In April 1979, the United States cut off its military assistance to Pakistan, except food assistance, as required under the Symington Amendment. This time the suspension resulted due to Washington's concerns about Pakistan's nuclear programme. It is pertinent to note that during this period, Pakistan had managed to construct a uranium enrichment facility.

In December 1979, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. The US offered \$400 million worth of military aid, which was however rejected by Pakistan as inadequate. In 1981, the US again offered a package of military aid worth \$1.5 billion, which was accepted. During the five years that followed after the influx of this aid, the US provided 40 F-16 fighters, 100 M-48 tanks, 64M-109 155 mm SP howitzers, 40 M-110 203mm SP howitzers, 75 towed howitzers and 1,005TOW anti-tank missile system, all of which enhanced Pakistan's defense capability substantially.

The aid rose from around \$60 million in economic and development assistance in 1979 to more than \$600 million a year in the mid-1980s. In total, the United States gave \$2.19 billion in military assistance from 1980 till 1990. The military aid was in addition to the \$3.1 billion economic assistance for Pakistan.

4) As soon as the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan in 1990, US military aid was again suspended under the provisions of the Pressler Amendment. The US imposed curbs on all economic and military aid to Pakistan. The Larry Pressler-proposed Amendment required the then US president to certify to the Congress that Pakistan did not possess nuclear weapons.

However, in 1995, the Brown Amendment authorized a one-time delivery of US military equipment worth \$368 million. However, no fewer than 28 F-16 aircraft costing \$658 million were not delivered to Pakistan, despite the fact that Islamabad had paid for them well in advance.

5) The Pak-US relations underwent a severe blow with Pakistan's nuclear tests and the ensuing sanctions in 1998. A presidential visit scheduled for the first quarter of 1998 was postponed and, under the Glenn Amendment, sanctions restricted the provision of credits, military sales, economic assistance and loans to Pakistan.

6) The ouster of premier Nawaz Sharif in 1999 in a military coup led by General Pervez Musharraf gave the US government another reason to invoke fresh sanctions under Section 508 of the Foreign Appropriations Act, which included restrictions on foreign military financing and economic assistance. The assistance was thus restricted to refugee and counter-narcotics assistance only. Aid to Pakistan dropped dramatically from 1991 to 2000 to a paltry \$429 million in economic funding and \$5.2 million in military assistance.

Pakistan's partnership in the Baghdad Pact, CENTO and SEATO strengthened relations between the two nations. At the time, its relationship with the U.S. was so close and friendly that it was called the United States' "most-allied ally" in Asia. The U.S. suspension of military assistance during the 1965 Pakistan-India war generated a widespread feeling in Pakistan that the United States was not a reliable ally. Even though the United States suspended military assistance to both countries involved in the conflict, the suspension of aid affected Pakistan much more severely. Gradually, relations improved and arms sales were renewed in 1975. Then, in April 1979, the United States cut off economic assistance to Pakistan, except food assistance, as required under the Symington Amendment to the U.S. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, due to concerns about Pakistan's nuclear program.

U.S. Civilian Assistance to Pakistan:

The U.S. Congress passed the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act (often referred to as "Kerry-Lugar-Berman," or "KLB," after its co-sponsors) in October 2009 in order to demonstrate the U.S. long-term commitment to cooperation with the Pakistani people and their civilian institutions. Since the passage of KLB, the U.S. government has committed over \$5 billion in civilian assistance to Pakistan, and also over \$1 billion in emergency humanitarian assistance for disasters like the 2010 floods.

U.S. civilian assistance to Pakistan facilitates cooperation fostering a more stable, democratic, and prosperous Pakistan and region, which is in the interest of both countries. It is focused on five priority areas: energy; economic growth, including agriculture; community stabilization of underdeveloped areas vulnerable to violent extremism; education; and health. These priorities were determined in consultation with the

government of Pakistan. The U.S. implements programs with Pakistani partners, including the government of Pakistan, civil society, and private sector actors, to increase local capacity and promote sustainability of efforts. To date, U.S. contributions have added over 1,600 megawatts to Pakistan's electricity grid through infrastructure upgrades, rehabilitation, and policy consultation; led to the launch of the Pakistan Private Investment Initiative (PPII), which will provide seed funding to small- and medium-sized enterprises in Pakistan; built or reconstructed roughly 1,000 schools; and funded about 1,100 kilometers of roads in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. In January 2015 the U.S. pledged \$250 million to help Pakistan facilitate the relief, reconstruction, and return of FATA communities displaced by counterterrorism operations.

U.S. Security Assistance to Pakistan:

U.S. security assistance to Pakistan is focused on strengthening the counterterrorism (CT) and counterinsurgency (COIN) capabilities of the Pakistan security forces, and promoting closer security ties and interoperability with the United States. U.S. security assistance has directly supported Pakistan's CT operations in the FATA. Foreign Military Financing (FMF) (\$265 million in FY 2015) promotes the development of Pakistan's long-term COIN/CT capabilities, particularly in FATA, and improves Pakistan's ability to participate in maritime security operations and counter-maritime piracy. International Military Education and Training (IMET) assistance to Pakistan (\$5 million in FY 2015) enhances the professionalism of Pakistan's military and strengthens long-term military relationships between Pakistan and the United States.

Pakistan's Membership in International Organizations:

Pakistan and the United States belong to a number of the same international organizations, including the United Nations, World Trade Organization, International Monetary Fund, and World Bank. Pakistan is not a signatory of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Alliance with United States:

Prior to 9/11, Pakistan, along with Saudi Arabia, was a key supporter of the Taliban in Afghanistan, as part of their "strategic depth" objective vis-a-vis India, and to try to bring stability to Afghanistan after years of civil war following the Soviet withdrawal. The Taliban, being primarily Sunni and Pushto, are of the same ethnic origin as Pakistanis on the other side of the Afghan border and were natural allies.

After 9/11, Pakistan, led by military dictator General Pervez Musharraf, reversed course under pressure from the United States and joined the "War on Terror" as a US ally. Having failed to convince the Taliban to hand over bin Laden and other members of Al Qaeda, Pakistan provided the U.S. a number of military airports and bases for its attack on Afghanistan, along with other logistical support. Since 2001, Pakistan has arrested over five hundred Al-Qaeda members and handed them over to the United States; senior U.S. officers have been lavish in their praise of Pakistani efforts in public while expressing their concern that not enough was being done in private. However, General Musharraf was strongly supported by the Bush administration – a common theme throughout Pakistan's relations with the US has been US support of military dictators to the detriment of democracy in Pakistan.

In return for their support, Pakistan had sanctions lifted and has received some 10 billion dollars in US aid since 2001, primarily military. In June 2004, President Bush designated Pakistan as a major non-NATO ally, making it eligible, among other things, to purchase advanced American military technology.

Pakistan has lost thousands of lives since joining the US' war on terror in the form of both soldiers and civilians, and is currently going through a critical period. Suicide bombs are now commonplace in Pakistan, whereas they were unheard of prior to 9/11. The Taliban have been resurgent in recent years in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. Hundreds of thousands of refugees have been created internally in Pakistan, as they have been forced to flee their homes as a result of fighting between Pakistani forces and the Taliban in the regions bordering Afghanistan and further in Swat. In addition, the economy is in an extremely fragile position.

A key campaign argument of President Obama's was that the US had made the mistake of "putting all our eggs in one basket" in the form of General Musharraf. Musharraf was eventually forced out of office under the threat of impeachment, after years of political protests by lawyers, civilians and other political parties in Pakistan. With President Obama coming into office, the US is expected to triple non-military aid to Pakistan to 1.5 billion per year over 10 years, and to tie military aid to progress in the fight against militants. The purpose of the aid is to help strengthen the relatively new democratic government led by President Zardari and to help strengthen civil institutions and the general economy in Pakistan, and to put in place an aid program that is broader in scope than just supporting Pakistan's military.

Pakistan and the United States drew closer together, high-level visits were exchanged, and the groundwork was laid for a security relationship that seemed to meet Pakistan's political needs and equipment deficit. At United States prompting, Pakistan and Turkey concluded a security treaty in 1954--the Turko Pakistan Pact--which immediately enabled United States military assistance to Pakistan under the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement signed the same year.

Pakistan also became a member of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in 1954 and joined the Baghdad Pact, later renamed the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) in 1959. Pakistan had little interest in SEATO and discerned no danger to its interests from China, joining mainly to oblige Washington. Even CENTO, which offered the advantage of a new approach to the Muslim world, was problematic because it drove a wedge between Pakistan and the Arab countries that remained outside it and was seen by Pakistanis as institutionally weak because the United States was never willing to become a full member. None of these arrangements addressed Pakistan's main concern, however--India.

At Pakistan's insistence, an additional agreement (the Agreement of Cooperation) on security was concluded with the United States in March 1959, by which the United States committed itself to the "preservation of the independence and integrity of Pakistan" and agreed to take appropriate action, including the use of armed forces, as may be mutually agreed upon . . . in order to assist the Government of Pakistan at its request." The

Agreement of Cooperation also said nothing about India and was cast in the context of the Eisenhower Doctrine, which dealt with communist threats to the Middle East. Pakistan saw the agreement as representing a high level of United States commitment, however, and some United States officials apparently encouraged an interpretation that saw more in the agreement than was actually there. There was considerable self-deception on both sides--Pakistan believed that it had secured an ally in its rivalry with India, and the United States focused on Pakistan as an adherent to the anticommunist cause.

Tangible gains to Pakistan from the relationship were substantial.

Between 1954 and 1965, the United States provided Pakistan with US\$630 million in direct-grant assistance and more than US\$670 million in concessional sales and defense-support assistance. Pakistan received equipment for one additional armored division, four infantry divisions, and one armored brigade and received support elements for two corps. The Pakistan Air Force received six squadrons of modern jet aircraft. The Pakistan Navy received twelve ships. The ports of Karachi (in West Pakistan) and Chittagong (in East Pakistan) were modernized. The program did not, however, provide for the wholesale modernization of the military, much less its expansion. Forces in Kashmir and East Pakistan were excluded, and there was a continuing tug-of-war between the United States and Pakistan as Pakistan sought to extend the scope of the program and wring more benefits out of it.

The impact on the military of this new relationship was intense. Pakistanis embraced the latest concepts in military organization and thinking with enthusiasm and adopted United States training and operational doctrine. The army and the air force were transformed into fairly modern, well-equipped fighting forces. In the course of the rearmament program, the military was substantially reorganized along United States lines, and hundreds of Pakistani officers were trained by United States officers, either in Pakistan or in schools in the United States. Although many British traditions remained, much of the tone of the army, especially the officer corps, was Americanized.

Pakistan's hopes for an equitable settlement of its disputes with India, especially over Kashmir, were probably small in any event, but by bringing the United States directly

into the South Asian security equation, rapprochement with India became virtually impossible. More important, India responded to Pakistan's new alignment by turning to the Soviet Union for military and political support--and the Soviet leader at the time, Nikita S. Khrushchev, was only too happy to oblige.

As a result, Pakistan not only incurred Soviet hostility but also ultimately triggered a Soviet military supply program in India that more than offset the United States assistance to Pakistan. Soviet displeasure was further heightened by Pakistan's decision to grant facilities at Peshawar for the United States to conduct U-2 aerial reconnaissance missions over the Soviet Union.

Prospects for Pakistan's relations with US improved after Republican Eisenhower came to power in 1952 in the White House. Pakistan pushed its case as an ally that could provide support for Middle East security and in return it asked for military and economic support for its flail economy. Unstable domestic politics had led to political and economic distress while the bureaucratic and military officers were getting stronger in the country. The Republican government was more receptive of the Pakistani position and its claims of anti-communist stand and an available allied state.

Pakistan joined with Turkey as member of the Middle East Defense Organization (MEDO) in 1954. This allowed Pakistan to formally seek aid as a regional ally of the US. In January 1955, Pakistan joined South East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) with a view to adding security to the East Asian flank of anti-communist alignment. However, it was not clear how Pakistan's role in both these organizations would actually materialize in the case of an actual conflict. However, for the Pakistanis, becoming part of these alliances allowed the country to create stronger links with the US administration and seek increasing aid.

In September 1955, Pakistan became a member of the Baghdad Pact organization which later became known as CENTO. Turkey, Iran and Iraq were its earlier members with the US as the backer of the security arrangement. The role of this organization was similar to the earlier MEDO as a northern-tier defense arrangement against communist influence in the Middle East.

"In the end, neither the Baghdad Pact nor SEATO amounted to much militarily. ...Joining the Baghdad Pact and SEATO gave Pakistan a strengthened claim on US resources and, in turn, the US acquired an even larger stake in Pakistan's well-being. As Pakistan's president Ayyub Khan put it in his biography, "Friends Not Masters", Pakistan had become America's "most allied ally in Asia".

A key development from Pakistan's perspective was the amount of development and military aid that started in 1954 and increased to \$500 million by 1957 as a result of Pakistan's joining the regional defense organizations and allying with the USA. During the second Eisenhower term, the relations between the two countries became even stronger. Pakistan's Army Chief staged a military coup in 1958 and later became the President of Pakistan. Field Marshal Ayyub Khan had developed strong relations with the Americans and his era from 1958 to 1969 turned out to be a strong era of US- Pakistan relations. In 1959, Ayyub's government allowed the US to set up an intelligence facility in Badaber, NWFP province and operate U2 surveillance flights over the Soviet Union from its Peshawar Airport. This arrangement and the closer relationship of the Pakistani government with the US administration allowed it to acquire increasing military hardware and arms for its defense services. The issue troubling the US was Pakistan's closer relations with China. The Indians and Chinese had fought a war in 1962 in which China had given India a bloody nose. As a result Pakistan moved to improve and strengthen its relations with China in order to position itself as a stronger foe for India. However, Pakistan's growing friendship with communist China irked the US who was facing a proxy war against the communists in Vietnam. Pakistan and India fought a war in 1965 that was an ill-fated affair started by a limited guerilla war in Kashmir that Ayyub started in order to pressurize India to come to the negotiating table over Kashmir.

Improving the Substance and Visibility of US-Pakistan Cooperation

While the cooperation between nations has dramatically increased since 9/11, residual distrust has only been marginally reduced. According to the PEW survey, while 57 percent of Pakistanis favor the current government policies and 52 percent consider Islamic extremism a threat, only 23 percent view the United States favorably. Although this is an improvement over the 17 percent reported two years ago, it is still well below

acceptable standards. What is needed is a deliberate strategy for improving the US-Pakistan relationship. Concentrated effort to debunk the perception that the relationship is based on the vested interests of the United States and the power-base of President Musharraf. It is reassuring that the US government has declared its policy regarding Pakistanis based on the following five goals:

1. Winning the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT).
2. Nonproliferation of WMD.
3. Promoting a peaceful Pakistan-Afghanistan relationship.
4. Improving the Pakistan-India relationship.
5. Promoting Democracy.

While these goals appear to focus mainly on security, there are a number of other areas where the United States and Pakistan can work together to improve their current relationship⁴

Aid to Pakistan by the Numbers


The United States began providing economic assistance along and military aid to Pakistan shortly after the country's creation in 1947. In total, the United States obligated nearly \$67 billion (in constant 2011 dollars) to Pakistan between 1951 and 2011. The levels year to year have waxed and waned for decades as US geopolitical interests in the region have shifted. Peaks in aid have followed years of neglect. In several periods, including as recently as the 1990s, US halted aid entirely and shut the doors of the USAID offices. This pattern has rendered the United States a far cry from a reliable and unwavering partner to Pakistan over the years.

History of US Obligations to Pakistan, millions US\$(2011):

In 2009, in an attempt to signal the United States' renewed commitment to Pakistan, the US Congress approved the Enhanced Partnership for Pakistan Act (commonly known as

⁴ Historical Dictionary of Pakistan, (2d ed.; London: The Scarecrow Press, 1999)

the Kerry-Lugar-Berman bill, or KLB). KLB's intention was to put security and development on two separate tracks, insulating the development agenda from unpredictable geopolitical and military events and facilitating longer-term planning for development. The act authorized a tripling of US economic and development-related assistance to Pakistan, or \$7.5 billion over five years (FY2010 to FY2014), to improve Pakistan's governance, support its economic growth, and invest in its people.



Even with strong authorizing language, however, it is up to the administration to request the funds and up to the Congressional appropriations committees to approve those requests. As quantified in a recent Congressional Research Service report by Susan Epstein and Alan Kroonstad, in only one of the first four years of KLB's five-year authorization did the final appropriation for US economic-related aid to Pakistan meet or exceed the average annual authorization of \$1.5 billion.

Economic Assistance and Technology Transfer:

Although Pakistan has an extremely promising young population with a fairly large pool of information technology (IT) experts and nuclear scientists, it is striving to enter the industrial age and has yet to challenge the information age. Even its modest consumer-based industries that have continued to grow have come under tremendous pressure as

markets are flooded with cheap Chinese goods. Pakistan's economy could be bolstered through direct foreign investment in the industrial infrastructure or by means of the transfer of crucial technologies to the manufacturing sector. The United States is in a position where it could take highly visible and meaningful actions to enhance Pakistan's exports to American markets. Similarly, Pakistan needs to invest in making its industrial output more competitive on the international market. American involvement in Pakistani economic development could provide a highly visible means of gaining the confidence of both the Pakistani people and the international community, bringing added value to the US-Pakistani relationship.

Kashmir:

The Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan has remained unresolved; it provides both risks and opportunities for the US-Pakistan relationship. The dispute has absorbed huge amounts of Indian and Pakistani resources over the last half-century, and it continues to bleed both countries of valuable resources that could be better applied to economic and social programs. India insists on a bilateral resolution of the dispute, however, this is unrealistic from the Pakistani viewpoint since the resolution would entail the ceding of disputed territories. Involvement of the international community, especially the United States, could help promote an early resolution of the dispute. The dispute has worked a severe economic hardship on Pakistan because the country is compelled to maintain a large military, far greater than normal regional security threats require. Further, the continuing insurgency in the Indian-Held Kashmir (IHK) has aroused militancy among the Muslim youth. These young people are not only motivated to fight the Indian occupation forces in IHK, but are further inclined to take up arms against perceived injustices anywhere in the world. Fair resolution of the dispute would help quell this militancy among the youth and would go a long way in reducing popular support for such behavior. The United States should lead an effort leveraging India's economic dependency on America. This effort should focus on the United Nations resolution based on granting the right of self-determination to the people of Kashmir. To ensure future security between the two nuclear rivals, America could enter a trilateral security arrangement designed to enhance nuclear command and control arrangement sin

South Asia. Perhaps, no other US action would receive so positive a response from both the Pakistani populace and the international community as the peaceful resolution of this divisive issue. Even incremental progress would receive regional visibility and dispel the perception that the US-Pakistani relationship is Musharraf-dependent or War-on-Terrorism centric. Moreover, progress in resolving this security issue would allow for the reduction of Pakistani armed forces, in addition to freeing up significant forces for security operations against terrorists⁵.

Appropriations for Economic-Related Assistance

Program or Account	FY2010	FY2011	FY2012 (Est)	FY2013 (Req)	FY2014 (Req)
Economic Support Fund (ESF)	\$1,292	\$919	\$905	\$928	\$766
Global Health & Child Survival-USAID (GHCF-USAID)	\$30	\$28	-	-	-
International Narcotics Control & Law Enforcement (INCLE)	\$170	\$114	\$75	\$124	\$74
Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining & Related Programs (NADR)	\$24	\$25	\$21	\$19	\$18
Total Economic-Related Assistance	\$1,516	\$1,086	\$1,001	\$1,071	\$858

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Major incidents that have marred the Pak-US ties:

Several incidents of violence against American officials and the US diplomats stationed in Pakistan turned the relationship sour. In November 1979, rumors that the United States had participated in the seizure of the Masjid Al-Haram, the Grand Mosque in Makkah, provoked a mob to attack the US Embassy in Islamabad. The Chancery was set ablaze, resulting in a loss of life.

⁵ Shahid Javed Burki, *Historical Dictionary of Pakistan*, (2d ed.; London: The Scarecrow Press, 1999)

In 1989, an attack on the American Center in Islamabad resulted in the killing of six Pakistanis in crossfire with the police. In March 1995, two American employees of the US Consulate in Karachi were killed and one wounded in an attack. In November 1997, four US businessmen were brutally murdered while being driven to work in Karachi. Pakistan tested its nukes on May 28, 1998 in retaliation to the Indian nuclear tests conducted a fortnight earlier. This proved a major setback for the never-so-exemplary Pak-US ties.

In March 2002, a suicide attacker detonated explosives in a church in Islamabad, killing two Americans associated with the Embassy. Unsuccessful attacks by terrorists on the Consulate General in Karachi in May 2002 also heightened the Pak-US diplomatic tension. Another bomb detonated near American and other businesses in Karachi in November 2005, killing three people and wounding 15 others. On March 2, 2006, a suicide bomber detonated a car laden with explosives near a vehicle carrying an American Foreign Service officer to the US Consulate Karachi. The diplomat, the Consulate's locally employed driver and three other were killed in the blast, while 52 others were wounded.

In September 2008, an explosives-laden truck exploded at Islamabad's Marriott Hotel, allegedly killing US Embassy personnel.

9/11 and the U-Turn in US-Pakistan Relations:



It was the incident of 9 /11 that changed the face of US-Pakistan relations completely and once again brought the two states close to form an alliance but this time against Taliban. Pakistan's leadership without learning from their past mistakes joined hands with US and became a critical ally and is still bearing the brunt of its unremitting support to U.S.

Since 2001 till today Pakistan is fully supporting US in its war against terrorism. . Yet it has failed to achieve the status that should be given as a recompense for its sacrifices. Even after 10 years of agony, US does not show any regard to Pakistan's significant role in curbing the militancy. Instead it has kept on accusing Pakistan from time to time and demands to 'do more'. These kinds of US accusation harms Pakistan's image in international community and are disliked at Pakistan's end. Osama raid has further tensed the already cold relations between the two partners and has brought the future of US-Pakistan relations under intense consideration. Today the people of Pakistan have given even more sacrifices than the NATO/US troops in Afghanistan. Pakistani public already fed up by the mess created by Afghan war wants US to end this menace. Amidst national, economic, social, religious crisis, unstable political regime, escalating drone attacks, loss of civilian lives and news of Osama's downfall has created trouble, which is spreading like a wild fire. The demand of 'Go America Go' is being chanted all across Pakistan. This shows a growing wedge between the two strategic partners. A Pakistani private channel's survey explored that 77% Pakistanis see US as their enemy. A new survey conducted by Washington's Pew Research Centre also shows that only 11 per cent of Pakistanis view the US and President Obama favorably. The US- Pak relations have not proved much fruitful for Pakistan and the nation feels betrayed by the US administrations. US want Pakistan to become its vessel state, where all policies are made only to serve the interests of US. The government should devise such policies that ensure to safeguard our own land and people not the US interests. Therefore, it is now time for politico-military leadership of Pakistan to sit and review their policies before this unconditional assistance to US costs the lives of the entire nation. Albeit despite growing hatred towards American policies and its presence in the region the war against terrorism has now become Pakistan's own war and therefore needs genuine concern of our government.

Effects of 9|11 on Pakistan⁶

ALMOST five years after 9/11, the scars of the American-led war on terror are fast becoming visible in Pakistan. Backlash from Pakistan's over-generous support to the US has radicalized society and placed the nation on an uncharted political course.

With damage control measures yet to be implemented, the prospect of unifying the different factions of society remains dim. International and regional events have been shaped by a strong reaction to the so-called war on terror which is now driving Pakistani youth to give up their lives for the "greater cause of jihad".

Contrary to western reports, most militants are not madressah students. Unfortunately, the western media has as usual resorted to stereotyping nations and individuals, giving rise to the misleading belief that every act of terror is masterminded by a Taliban or mullah. But the reality is quite different.

In late 2005, the interior ministry compiled an investigative report on the identity of suicide bombers in Pakistan. The report reveals that 9/11 produced 22 suicide bombers. Of these, only three were madressah students. The rest were ordinary youngsters who had joined militant outfits, and who subsequently went on to target western interests and mosques of rival minorities including the Shia community. Unofficial figures of homegrown suicide bombers have now risen to as many as 30.

The pre-9/11 era spanning more than 50 years in Pakistan saw hardly any suicide bombers. But in a matter of just five years, 30 cases of suicide attacks were recorded in Pakistan. One of the reasons for this is that the government has opted for a secretive modus operandi instead of pursuing a genuine and transparent long-term strategy with regard to the US-led anti-terror campaign that is undermining the country's sovereignty.

There has been a 10 per cent increase in the enrolment of well chieve its long-term vital geo-strategic interest. Strategic goals might turn out to be short-term tactical policy arrangements if the people continue to feel insecure over the infringement of their rights as citizens of a sovereign state off educated students in madressahs. Abdul Rashid Ghazi,

⁶ (sarwar hussain, Karachi)

who heads the second largest madressah network in Pakistan, says that highly qualified youngsters are approaching the religious scholars to know more about jihad.

Hundreds of suspected militants have been detained without any charge. Their families have not been informed about their whereabouts. Many Pakistanis were handed over to the US clandestinely on unproven charges of connections with Al Qaeda and the Taliban. This has generated a wave of public sympathy for them. This means that there are more minds that accept suicide bombings. Many young men who are no strangers to images of destruction and who have been brushed aside by their own undemocratic regime are willing to become suicide bombers.

Internet and the comprehensive coverage of world events by the international media have raised the level of political awareness. The media provides youngsters with graphic text, videos and images of US carpet bombings and air raids in Afghanistan and Iraq. They see the devastation and humiliation wreaked on ordinary Muslims including those who have suffered physical and mental agony at the hands of US forces in Iraq's Abu Ghraib prison and Guantanamo Bay. These images are not easily forgotten and remain etched on the minds of hundreds of millions of Muslims around the world silently watching the rape of Muslim nations by the world's lone superpower.

The question is where these frustrated youngsters will end up in their effort to participate in what they view as a jihad. Obviously, their prime targets are western interests to which the general public in Pakistan may not object given the growing anti-American wave in the country and elsewhere in the Muslim world. But at the same time, this unbridled lot is vulnerable to misuse by powerful unscrupulous elements for suicide targets against different Islamic sects. These targets are no longer restricted to the Shia community. The recent bombing in Nishtar Park in Karachi has sowed sufficient seeds of enmity within major schools of thoughts among Sunnis.

Another part of the problem is the frequent compromises the government makes with regard to Pakistan's sovereignty. There have been incidents of direct commando operations by the FBI that has whisked away citizens in league with Pakistani security agencies. Similarly, repeated incursions of US forces in the bordering northwestern

region with Afghanistan have incensed tribesmen who see the Pakistan army as an extension of US forces on the other side of the border.

So far, armed militants have ambushed and killed over 650 Pakistani soldiers in North and South Waziristan region since 9/11. Within the last two months, over a dozen security officials have been killed in suicide attacks, a level of violence never witnessed in the tribal belt before.

Lack of democracy, institutional instability and the resultant breach of sovereignty have compounded the problem.

While our rulers may finally be trying to navigate a new course and exploring strategic options including looking for more reliable allies, tackling domestic problems might prove a far more difficult exercise.

Output of Alliances and Cultivation of American Friendship:

Pakistan strove hard for four years of partition no issue was resolved through military alliances. Secure US aid prior to 1953 but it did not succeed the us was more interested in providing aid to India due to its strategic position vis a vis communist china Pakistan miscalculated at diplomatic level it never obtained us support against India on issues such as Jammu and Kashmir Indus water and economic assets of Pakistan which were taken by India at the time.⁷

⁷Pakistan economic and social review volume 49 no .1(summer 2011) pp 109- 132 (Mussaratjabeen and mohammad saleemm azhar)

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS AFGHANISTAN



Written by: KANWAL FAIZ

Afghanistan–United States relations

Afghanistan–United States relations can be traced to 1921 but the first contact between the two occurred further back in the 1830s when the first recorded person from the United States was visiting Afghanistan. In the last decade, Afghan-American relations have become stronger than ever before. Afghanistan and the United States have a very strong and friendly strategic partnership. In 2012, relations became even closer when the President of the United States, Barack Obama declared Afghanistan a Major non-NATO ally. According to a 2012 BBC poll, the U.S. was the most favored country in Afghanistan.

History:

The first recorded contact between Afghanistan and the United States occurred in the 1830s when Josiah Harlan, an American adventurer and political activist from the Philadelphia area of Pennsylvania, traveled to the Indian subcontinent with intentions of becoming the King of Afghanistan. It was when the British Indian army invaded Afghanistan, during the First Anglo-Afghan War (1838–1842) when Afghan kings Shuja Shah Durrani and Dost Mohammad Khan were fighting for the throne of the Durrani Empire. Harlan became involved in Afghan politics and factional military actions, eventually winning the title Prince of Ghor in exchange for military aid. The British-Indian forces were defeated and forced to make a complete withdrawal a few years later, with around 16,500 of them being reported to be killed and captured in 1842. There is no clear evidence as to what happened because the claim is made by William Brydon, the lone survivor. Harlan is believed to have left Afghanistan around the same period, eventually returning to the United States.

Official diplomatic relations

In January 1921, after the Treaty of Rawalpindi was signed between Afghanistan and colonial British India, the Afghan mission visited the United States to establish diplomatic relations. Upon their return to Kabul, the envoys brought a greeting letter from U.S. President Warren G. Harding. After the establishment of diplomatic relations,

the US policy of helping developing nations raises their standard of living was an important factor in maintaining and improving US ties with Afghanistan. Residing in Tehran, William Harrison Hornibrook served as a non-resident US Envoy (Minister Plenipotentiary) to Afghanistan from 1935 to 1936. Louis Goethe Dreyfus served from 1940 to 1942, at which point the Kabul Legation was opened in June 1942. Major Gordon Enders of the United States Army was appointed the first military attaché to Kabul and Cornelius Van Hemert Egret represented the U.S. Legation from 1942 to 1945 followed by Ely Eliot Palmer from 1945 to 1948.^[6] Although Afghanistan had close relations with Nazi Germany, it remained neutral and was not a participant in World War II.

Cold War

Afghan-American relations became important during the start of the Cold War, between the United States and Soviet Union. In 1958, Prime Minister Adour Khan became the first Afghan to speak before the United States Congress in Washington, DC. His presentation focused on a number of issues, but most importantly, underscored the importance of US-Afghan relations. While in the US capital of Washington, Adour met with President Dwight Eisenhower, signed an important cultural exchange agreement, and reaffirmed personal relations with Vice President Nixon that had begun during the latter's trip to Kabul in 1953. The Prime Minister also traveled around the United States visiting the New York Stock Exchange, the Empire State Building, hydroelectric facilities at the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), and other sites.

At that time the United States declined Afghanistan's request for defense cooperation but extended an economic assistance program focused on the development of Afghanistan's physical infrastructure—roads, dams, and power plants. Later, US aid shifted from infrastructure projects to technical assistance programs to help develop the skills needed to build a modern economy. Contacts between the United States and Afghanistan increased during the 1950s, especially during the Cuban Revolution between 1953 and 1959. While the Soviet Union was supporting Cuba's Fidel Castro, the United States was focusing on Afghanistan for its strategic purposes. This was mainly to counter the spread

of communism and the strength of the Soviet Union into South Asia, particularly the Persian Gulf.

From the 1950s to 1979, U.S. foreign assistance provided Afghanistan with more than \$500 million in loans, grants, and surplus agricultural commodities to develop transportation facilities, increase agricultural production, expand the educational system, stimulate industry, and improve government administration.

Soviet invasion and civil war¹

Following the Soviet invasion, the United States supported diplomatic efforts to achieve a Soviet withdrawal. In addition, generous U.S. contributions to the refugee program in Pakistan played a major part in efforts to assist Afghan refugees. U.S. efforts also included helping the population living inside Afghanistan. This cross-border humanitarian assistance program aimed at increasing Afghan self-sufficiency and helping resist Soviet attempts to drive civilians out of the rebel-dominated countryside. During the period of Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, the U.S. provided about 3 billion US dollars in military and economic assistance to the Mujahedeen groups stationed on the Pakistani side of the Durand Line. The U.S. Embassy in Kabul was closed in January 1989 for security reasons.


Nato Presence and the Karzai Administration



¹Afghanistan : post Taliban governance, security & US policy ; Kenneth Katz man, specialist in Middle east affairs . June 6 ,2016 congressional Research Service.

Following the September 11 attacks in the United States, believed to be orchestrated by Osama bin Laden who was residing in Afghanistan under asylum at the time, the U.S.-led Operation Enduring Freedom was launched. This major military operation was aimed at removing the Taliban government from power and to capture or kill al-Qaeda members, including Osama bin Laden. Following the overthrow of the Taliban, the U.S. supported the new government of Afghan President Hamid Karzai by maintaining a high level of troops to establish the authority of his government as well as combat Taliban insurgency. Both Afghanistan and the United States resumed diplomatic ties in late 2001.

Department of Defense War-Related Funding (in Billions of Dollars)



The United States has taken the leading role in the overall reconstruction of Afghanistan by providing billions of dollars to the Afghan National Security Forces, building national roads, government and educational institutions. In 2005, the United States and Afghanistan signed a strategic partnership agreement committing both nations to a long-term relationship.

United states, Taliban & Crisis in Afghanistan(B.K Shrivastava)

Afghanistan is in a crisis of “Biblical” proportions. For nearly three decades it has been subjected to unprecedented violence which was ignited by the hasty initiatives of a radical regime to transform a traditional & conservative society. When the soviet forces entered Afghanistan, the violent resistance burst out in an all engulfing flame. The war in Afghanistan forced one third of its population to leave the country & become refugees in neighboring Iran & Pakistan. Millions lost their lives or were seriously wounded. But the end of the war against the soviet forces did not bring peace to the country. Another seemingly unending civil war began that has now gone on for eleven years. The Afghan cities, especially Kabul, has been bombed & subjected to such heavy shelling that it resembles a huge pile of rubble. Afghanistan has recently experienced earthquake & it is now in the midst of one of the worst drought in its history the people in Afghanistan must be helped in the hour of their worst crisis but due to the prevailing conditions & the nature of its political regime not much international assistance is coming. Its rulers have told the people that they are suffering because they are not righteous enough.

The Beginning of the civil War

When the U.S. agree to be the co –guarantor of the Geneva Accord on April 1988 it knew that the war would continue even after the complete withdrawal of the soviet forces .The mujahedeen whom it had supported all these years ,were not a signatory to the Accord .ON THE Contrary, they had deceased their determination to continue the fight till the Najibullah government was overthrown and president Zia –ul –Haq had told president Reagan that notwithstanding the language of the Accord that Pakistan had signed ,it would continue to do what it had been doing all along ,that is ,giving every possible help to the Mujahedeen .under pressure from the supporters of the Mujahedeen in the congress and outside ,the united states itself had secured the freedom to supply arms to the Mujahedeen under positive symmetry .The Reagan administration had assumed on the basis of intelligence reports that no sooner the soviet forces Najibullah government would collapse like a house of cards.

Initially, the Started tried United to overcome this problem by increasing its arms supplies. Much worse development followed The Mujahedeen groups, which were United when fighting the soviet forces, fell out and began to squabble the difference were predictably along the ethnic default line .the northern Afghanistan came under the control of the Tajik field Commander Ahmed Shah Masood and the southern part of country came under Hizb-e-Islami of pashtun, Gulbuddin Hikanatyar.

The Rise of the Taliban

Afghan is one of the poorest countries in the world. In 1989 the year of which such statistics exist, the average income per person was only 200/year since then it has surely dropped further due to the constant civil war. It has the fourth highest infant mortality rate in the world. Life expectancy for both men & women is 43-44 years old.



In 1996 the Taliban took control of Afghanistan's capital, Kabul. They banned all opposition group political parties and trade unions. They introduced a brutally repressive form of Sharia law. Music, movies, T.V, card playing, singing, dancing, boxing and buried alive. Women are virtually enslaved. One of the Taliban's major financiers is Osama Bin Laden .He calls for a war of the "believers" against the "non-believers" includes non-Muslims and Muslims who do not subscribe to his particular form of

‘‘pure Islam ‘‘Wahabism. It’s a puritanical trend of Sunni Islam imported from Saudi Arabia.

Islamic fundamentalism is a completely reactionary ideology the seeks to turn the wheel of history backward to establish theocratic dictatorship. The Taliban’s Sharia Law has nothing in common with Afghan culture. Most Afghan Muslims belong to the Hanafi School of thought, the most tolerant denomination of Sunni Islam the Taliban fighters were recruited and educated at madrasas, Islamic religious schools in Pakistan. By mid - 1994, Afghans were very unhappy with the oppressive rule that had been ushered in the wake of the victory of the mujahideen. They had suffered for a decade when the Soviet forces invaded their country. Now they were suffering even more under the oppressive and corrupt rule of the warlords and local chieftains. The mujahideen were engaged in plundering and killing their own people, besides fighting among them. The Taliban rode on the crest of the rising wave of frustration and anger against the mujahideen. They took up arms with the promise of disarming mujahideen groups and restoring peace in the troubled country through the establishment of a strict Islamic regime.

The American officials believed that the Taliban leader offered the only realistic chance of putting an end to the growing of poppy and opium in Afghanistan because of their conservative Islamic belief. With the estimated annual production of 25,000 tons of raw opium, Afghanistan was one of the biggest country sources of narcotics in the world. The United Nations Drugs control program reported that opium production jumped by 25 per cent over the last year. All the increase had taken place in the areas controlled by the Taliban. There was disappointment that despite promises to the contrary, the Taliban had done nothing to restrict the growing of poppy & production of opium. On the issue of the UN seat for the new government, he said that the issue would be decided by members of the United Nations at the appropriate time.

International Terrorism

The US citizens had been the victims of international terrorism in the past. Most of the terrorist attacks had taken place in the Middle East because of American support for

Israel .During the war against the soviet forces in Afghanistan, the United States provided funds, gave weapons and created facilities for training guerrillas².



Though it projected the war as the of national liberation, extremist Muslims everywhere saw it as a war by their co-religionists against the infidels. In its zeal to support the war, the united States indirectly contributed to the growth of extremism in Afghanistan. The Muslim volunteers came from far off countries, many of them not only for fighting in Afghanistan but also in Chechnya a & Kashmir & against their own governments, which they perceived to be subservient to the west & against Islamic values. Neither the mujahideen nor their successor the Taliban was interested in ending international terrorism. Nor could they do so without watering down their own commitment to what they believed to be their religious obligation jihad. Even the afghan war was jihad for them. Nothing illustrates this better than the career of Osama bin laden, the Saudi Arabian billionaire who rebelled against his own government because of its subservience to the United States. He first actively participated in the war against the soviet union in Afghanistan & then continued his jihad un Kashmir, Chechnya & against the united states.

² Afghanistan: post Talban Governance Security and U.S. Policy; Kenneth Katzman, Specialist in Middle East Affairs. June 6, 2016 Congressional Researcl Service .

US Seeks Pakistan's Help



Pakistan has considerable influence over the Taliban .In the civil war it provided a great deal of assistance to the Taliban .In his report to the general assembly on April 3,1996, UN Secretary General noted “The escalating foreign interference by countries in the region and beyond further complication the process and fueled the machinery for the war. But the countries concerned either denied involvement or described as legitimate assistance to the Afghan people” The secretary general did not name any country .The government of Afghanistan at that time headed by president Rabbani in a letter addressed to the secretary general accused Pakistan of intervening in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. It alleged that this was one of the main causes of the arms conflict in Afghanistan. The Taliban supported by Pakistan seized Kabul in 1996 and the northern areas in September 1997 .The Taliban movement itself had arisen from the zealots trained in the Madras as in Pakistan; some of their former students occupy the top echelon of the leadership of the Taliban, which controls eighty five percent of Afghan territory .the Clinton administration sought cooperation from the government of Nawaz Sharif under pressure from the United states Sharif Projected Pakistan as the victim of terrorist activities .While conceding that there existed camps in Afghanistan which were training terrorists ,he went on to add that they were also “being sent to Pakistan to kill our people “The was some truth in the statement . The Sunni Fundamentalists trained in Afghanistan were targeting the shia population in Pakistan .the camps were not training terrorists for

sending them to Pakistan alone. Complaints were pouring from Russia ,Central Asian Republics, China and Arab states .

When General Pervez Musharraf overthrew the government in a coup ,he called for a “William Milan”, the US Ambassador in Pakistan welcomed this, as a marked change in attitude from the previous government. Speaking to the press in Islamabad, the ambassador said “This a good thing and this is new. We think that Pakistan government is a only government with much leverage with the Taliban and we always thought that Pakistan government could do more” The ambassador terrorism was acknowledged that the issue of terrorism was troublesome for Pakistan as well as Afghanistan. Several militant groups had headquarters in Pakistan, including Harkat –UL- Mujahideen, which the united states had declared to be a banned terrorist organization.

Effort to End Conflict

In April 1999,testifying before the senate foreign relation committee, Inder furth reported some recent efforts by the international community to reach political settlement in Afghanistan .He pointed out that though the Taliban controlled nearly eighty five percent of the area as compared to commander Ahmad Shah Massoud who controlled only fifteen percent and also enjoyed superiority in artillery, armor and planes over the northern alliance, the military strength of the two sides was nearly equal .In April 1998, American Representative to the united nations ambassador, Bill Richardson visited Islamabad to facilitate negotiations between the Taliban and the northern alliances .He met with Rabbani and Taliban leaders and later on met the leaders of the northern alliance. An agreement was reached to hold talks on cease fire and exchange of prisoners .In the last week of April direct talks did take place in Islamabad. The United Nations and the OIC jointly sponsored the talks. But the talks collapsed. He charged that the United Nations favored its enemy³.

³ Derek Reveron is a professor of national security affairs at the Naval war college in Newport Rhode Island .He served in Afghanistan 2010-11 .These views are his own .(October 6,2011) The Afghanistan crisis Issues & perspectives

The American federal government has placed no restriction on American companies from doing business with the Taliban. The United States has remained engaged with Afghanistan all these years. It provides financial assistance and humanitarian assistance through international and non- government organization. USAID's office of US foreign disaster assistance provided \$7 million for earth quake relief and for internally displaced and other vulnerable persons inside Afghanistan. The United States has been following the carrot and stick policy .but its stick has been ineffective and the carrots too unattractive for the Taliban.

The Taliban Resurgent: Threats to Afghanistan's Security

The success or failure of the U.S. mission in Afghanistan has reached a critical juncture. Newly appointed Defense Secretary Ashton Carter announced on February 21, 2015 that the United States is considering a number of changes to the U.S. mission in Afghanistan, including slowing the drawdown timetable and rethinking the U.S. counter-terrorism mission. On March 16, 2015, anonymous U.S. officials confirmed that the United States is likely abandoning its plans to cut the number of U.S. troops to 5,500 at the end of the year. The United States could allow many of the 9,800 troops in Afghanistan to remain beyond 2015. A visit by Afghan President Ashraf Ghani to Washington, DC from March 22-25, 2015 is intended to discuss these issues⁴.

Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups continue to be present in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Al-Qaeda maintains safe havens in the region from which it continues to provide support to global terrorist activity. Concerns are also rising over reports of groups affiliated with the Islamic State spreading in Afghanistan. Preventing these groups from maintaining or gaining a solid foothold in Afghanistan is a strategic goal of the U.S. counter-terrorism mission, and is unlikely to be achieved by the ANSF on its own. There is little discussion about maintaining a counter-terrorism and advisory force past the 2016 end date for the U.S. mission. The violence witnessed in the last year is indicative of a resurgent enemy, and the ANSF will require robust, long-term assistance from the United States for support in containing these threats.

⁴ by Lauren McNally and Paul Bucala

President Ghani is a willing and welcoming potential partner in the Resolute Support Mission and wants to see both U.S. and Afghan interests met. One of Ghani's first acts as president was to sign the Bilateral Security Agreement, and he remains a strong advocate of continued U.S. presence in Afghanistan. The United States is in a position to support Ghani as he leads Afghanistan into a new decade of transformation that includes a long-term and effective Afghan-U.S. security partnership, although he will face tough requirements to preserve the security of the country even so.

Ending the War in Afghanistan; The Afghan Role



For some time president Karzai has sought to initiate such an internal Afghan process. The United States, even under the Bush administration, was not opposed in principal. Until recently however, Washington has preferred to concentrate on detaching low level fighters from the insurgent cause, a process labeled “reintegration”, arguing that any top down effort at reconciliation should await improvements on the battlefield⁵.

The attraction of reintegration are evident. Each insurgent brought over weakens the enemy while it corresponding strengthen the government forces. In Iraq such a process broke the back of the Sunni insurgency, resulting in the massive defection of enemy

⁵ American Foreign Policy Towards Afghanistan: 1919-2001 .

fighters who in 2007, moved more or less overnight from killing American soldiers to working for them. This shift was achieved without the U.S. or the Iraqi government having to make any concessions affecting the nature of the Iraqi state, or the constitutional order that the United States has helped establish there.

Reconciliation, by contrast, would launch a process of mutual accommodation among two competing Afghan leaderships with very different visions of the Afghan state, inevitably opening the prospect of substantive trade-offs that make both American official and many uneasy, not to say apprehensive .

The Obama administration has nevertheless recently come around to a conditions embrace of negotiation with the insurgency leadership. There are several reasons for this change of heart.


First it has become clearer that replication the sort of wholesale shift in loyalties seen among former insurgents in Iraq will be difficult in Afghanistan.



By 2007, the Sunni minority, the smallest of Iraq's three major sectarian groups, had been brutally and decisively beaten by majority Shia militias. It was only after this defeat that the Sunni turned to American forces for protection. By contrast, the Taliban

insurgency in Afghanistan is root not in that country's smallest ethnic group, but in its largest. Further these Pashtun insurgents have not been losing their civil war for the last serial years, but winning it. In Iraq, al Qaeda had, by 2007 mad itself very unwelcome among its Sunni allies by indiscriminant violence and abusive behavior. In Afghanistan, al Qaeda is hardly present and certainly presents no comparable threat to the insurgent leadership or the Pashtun way of life.

Additionally, tribal structures in Afghanistan have been weakened by thirty years of civil war, making Afghan elders a less influential set of interlocutors for the United States than the Iraqi sheiks who proved able to bring almost all of their adherents over with them when they decided to switch sides.



Second, the ambiguous results of the Marja campaign and the delay in the Kandahar operation have underlined how difficult it is to achieve the synchronicity of civilian and military, American and allied, international and Afghan government effort that the current counterinsurgency strategy calls for, particularly within the tight time line set by

president Obama. The current influx of American and European forces may be able to stabilize the battlefield situation and stem further loss of Afghan public support, but a palpable reversal in fortunes by mid -2011 is more problematic. American generals, notably the recently departed Stanley Mc Chystal, have made clear that this war is not going to end in a military victory. The insurgency do not have the support of the majority of the population, or even most Pashtun, but they are probably the largest, and certainly the best organized, and most militant faction of two country's biggest ethnic group. It is hard to imagine a sustainable peace without their acquiescence, particularly as long as they enjoy a sanctuary within Pakistan.

Finally, Washington has also come under pressure to support a reconciliation effort not just from Karzai, but from several of its allies, most notably the British, whose publics are even less supportive of continued military engagement than the American.

These consideration have led president Obama to give President Karzai a green, or at least yellow light to pursue his efforts to engage the insurgent leadership. In doing so, Obama real farm three red lines originally laid out the Bush administration. First, the insurgency would need to cut all ties with al Qaeda. Secondly, they should agree to operate politically within the confines of the existing Afghan constitution. Third they should lay down their arms.

“Any settlement among the major Afghan adversaries would crumble quickly unless supported by all the other players in the ‘great game’”.

The U.S. administration has left somewhat vague whether these three red lines are preconditions for negation or criteria for its outcome, but they make sense only as the latter, and most U.S. officials recognize this. Thus Washington is already supporting Karzai's effort to remove several Taliban figures from a UN sanction list.

Combining the External and Internal Track:



Just as an international accord on Afghanistan would have little meaning unless accompanied by a successful internal process of reconciliation, the reverse is true. Any settlement among the major Afghan advisories would crumble quickly unless supported by all the other players in the “great game”. It is significant that Pakistan has recently offered itself as a facilitator and mediator. But even if Pakistan can broker a deal between president Karzai and Mullah Omar, this would only mark the start of old northern alliance.

It will be important, therefore, for the United States to parallel president Karzai’s effort at sparking an internal dialogue with its own consultations with all the major and regional powers that have stakes in the game and have influence with the Afghan protagonists. So far such U.S. discussions seem far more advanced with Pakistan than the other players.

Whether the insurgent leadership is interested in negotiation is uncertain. Regional experts on civil wars often end in negotiated settlement rather than clear-cut victory or defeat. Once begun, such bargaining can take years, during which violence often increases as both sides seek to maximize their leverage. In the end, the side that emerges best is the one that demonstrates the greatest endurance. American officials would naturally prefer to negotiate from a position of strength, reflecting gains on the battlefield. Given the mid -

2011 timetable set by president Obama for the beginning of an American draw down, this may prove unfeasible .the quicker the president can clarify his longer –term intentions and assuming he commits to a residual level of engagement large enough to at least maintain a stalemate and permanently deny the insurgents hope of military victory, the sooner meaningful peace talks may be able to start.

Building a grand strategy in Afghanistan, Pakistan & India

War in Afghanistan (2015–present)

War in Afghanistan (2015–present) refers to the period of the war in Afghanistan following the 2001–2014 phase, led by the United States. The U.S.-led war followed the September 11 attacks, aiming to dismantle al-Qaeda and deny it a safe-haven in Afghanistan by removing the Taliban from power. After 2001, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) became increasingly involved, eventually running combat operations, under the direction of a U.S. commander. On 28 December 2014, NATO formally ended combat operations in Afghanistan and transferred full security responsibility to the Afghan government via a ceremony in Kabul, marking the beginning of the new phase of the conflict⁶.

The planned partial withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan, as well as NATO troops, and the transfer of many combat roles from NATO forces to the Afghan security forces occurred between 2011 and 2014. A bilateral security agreement was signed between the US and Afghanistan that would allow NATO troops to remain after the withdrawal date in an advisory and counter-terrorism capacity. The NATO troop presence would amount to approximately 13,000 troops including 9,800 Americans as well as 26,000 military contractors. The relatively small American presence there has been active in executing airstrikes as well as providing close air support (CAS) for the Afghan forces. Not counting CAS missions, American airstrikes are estimated to have killed 1,900–2,400 militants since January 1, 2015, as well as 75–120 civilians

As early as November 2012, the U.S. was considering the precise configuration of their post-2014 presence in Afghanistan. On 27 May 2014, President Barack Obama

⁶ The Afghan crisis ;Issue and prospect , k , warikoo

announced that U.S. combat operations in Afghanistan would end in December 2014. A residual force of 9,800 troops would remain in the country, training Afghan security forces and supporting counterterrorism operations against remnants of al-Qaeda. This force would be halved by the end of 2015, and consolidated at Bigram Air Base and in Kabul. Obama also announced all U.S. forces, with the exception of a "normal embassy presence," would be removed from Afghanistan by the end of 2016. These plans were confirmed with the signing of the Bilateral Security Agreement between the United States and Afghanistan on 30 September 2014.

The Special Operations Joint Task Force – Afghanistan, the remnant U.S./NATO special forces organization, includes a counter-terrorism task force. In the words of the U.S. Special Operations Command Fact book for 2015, this task force '[c]onducts offensive operations in Afghanistan to degrade the Taliban, al-Qaeda, and the Haqqani Networks in order to prevent them from establishing operationally significant safe havens which threaten the stability and sovereignty of Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the United States. This task force is similar to previous forces such as Task Force 373.

The Taliban began a resurgence due to several factors. At the end of 2014, the US and NATO combat mission ended and the withdrawal of most foreign forces from Afghanistan reduced the risk the Taliban faced of being bombed and raided. In June 2014, the Pakistani military's Operation Zarb-e-Azb, launched in the North Waziristan tribal area in June 2014, dislodged thousands of mainly Uzbek, Arab and Pakistani militants, who flooded into Afghanistan and swelled the Taliban's ranks. The group was further emboldened by the comparative lack of interest from the international community and the diversion of its attention to crisis in other parts of the world, such as Syria, Iraq and Ukraine. Afghan security forces also lack certain capabilities and equipment, especially air power and reconnaissance. There is also the political infighting in the central government in Kabul and the apparent weakness in governance at different levels is also exploited by the Taliban.

Taliban and allied forces

As of mid-2015, the Taliban are "directly or indirectly" supported in Afghanistan by "about a dozen" militant groups, having "different goals and agendas" according to the BBC. The groups include many headquartered elsewhere in Pakistan (Lashkar-e-Taiba and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi). Among the groups are⁷:

Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan—Afghan Taliban led by Mullah Akhtar Mohammad Mansour
High Council of Afghanistan Islamic Emirate—Taliban splinter group led by Mullah Muhammad Rasul Hezbi Islami (HIG) or Islamic Party—a comparatively minor Afghan insurgent group led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.¹ Currently in peace negotiations with the Afghan government.

Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) -- Pakistani Taliban al-Qaeda—supports the Afghan Taliban and has renewed its allegiance to the Taliban leader, Mullah Mansour
Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) -- Pakistani militant group traditionally focused on India
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) -- Pakistani sectarian militant group targeting Shias¹
Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) -- a splinter faction of IMU now loyal to Afghan Taliban

Opposing the Taliban and the Afghan government are ISIL's Khorasan Province—challenges the Taliban's legitimacy and supremacy.

Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) -- linked to ISIL since August 2015

Afghanistan and the Future of U.S. Foreign Policy

Ten years after the 9/11 attacks and the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, one thing is clear—the United States now seeks to export security around the world. Beyond counterterrorism efforts to combat al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, U.S. strategy attempts to support sovereign governments with the necessary tools to reduce security deficits that give rise to regional instability and international terrorism. The case of Afghanistan is instructive. While al-Qaeda brought the United States and its allies to Central Asia in 2001, the 2011 strategy in Afghanistan is focused on supporting the Afghan government

⁷ . American Interests in south Asia; Building a grand strategy in Afghanistan ,Pakistan and India .

and empowering its security forces to assume security lead from NATO forces by December 2014⁸.

What is true in Afghanistan is increasingly true throughout the world. U.S. military strategy reinforces sovereignty by partnering with nearly every military in the world. Over the last decade, the American security assistance program expanded from about 50 to 150 countries. Funded through the Department of State, security assistance is implemented by the Department of Defense. This type of assistance includes bringing foreign officers to the United States to teach them how to pilot helicopters, to helping countries control their maritime space by providing ships and training.

In contrast to the Cold War, when countering a "peer competitor" in the Soviet Union was the fundamental organizing principle of the international system, "weak states" preoccupy strategic thinkers today. The 2011 National Military Strategy of the United States underscored this by noting, "In this interdependent world, the enduring interests of the United States are increasingly tied to those of other state and non-state actors." This preoccupation with weak or failing states is one of the enduring impacts of the last decade.

The rationale for providing security assistance has been based on the assumption that instability breeds chaos, which could necessitate military intervention. Accordingly, the U.S. military should support other countries through military-to-military contacts, equipment transfers, and combined training activities to help foreign governments help themselves prevent tragedy. Since the United States has a dominant military and strong defense sector, countries increasingly choose to partner with the United States to take advantage of these assets. The United States generates partnerships to broaden its influence, gain access to strategic locations, and promote international security.

To be clear, security assistance does not always translate into influence. Countries such as Israel and Pakistan, for instance tend to be more responsive to domestic politics than American pressure. Yet the new model of security assistance is a far cry from what the

⁸ Derek Reveron is a professor of national security affairs at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. He served in Afghanistan 2010-11. These views are his own.

U.S. military practiced in most of the 20th century. Then, military assistance meant installing U.S.-friendly governments through the power of the bayonet, promoting insurgency to overthrow unfriendly governments, and arming friendly regimes regardless of human rights records. With Congressional oversight and Department of State guidance, security assistance programs today represent a maturity developed over the last decade. The United States aspires to create true partners that can confront their own threats to internal stability that violent actors can exploit. It also seeks to foster independence by training and equipping militaries to reduce dependence on U.S. forces. This is vividly on display in Afghanistan, where security is essential to promoting Afghan democracy and economic development.

Done on a mass-scale, the Obama Administration is developing and professionalizing a 305,000-strong Afghan military and police, which will grow to 352,000 by October 2012. Security assistance is intended to empower Kabul to assume lead security responsibility, which is done for about one-tenth the cost of international forces. While there are real challenges to this effort, including the insurgency, attrition, and corruption, growth could not have been achieved without unifying international efforts under the NATO flag, addressing underlying challenges like literacy, and active coalition partnering with Afghan units. At the same time the force is being developed, civilian control of the Afghan security forces is being actively promoted.


The United States did not get to this place easily. Stunted efforts in Afghanistan in the early 2000s were rooted in the belief that "superpowers don't do windows." But the Taliban's resurgence and proliferation of al-Qaeda affiliates changed the trajectory of U.S. foreign policy to address weak states. The challenges of supporting a functioning state in Afghanistan and Iraq have renewed calls for restraint. Yet, exclusively focusing on post-conflict zones fails to take into account the demand for security assistance from long-time allies such as South Korea, new partners like Georgia, neighbors such as Mexico, and strategic countries like Pakistan. While an undertaking on the same scale as the provision of security assistance in Afghanistan may not be repeated soon, the United States will certainly continue to help long-time allies and new partners develop their own security capabilities

AMERICAN INTEREST TOWARDS SAAARC ORGANIZATION



WRITER BY "SIDRA RIAZ"

What is SAARC?



The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) is an economic and geopolitical organization of eight South Asian nations. It plays the role of a guiding force for the member countries. For the last two months, SAARC has been frequently making headlines with several new developments being proposed by its member nations.

INTRODUCTION



- SAARC is an economic and political organization.
- SAARC was established on December 8, 1985.
- In terms of population - almost 1.5 billion people.



Environmental problems have progressively come into focus all over the world after the Stockholm Conference and the more recent conferences on global environmental problems at various international forums. A wide cross section of people including scientists, engineers, executives and the general public are increasingly becoming aware of the environmental problems and need for ecological protection and restoration. Countries have become acutely aware that although they have had a different past individually, they certainly have a Common Future.

During the Third SAARC Summit at Kathmandu in November 1987 the Heads of State or Government expressed their deep concern at the fast and continuing degradation of the environment including extensive destruction of forests in the region. They also noted that the region was afflicted with natural disasters such as floods droughts, landslide cyclone and tidal waves which caused excessive damage of the natural resources and immense human suffering. They also expressed concern over the danger posed by the global sea level rise and its effects on South Asian countries.

As these natural disasters and environment degradation were severely undermining the development process and prospects of the Member Countries the Heads of State or

Government decided to intensify regional cooperation with a view to strengthening air disaster management capabilities. They also decided to commission study on the causes and consequences natural disasters and the protection and preservation of the environment.

In pursuance of this decision, the Secretary General consulted the Member States on the possible methods of conducting the study. On the basis of these consultation the Secretary General concluded that a meeting of experts nominated by each member country should be held to formulate recommendations on the objectives, terms of reference, methodology, funding and time frame of the study. Accordingly, at the invitation of His Majesty's Government of Nepal, the meeting of experts was held on 11-15 July, 1988 at Kathmandu.

The Group of Experts concluded that natural disasters such as floods, droughts, cyclones, submersion of coastal areas due to rise in the sea level, tidal waves, landslides, mass wasting, earthquakes and glacial lake outbursts, and environmental degradation deserve careful study. The Group noted that public awareness is very important to protect and preserve the environment and that the study would provide Member Countries with an opportunity to arouse greater public consciousness.

The recommendations of the Group of Experts relating to the objectives terms of reference, methodology, funding and time- frame for the study were as follows:

Objectives

To provide a basis for the Member Countries to draw up policy conclusions and recommendations and to identify areas as keeping in view the potential and possibilities of evolving a regional plan of action for strengthening disaster management capabilities and for the protection and preservation of the environment.

Background of SAARC



It was back in 1980 when the concept of regional political and economic cooperation in South Asia was first thought of and fired the public imagination. Even before that, the idea was discussed in three major conferences: Asian Relations Conference (New Delhi), Baguio Conference (Philippines) and Colombo Powers Conference (Sri Lanka), which were held between 1947 and 1954. Ex-president of Bangladesh, Ziaur Rahman was the one who made a formal proposal on May 2, 1980. The first SAARC summit was held in Dhaka on 8 December 1985, when the organization was established. Afghanistan is the only new inclusion that happened since SAARC was established.

American interest in SAARC

After years of relative marginalization, South Asia is steadily increasing its influence in international affairs. All major powers, including the United States, European Union, China, Japan, and Russia, are expanding their engagement with the Subcontinent. On the economic front, India's high level of performance in recent years has brought the region into sharp focus. However, such high growth rates are also visible across the Subcontinent, making it the second-fastest growing region in the world — after China. India is now an important factor in managing new international trade,

energy, and environmental challenges. On the political front, most major issues that confront U.S. policy international terrorism, Islamic radicalism, weapons of mass destruction, proliferation, state failure, nation building, and promotion of democracy ingrained in the South Asian Subcontinent. South Asia will become increasingly relevant to a number of new challenges confronting U.S. foreign policy, such as Asia's regional balance of power, maritime security, and global warming. South Asia is at the crossroads of a rising Asia, making its geopolitical relevance significant. Strengthening the U.S. partnership with all the South Asian countries is likely to have positive spillover effects in East Asia, the former Soviet republics of Central Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. A strong with the United States, can emerge as a force for peace and stability across the Indian Ocean and its littoral. Since the late 1990s, the United States has devoted considerable political and diplomatic energies to its engagement with South THE U.S. Role in South asia | 55Asia, which developed a new intensity after September 11, 2001. These bipartisan efforts have produced a number of positive results— including producing a credible framework for an enduring strategic partnership with India, the centerpiece of which has been the historic civil nuclear initiative. Also, in the last few years, the United States has simultaneously helped to improve bilateral relations between New Delhi and Islamabad, an objective that for decades was deemed impossible. Deliberate American neutrality in the India-Pakistan conflicts have encouraged New Delhi and Islamabad to embark on a bilateral, and rather productive, peace process. Since 9/11, America has been involved in stabilizing Pakistan and Afghanistan against local and trans-national threats of terrorism and religious extremism, while also economically mode rinsing the region. Consequently, the United States has emerged as the single-most important external partner of the Subcontinent. Although America's recent gains in South Asia are indeed historic, they remain to be consolidated. There also exists the danger that some of the U.S. advances in the region might be reversed in the near future. This chapter defines five broad objectives for the next administration's approach toward South Asia and 10 specific policy recommendations. Given its recent preoccupation with the global war on terror, the United States has tended to undervalue its broader range of equities on the Subcontinent. Despite resentment in many quarters about the recent thrust of its policies, the United States has nonetheless developed a huge reservoir of goodwill in the

Subcontinent. The United States needs to find ways to synergize its pursuit of its interests with its enduring cultural attractiveness on the Subcontinent. Promoting democracy has been a major thrust of U.S. policy in recent years, but democracy's implementation in the Subcontinent has been beset with multiple contradictions. For example, the U.S. has demanded the complete isolation of the military rulers in Burma; yet in Pakistan, the U.S. has wavered between its commitment to promoting democracy and retaining its leverage with the Pakistani Army, which has traditionally dominated the polity. In Nepal, the U.S.'s narrow emphasis on counter-terrorism has overlooked the Maoists' importance as a political force representing long-overdue social and political modernization. Since 1996, the Maoists have taken arms in demanding various reforms, which included the replacement of the monarchy with a republic. While their use of violence against innocent people in pursuit of their political aims were among good reasons for the United States to label the Maoists as a terrorist organization, there is also the larger imperative of drawing them into the political mainstream. The Maoists emerged as the single-largest political formation in the elections to the Constituent Assembly in early 2008.

More broadly, the South Asian political elites admire the core political values of the western world — including the tradition of common law, administrative systems, financial and banking cultures, and the English language. These intellectual bonds distinguish the Subcontinent from much of East Asia and the Middle East. THE U.S. ROLE IN SOUTH ASIA | 61 East. U.S. foreign policy needs to take full advantage of this shared culture by significantly expanding its public diplomacy in South Asia. Easing the U.S. visa regulations for South Asian professionals will help build lasting ties between America and the Subcontinent. Given its recent preoccupation with the global war on terror, the United States has tended to undervalue its broader range of equities on the Subcontinent. Despite resentment in many quarters about the recent thrust of its policies, the United States has nonetheless developed a huge reservoir of goodwill in the Subcontinent. The United States needs to find ways to synergize its pursuit of its interests with its enduring cultural attractiveness on the Subcontinent. Promoting democracy has been a major thrust of U.S. policy in recent years, but democracy's implementation in the Subcontinent has been beset with multiple contradictions. For example, the U.S. has

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American interest in SAARC countries



Interest rescheduled is the amount of interest due or in arrears that was rescheduled in any given year. debt from private creditors include bonds that are either publicly issued or privately placed; commercial bank loans from private banks and other private financial institutions; and other private credits from manufacturers, exporters, and other suppliers of goods, and bank credits covered by a guarantee of an export credit agency. data are in current u.s. dollars. this page has the latest recorded value, an historical data chart and related indicators for interest rescheduled - private (us dollar) in maldives.

Washington:

The United States still has three key interests in Pakistan, averting Al Qaeda's re-emergence, preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and promoting regional stability, says the next chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Marine Corps Gen Joseph F. Dunford Jr, who currently heads the US Marine Corps, told his confirmation hearing that Pakistan's cooperation was also important for ensuring a "peaceful outcome in Afghanistan."

During the three-hour long hearing at the US Senate Armed Services Committee on Thursday afternoon, the lawmakers showed a keen interest in the future of US-Pakistan relations.

If confirmed by the Senate, Gen Dunford would succeed Army Gen Martin E. Dempsey on Oct 1. He said that the US-led coalition and the Afghan government were closely watching the ISIS's attempt to expand its reach to Afghanistan and Pakistan and were collaborating closely to prevent this threat from expanding.

Gen Dunford: Regional partners have an important role to play in ensuring a stable, democratic Afghanistan. "We have encouraged stronger ties between Afghanistan and Pakistan and have been pleased with their recent bilateral efforts to address their security concerns."

Areas of divergent interest with Pakistan include "our views on the use of proxies and the importance of a positive and stable Pakistan-India relationship".

The US-Pakistan relationship, according to general, was fundamental to US vital national security interests. The US will need to continue cooperation with Pakistan to defeat Al Qaeda, support Pakistan's stability, and achieve a lasting peace in Afghanistan.

"If confirmed, I would continue to evaluate the specifics of the relationship based on my assessment of our shared interests with Pakistan and its effectiveness of achieving our shared goals.

"I will continue to evaluate the efficacy of the mil-to- mil cooperation we have with Pakistan and identify ways in which we can work with Pakistan to enhance regional stability."

Gen Dunford said Pakistan had been, and remained, the largest recipient of the Coalition Support Fund. It is in US interests to have an enduring partnership with Pakistan.

As US mission in Afghanistan transitions, there remains a need for our mutually beneficial relationship.

“If confirmed, I will provide military advice and recommendations regarding our support for their operations based on my assessment of Pakistan’s effectiveness and the larger strategic environment.”

Gen Dunford said the US assistance to Pakistan had enabled operations in Afghanistan and operations against Al Qaeda and helped secure its strategic interests.

“If confirmed, I will continue to work with the Pakistani military to ensure that they continue to do more.”

Gen Dunford also supports conditioning US assistance to Pakistan to the country’s continued cooperation in areas of mutual security interest.

On Afghanistan-Pakistan relationship, he said the current relationship appears to have improved since the election of President Ghani. It is clear that security in Afghanistan and Pakistan are linked. Both sides are working to ensure that concrete steps are taken to enhance their bilateral relationship and cooperation.

About counterterrorism operations, he said Pakistan had cooperated with the United States in its operations against Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations. Pakistan’s actions in North Waziristan and other areas have disrupted groups that are a threat to US personnel and objectives in Afghanistan. “We will continue to work with Pakistan to do more.” Recently, improving ties with India has been an important strategic

Success and failure of SAARC



The two-day 16th summit of South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (Saarc) held in Bhutanese capital of Thimpu on April 28-29 concluded with a joint declaration expressing the resolve of their leaders to wage common struggle for economic development, improve their inter-connectivity, promote people to people contacts and evolve a joint strategy to tackle the issues of climate change, water and food shortages.

During the last quarter of the previous century international relations witnessed a strong surge towards regionalism. The underlying idea was to promote peace and economic progress through multilateral partnership of states in the region by pooling the available resources. Further impetus was provided by the emergence of new issues that threatened the fabric of international norms, such as terrorism, drug trafficking, extremism, and economic crisis. It was realised that these problems could not be solved at bilateral level and required joint efforts and close coordination. Accordingly regional groupings such as ECO, GCC, Asean and Saarc emerged.

SAARC came into being in December 1985, with the adoption of its charter in Dhaka. The objectives were to promote the welfare and improve the quality of life of the people

of South Asia by accelerating economic growth in the region and building up mutual trust among the member states. The importance of SAARC as a regional organization despite its rather unsatisfactory record, is recognized by all leaders. The feeling that peace and prosperity are indivisible and that the South Asia region has a common destiny and a shared struggle for a better and brighter future has emerged dominant theme.

The leaders who gathered in Thimpu made a frank appraisal and acknowledged that the organization has failed to live up “to the hope and aspiration of 1/5th of humanity” represented by SAARC members. The Prime Minister of Bhutan also expressed the hope that SAARC will not turn into just “a talk shop”.

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This honest confession that “the bloc has not moved away from declarations of intent to concrete implementation”, should however not blind us to the achievements.

Its performance has not been entirely dismal. Despite failings, a number of significant achievements such as (i) The Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism (ii) Saarc Agriculture Information Centre at Dhaka (iii) Saarc audio visual exchange programme (SAVE) and (iv) Social Charter to set targets for eradication of poverty, population stabilization and human resource development fall to its credit.

The South Asia Preferential Trading Agreement (SAPTA) was signed in the 7th summit at Dhaka in April 93, but it has not yet been operationalised. The proposal to establish South Asian Food Reserve and South Asian Development Fund have also met the same fate. Similarly declarations on enhancing political cooperation and promotion of mutual trust and understanding reiterated in each summit have registered limited success. Saarc despite these limitations and poor performance, however, remains a useful tool for smaller countries to promote understanding and cooperation at bilateral level.

Facing criticism that Saarc has failed to realize its ambitious objectives during the last 25 years, the Thimpu Summit decided not to indulge in rhetoric and set ambitious goals. The two major and modest projects agreed upon were US\$300 million fund to reduce poverty in the region and also on trade and environmental protection.

The perceptions of the failure of Saarc to implement its charter have been aggravated by the political climate obtaining in the region. SAARC summits should act as a forum where member states discuss not only matters of regional importance but also the underlying causes of tension in bilateral relations.

To retain its credibility and relevance Saarc should eschew unrealistic economic and social goals; instead it should be effectively used as a medium to discuss issues of peace, security and development with international organizations and agencies to promote interests of the member countries.

At the Thimpu Summit, the leaders pledged that they will united work to realize the aspirations of the founding fathers t as set out in the first Summit.

The fundamental weakness that Saarc suffers from is trust deficit among the member's states. The political differences had deep negative impact on the political will to realise the economic cooperation and integration. Besides political differences and conflict, economic factors have also played an unhelpful role. The member states except India have still not reached the take-off stage to be able to pursue the programme of economic integration and collaboration.

The establishment of Saarc Development Fund, Food Bank, The Arbitration Council, and the Regional Standards Organisations are the right moves. Saarc should also seek free and preferential trading arrangements with other regional bodies notably EU and the Asian.

It should also remain fully focused on Saarc social charter to spread out its reach to the common man. The people of South Asia desire to have a peaceful, prosperous and secure future. The security can be obtained through sincere and sustained efforts to narrow the political differences. Saarc is the appropriate tool not only to build trust but also to solve disputes and create conducive climate for realization of Saarc charter.

The writer is a former ambassador. THE two-day 16th summit of South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (Saarc) held in Bhutanese capital of Thimpu on April 28-29 concluded with a joint declaration expressing the resolve of their leaders to wage common struggle for economic development, improve their inter-connectivity, promote people to people contacts and evolve a joint strategy to tackle the issues of climate change, water and food shortages.

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The writer is a former ambassador.

Point of View

Nearly 35% of the population in South Asia currently earns an income of less than 1 dollar. The formation of SAARC in 1985 has done nothing to eliminate the problem of poverty in this region. It is due to the ineffectiveness of regional organizations such as SAARC that the long standing problem of poverty in this region has not been solved.

Another goal of SAARC had been to strengthen the relationships and collaborations between countries on important social, economic, cultural, scientific, technological and political issues. But the member countries have not been able to achieve significant cohesion and connectivity compared to other parts of the world such as • Another problem is that there have been no concrete steps towards major initiatives for peace and development in this region. SAARC has not been able to make headway for key issues such as collaboration on initiatives to counter terrorism. It has not promoted peace and comity between member nations. The biggest problem is that the regional organization has failed to promote trust and understanding.

There is a sense of insecurity between key members of SAARC. While the leading nations have established hegemony, the other countries are left out of the power equations. Ever since its formation in 1985, SAARC has been unable to promote a better relationship between India and Pakistan. Relations between the two nations are still cold and there are frequent exchanges of fire across the LOC in Kashmir. The diplomatic circles have strove to find solutions but a rapprochement between the two nations now seems next to impossible. SAARC has not promoted mutual understanding and compassion between the two nations and issues.

Member nations are also accusing each other of abetting separatist and secessionist forces on their soil. Rather than dealing with the problem jointly, member nations are becoming increasingly isolated from each other. SAARC has failed to resolve the deadlock regarding several key issues and conflicts in South Asia. In the 20th century, the religious and ethnic difference had split the South Asia into many different states that brought changes in this region. In terms of population and geographical prominence, the importance of this region cannot be abnegated. Two nuclear states (Pakistan, India) and almost 1.5 billion people of the world's population of this region increase the importance of this area. So, it was a demand for a joint converged platform for an economic development and cooperation between the member states of this region.

The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) came into being in 1985 as an economic and political organization, which have eight member states, i.e. India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, Maldives, Nepal, and Bhutan. The underlying idea behind the SAARC was to promote peace, accelerate economic stability, cultural growth, social advancement, In recent years, some countries like China and Iran show their concern over the membership in SAARC. Due to the significant importance of this region, many European states are now the observer of this. Despite the relationship between India and Pakistan, it is still a useful tool for smaller countries to promote understanding and cooperation at the bilateral level. Since 1985 SAARC has evolved slowly but continuously both in But today this region is facing many issues like terrorism, poverty, deprivation of food, drug trafficking, extremism, and economic crisis. These core issues cannot be resolved at bilateral level. It is significant to have a joint effort and close coordination among the member countries to solve these. SAARC almost failed to accomplish its ambitious objectives during the last 25 years due to the political difference, conflicts and poor economic state of the member countries. Most of the programs and achievements exist only in official documents.

US and SAARC Current Affairs

The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), as the name states, is a group designed to increase the cohesion between all South Asian states and to tackle the region's common problems together. Yet for the residents of Pakistan and India, and

arguably for many neutral spectators too, the summit is important because it gives the two nations a chance to practice some diplomacy and engage in dialogue.

In the opening days the Nepalese Prime Minister, K P Sharma Oli, gave a much-needed address on the problems faced by the region today; unpredictable weather patterns caused by global warming, ill-prepared government when it comes to natural disaster managements, and grinding poverty in large sections of the land. His solutions – focusing on intra-state cooperation and cultural exchange – were also the need of the hour. Alas the good work done by several groups and bodies under the SAARC banner will be – and already is – overshadowed by the 20-min meeting between Foreign Affairs Advisor Sartaj Aziz and India's External Affairs Minister, Shushma Swaraj on the sidelines of the summit.


The meeting did bear some positive fruit, although it still falls short of any meaningful exchange. Since the Pathankot attack bilateral talks are aimed at damage control, and this one continues that trend. Pakistan's stumped Pathankot probe would be allowed to visit India, so they can gather evidence, if any, and carry their investigations further. While the chances of some actual discovery that might lead to something concrete are slim, the gesture from both sides is what really counts at the moment. Post-Pathankot, anything that contributes to the beginning of an open –ended dialogue by legally empowered diplomats is a victory. And while such talks may not have been mentioned, the continued engagement and cooperation will make the path easier.

Another major development coming out of the summit is the agreement on the Indian Prime Minister's visit to Islamabad – where another SAARC summit is being held in November. The last blitz of a visit was more an icebreaker than anything else; this, observers hope, can lead to great progress if managed right.

Bangladesh, Bhutan, India and Nepal (BBIN) have inked a Motor Vehicles Agreement (MVA) for the regulation of passenger, personnel and cargo vehicular traffic for the economic benefit of the entire region. On behalf of India, the agreement was signed by Union Minister of Road Transport & Highways

India has won the 2015 South Asian Football Federation (SAFF) championship for record seventh time. In the final match played at Thiruvananthapuram (Kerala), India defeated defending champion Afghanistan by 2-1 goal score. Jeje Lalpekhlua (72nd minute) and Sunil Chhetri (101th) had scored goals for India. For Afghanistan single goal was scored by Zubayr Amiri at 70th minute. Indian Team Captain: Sunil Chhetri. Bangladesh, Bhutan, India and Nepal (BBIN have inked a Motor Vehicles Agreement (MVA) for the regulation of passenger, personnel and cargo vehicular traffic for the economic benefit of the entire region. On behalf of India, India has won the 2015 South Asian Football Federation (SAFF) championship for record seventh time. In the final match played.¹

SAARC in Present and Future



FUTURE MEMBERS

- **China** has shown interest in joining SAARC . While Pakistan & Bangladesh support china's candidature ,India strongly opposes it.
- **Indonesia** supported by Sri Lanka intends to become a observer of SAARC.
- **Myanmar** has expressed it's desire to become a full time member of SAARC. Myanmar's military regime officially applied for full SAARC membership in May 2008. However, the application is still being considered and the government is currently restricted to observer status.
- **Russia** intends to become an observer as well, and is supported by India
- **Iran** because of it's strong cultural, economic and political relationships with Afghanistan and Pakistan and has expressed its desire to become a member of the South Asian organization.

¹ Maj.Gen. Ramesh Chopra (Retd)

General

I just attended the “Asia Relations Conference-Transforming South Asia” in New Delhi which was at the Minister/Ambassador level and lead by the Indian National Security Adviser, where the spirit was indeed optimistic, with cooperation amongst the SAARC Nations improving; auguring well for the future development of the Region. Now coming to the present Conference at Kathmandu, despite the downturn in the Global Economy, South Asia is emerging as one of the fastest – perhaps second – growing Regions in the World, with the growth rate in recent years averaging 6-8 percent; what I wish to add is that, of special advantage is India, a SAARC member and nearby China, an observer, both economic giants, leading the way, their expanding robust economies, rising share in global trade, FDI flows besides impressive achievements in economic and some human development should be optimised and act as catalysts for the SAARC Region as a whole. In my view, SAARC – despite the difficult environment – has certainly come a long way in effecting regional economic and development cooperation projects, that too against severe political constraints. The ongoing implementation of various flagship regional cooperation projects like the establishment of the SAFTA Treaty, South Asian University, SAARC Development Fund, SAARC Food Bank and creation of the South Asia Forum are but pointers to SAARC’s emergence as a dynamic economic grouping with potential. On a more positive note, while it is considered a major step forward in making a transition from SAARC Preferential Trading Arrangement (SAPTA) to a South Asia Free Trade Area (SAFTA) Treaty, there is a need for an intensification of the regional economic integration initiatives. While some of the apprehensions concerning SAFTA’s success are genuine, several are based on unfounded reasons. What needs to be done is expand SAFTA’s scope to cover services and investment besides trade and liberalization. SAARC has no magic wand! It only provides a Regional Institutional Framework that can act as a catalyst. Member States have to take responsibility themselves to undertake conceived projects unilaterally, bilaterally or multilaterally. However, the downside challenges, besides the growing scourge of terrorism and extremism are: forty percent of the World’s poor live here and South Asia fares poorly in

respect of food security, human development, namely, health, nutrition, education and so on. Nevertheless, despite the trade percentage of SAARC, both as a whole and intra-SAARC being only single digit, these can be alleviated, to a great extent through deeper regional economic integration, closer cooperation and facilitation in investment and trade, strengthening transport infrastructure especially in the border regions, creating energy security through sharing of resources, oil, gas (Bangladesh and Pakistan), water (Nepal) and finally, extending coverage to incorporate services, industrial development, finance and capital markets. India being the largest country, and in the words of the India PM, “India has a special responsibility that flows from geography of our region and the size of (India’s) economy and market”. I will not go into figures etc. but with a sustained economic growth, India is in a better position and, I am convinced that, with a sustained economic growth should continue to make unilateral gestures and aid its neighbors:

Bangladesh, \$1 billion credit line; Afghanistan – which is strategically vital for the region’s security and economic interests, providing a gateway to Central Asia, India is investing in infrastructure projects – \$2 billion plus and recently, investing in Hajigak iron ore mines; Bhutan, loan grants for massive hydro-power projects; Sri Lanka through the long-standing FTA; Myanmar, for better connectivity to the region, India is building a multimodal system that could help improve trade and provide a gateway to ASEAN and, finally, extending economic concessions such as the facility of duty free access to Indian markets from Bangladesh, Nepal and Bhutan. India, it is also felt, should assume asymmetric responsibilities in the multilateral proposals within the framework of SAARC. The vision in the next decade should be: “Stability, Security and Growth” leading to a South Asia Economic Union/Community. During my discourse, I do not wish to follow the normal custom of weaknesses and skepticism regarding the value and continuance of SAARC– which is passé – but try and throw up some new issues and challenges that can be conjointly faced by SAARC members. First, a new fast growing phenomenon is: **a) Non-Traditional Threats Impacting the SAARC Region)** Over the years, the line between conventional threats, which constitute traditional security issues – which I am well aware of, having fought four wars– are generally tackled individually by countries themselves or in some cases, through treaties and partnerships – and non-

traditional i.e. non-military have blurred. Nontraditional threats are also critical to a Nations' security indwell-being and, since these recognize no borders nor sovereignty, need to be confronted through regional cooperation which is where SAARC comes in. New challenges and threats have emerged such as: non-traditional threats in the India Ocean, devastation through climate change – such as the recent earthquake and tsunami – with impact on food, water – the last a contentious issue of sharing, which has a potential for not only inter-state but also intra-state conflict – and energy resources with the consequent implications on the region's economy, threat of pandemic diseases, piracy, trans-national crime, demography – leading to overpopulation or can, as India expects in the years to come, to convert it into a dividend; migration due to economic disparity, all of which do not recognize political boundaries. Since such phenomenon affects the well-being and survival of society, these need to be addressed regionally, by Governments, NGO's (such as CSAS), academicians as well as International and Business Organisations and require comprehensive political, economic and joint social responses. It goes without saying that, the SAARC Agreement on Rapid Response to National Disasters should be strengthened and implemented. ii) In the final analysis, SAARC nations will have to cooperate with each other, move beyond conventional to innovative approaches and draw a comprehensive approach to evolve institutional frameworks to defeat such non-traditional challenges. A step in the right direction by India – which it can share with other SAARC nations or which they can emulate – is the formation of Ecological Task Forces to restore degraded eco-systems, undertake forestation, soil conservation, water resource management techniques – which India has learnt from Israel – establishing a Ministry of Renewable Energy (the only one in the world) and a National Action Plan for climate change with eight task forces.iii) While the UN and Multi-lateral Institutions can be tapped for their expertise, in South Asia, SAARC with a network of prominent NGOs and Think Tanks should hold regular dialogues on such security issues, set up mechanisms to take regular contact and dialogue to the next higher level so as to make recommendations to Governments to help face such challenges in an effective manner's) Energy Cooperation and Security) As far as energy security is concerned, it is for consideration whether technology and R&D can help resolve the dilemma; two routes are available, individual R&D by nations or draw on the expertise available with

Regional Blocs such as EU, and BRICS. Inevitably, there will be new challenges and competition for resources and renewable energy technology.

ii) It needs emphasis that, higher economic growth and demographic pressures have resulted in phenomenal consumption of commercial energy in South Asia making SAARC vulnerable due to overwhelming dependence on imported fossil fuels. Considering the critical role of energy and the pernicious effects of disruption, it is critical to ensure energy security. The complementary energy resource endowments i.e. natural gas in Bangladesh needs to be accurately gauged for utilization by Bangladesh industry and, if possible, export to neighboring countries; India could certainly benefit and Pakistan, coal and petroleum products in India and hydro-power in Nepal and Bhutan provide a basis for regionally integrated energy cooperation. Regional cooperation for energy security should cover regional transit facilities for energy trade with the neighboring South Asia countries. For this, the SAAR Working Group on Energy needs to be further strengthened. Regional energy trade should be promoted in hydro-power, bulk electricity, petroleum products, natural gas and coal. Furthermore, SAARC Energy Centre should Endeavour to foster collaboration with multi-lateral bodies, with other energy blocs and also with sources of energy technologies') Water Politics) Water, being a trans-boundary resource in the Sub-Himalayan region of SAARC, it is an imperative for the fast growing economies with burgeoning demography and, which are increasingly reaching water stressed conditions. This aspect needs to be addressed through a regional approach on priority, formulating strategies of sharing and consolidating water resources. The issues complex as Tibet – from where most rivers flow – is the Upper Riparian and so is Nepal (which has nine tributaries joining the Ganges), India (multi-river dependent on the YarlungTsangpo/Brahmaputra, Indus and Sutlej), being the Middle Riparian and Bangladesh the Lower Riparian. There are also competing interests of the adjoining river basin states like India and Bangladesh. Given the complicated hydrological situation – wherein to date there exists no legally binding water course treaty – there is need for initiation of a broad based and more substantive water dialogue, through an Institutional Cooperation by the SAARC Co-riparian Nations (India, Bangladesh, Nepal and perhaps even Bhutan) with China. In the interim, to avoid misperceptions due to lack

of reliable information and riparian cooperation, data sharing regarding water flows, dam construction with attendant restrictions on water supply should be institutionalized. Additionally, all these countries including China should discuss signing of an Agreement to enable joint inspection on the usage of rivers by the countries upstream; perhaps on the lines of the Indus Water Treaty between India and Pakistan. In Nepal where there is potential for 83,000 MW hydropower – and only 509 MW has been tapped so far – since inter-Government cooperation has not succeeded due to domestic and political constraints – private players from the SAARC Region, including Observers such as Japan, EU countries and faraway USA, could be encouraged to assist but the bottom line would be provision of stability by Nepal as these would be commercial ventures. The fourth challenge in the region is Terrorism and, therefore, the urgency for (d) Counter Terrorism. In the realm of counter terrorism and involvement of non-State actors, there are dual challenges that SAARC nations have a responsibility to address. In brief, priority should be accorded to challenges such as, criminalization of terrorism, illicit narcotics trade, human trafficking, money laundering, and cyber threats another new challenges. They must work together to neutralize the threats posed to each other by sharing resources and intelligence/information/data about extremists and terrorist outfits, as considered appropriate, through collaboration between relevant Institutions (some Indian agencies to the fore are the National Investigative Agency, National Intelligence Grid and the soon to be formed National Counter Terrorism Centre). Greater networking and dialogues should be promoted between existing anti-terror mechanisms of Member countries as well with UN Agencies such as the Security Council created Counter Terrorism Committee

Executive Directorate (CTED) and Centre on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation & best practices shared. SAARC countries can gainfully share their experiences and views in cooperating at the National, SAARC and International level & under Criminal Justice, Rule of Law & Human Rights and bring terrorists to justice.

ii) Hopefully, the Additional Protocol to the SAARC Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism – which came into force in Jan 2006 - would help in combating terrorism. Another aspect that merits consideration is cooperation in training anti-terrorism forces. India is presently committed to provide training and equipment to

Afghan Security Forces. Besides India, other SAAR members with anti-terrorism experience could cooperate and assist each other in this security sector. Pertinent would be a SAARC media strategy to confront the influence of extremist and terrorist organizations, highlighting the positive role played by SAARC members. Fifth, no analysis of SAARC can be complete without addressing the current's) Look East Policy and Myanmar) The Look East policy of some of the SAARC Nations with India accelerating business eastwards – to include its North-East –coupled with sub-regional integration through BIMSTEC, is a move in the right direction. Bangladesh could – to its immense advantage– become a transportation and transshipment hub, not only for East-West transit traffic but also as an entrepôt for Nepal, Bhutan and India's North-East. In the Look East context, it is for serious consideration that – despite the moratorium on SAARC expansion –Myanmar, which was an integral part of the Indian sub-continent till 1935, is slowly but surely opening up and democratizing, be considered for up gradation from Observer to Member status. It is a veritable store house of unexplored natural resources including the unexploited vital oil and gas reserves, minerals, timber and vast tracts of arable land. It could become the most convenient connectivity point – which may well take years but a beginning should be attempted – for transit and growing trade and investment opportunities for SAARC with South East Asia, ASEAN and Southern China. Additional Miscellaneous Recommendations Generally, the challenge for SAARC has always been and continues to be, the articulation of a common vision. The member Nations are at different stages of political and socio-economic development. One of the eight member States, India– which has a 15,000 km border touching the others even States which do not have a mutual border and China – an Observer which borders a few States – are virtual heavy-weights in any relevant global, political and economic discourse. In my view, SAARC could systematically create frameworks offering policy and development options for the emerging and developing members and assume the role of a veritable Think Tank for such nations, similar to the role played by the up and coming BRICS, OECD, SCO and so on. Besides challenges that I have already enumerated, SAARC could create its own Research and Development Policy Division within its restructured and strengthened Secretariat for addressing specific issues such as Regional Crisis Responses, increasingly Urbanization challenges, health care, food security and

sustainable development, trade, services and market reforms etc. One issue that I wish to reiterate, is that at any SAARC Meeting –whatever the level, Think Tank, Working Group or even Summit – there is a dire need for an attitudinal change and, historical and so far un-resolvable, political differences and disputes should NOT be aired as these tend to vitiate and over shadow the proceedings and I am explicitly referring to the two major countries in SAARC, i.e. – India-Pakistan. A positive recent trend is the seeming thaw in India-Pak relations, Pak's decision to switch over to a reduced negative list, paving the way to give India MFN, should be welcomed. The overall objective is to discuss and implement matters of benefit to the entire group. Specific recommendations in this regard are:

The focus in SAARC meetings should be to consolidate and implement existing initiatives and deepen the relationship for the long-term. However an important aspect of SAARC forums, especially at the Summit level, on the side-lines, leaders do have fruitful discussion on vexed issues, which sometimes lead to formal dialogues)

SAARC should get moving on infrastructure, for e.g., modernizing the India-Pak land border Check Posts, the priority being transport, transit and trans-shipment; water, power and telecoms, the last-named being necessary for technology, R&D, innovation and the Internet revolution. India has earmarked \$1 trillion for infrastructure in the next five years with half the contribution coming from the private sector. Since the infrastructure will cover border regions, it will help develop the frontier areas of SAARC neighbors and, perhaps to some extent lessen migration.

Since finance and capital are both vital for socio-economic development and related schemes, it is for consideration that in the long term, SAARC expand its Development Fund into a SAARC Development Bank; perhaps, not too ambitious on the lines of the World or ADB but starting with a corpus of say a few billion dollars. Countries led by India (China with foreign exchange reserves of \$3 trillion plus could contribute depending on their capability.

Now that there is a South Asia University, it can be utilized not only for just people-to-people contacts, scholarships, etc. but also for serious studies, joint research and cross-

fertilization of ideas on SAARC matters. As far as information technology issues are concerned, India – being a world leader - could contribute its expertise in a large measure.

Since innovation and new ideas are the buzz words of the new generation – India, alone, will be adding 100 million skilled youth into the global and regional work force in ten years – the big role that major States and SAARC leaders can play is bringing in “Reverse Mentoring”. They must listen and learn from civil society especially the junior players, who have the capability to do things more efficiently as well as through the medium of technology! While the Region is generally lagging on innovations and R&D, big players like India do have a better chance of bringing about the next level of innovations, especially business model and process innovation; despite non-availability of huge investments, youth should be encouraged to come up with newer ideas and schemes.

Since my fifth recommendation is regarding innovation and junior players, an important aspect which is not generally discussed is SMEs, now MSMEs and micro-finance (in which Bangladesh is the leader). These play a large role in the SAARC Nation’s economy. As an e.g., in India, MSMEs account for 45 per cent of Industrial output, 40 per cent of exports both, amounting to 17 per cent of the GDP. The big boys of industry with their powerful Captains, TATAs, Reliance, Birlas and so on can very well look after themselves without Government or SAARC assistance. But as far as the micro and smaller industries are concerned, we need to capitalize on India’s and Bangladesh’s experience through the vehicle of SAARC for the other remaining States.



U.S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD CHINA

WRITER BY "AFSHAN BASHIR" AND "GHAZAL SHAFIQ"

ADVANTAGES OR DISADVANTAGES U.S. CHINA FOREIGN POLICY OR HAS U.S. CHINA FOREIGN POLICY FAILED OR NO?



ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES

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A FRAMEWORK FOR U.S. POLICY TOWARD CHINA



US CHINA CURRENT AFFAIRS



Written By: Ghazal Shafiq


ASSESSING U.S. FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD CHINA



U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE DISPUTES IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA 1995



U.S. AND CHINA FOREIGN POLICY IN FUTURE



Written By: Afshan Bashir




INTRODUCTION

The United States has pursued an engagement strategy toward China for almost four decades. Regardless of party affiliation, every U.S. president since Nixon has aimed to integrate China into the international system. That decision has been and continues to be one of the greatest American foreign policy successes of the post-World War II era. The U.S. engagement strategy toward China and alliance relationships in the Asia-Pacific region made it possible for Asia-Pacific nations to focus on economic development at home instead of strategic competition.

Now, nearly 37 years after U.S.-China normalization, China is an upper-middle-income nation. China's economic growth is allowing it to expand its military capabilities and foreign policy ambitions. That is a natural expansion. Beijing is increasingly unwilling to sit on the sidelines and watch other nations shape international norms. Today, instead of biding their time, Chinese leaders are experimenting with new ways to use their nation's growing strengths to shape the international environment in China's favor. On some issues, those efforts dovetail with U.S. interests, so China's new assertiveness is opening up new opportunities for cooperation. Where U.S.-China interests are not aligned, however, Chinese actions are reheating old frictions and creating new ones. Those frictions—most notably in the South China Sea—are triggering new debates in the United

States about overall foreign policy strategy Toward China. Some U.S. observers discount the new opportunities for cooperation and argue that because some challenges in the U.S.-China relationship appear difficult to navigate, the United States should scrap the entire engagement strategy and begin treating China as a The fundamentals of the U.S.-China relationship are the same today as they were in the 1970s when the United States first reached out to turn this former rival into a strategic partner. Chinese leaders still prioritize domestic economic growth and stability above all other policy goals; they still view the U.S.-China bilateral as China's most important foreign policy relationship and want that relationship to be peaceful and cooperative. The Chinese military still focuses first and foremost on defending the Chinese Communist Party's right to govern the Chinese mainland and its territories. These fundamentals have not changed. What have changed in recent years is China's capabilities and the tools Beijing is using to further its domestic and foreign policy interests.



Advantages or Disadvantages U.S. China Foreign Policy Or Has U.S. China Policy Failed or no?

The United States is now immersed in its most intense debate over China policy in decades certainly since the Tiananmen Crisis of 1989, and possibly since the first serious

discussion of normalizing relations with China in the mid-1960s.¹ Some aspects of the debate are even reminiscent of the first great debate over U.S. strategy toward China—the “who lost China” controversy of the early 1950s. So far, the current debate has been conducted relatively quietly, primarily among analysts of China, scholars of international politics, and specialists on U.S. foreign policy. However, with the presidential election campaign of 2016 ramping up, one or more of the candidates will almost certainly seize the issue. Depending on what positions the candidates take and which of them wins the election, the possibility exists for significant changes in U.S. policy toward China in the next administration. Present policy is widely believed to have failed, and strong arguments are being presented for a tougher U.S. policy toward Beijing. If those arguments dominate the debate, U.S.–China relations will deteriorate significantly. The debate revolves around several fundamental questions: the evolution of China’s international ambitions, the definition of U.S. national interests in the Asia-Pacific region, the future of China’s economic and political system, and the shifting balance of power between China and the United States. I will address some of these larger questions further in the conclusion to this article. However, the body will focus mainly on three more specific questions that have animated the debate so far:

Why is the United States disappointed by Beijing’s domestic and international conduct over the past several years? Is the United States’ frustration justified?

To what extent has U.S. policy been responsible, either in implementation or in design, for this disappointment with China? Does the responsibility lie with Washington, Beijing, or both?

If U.S. policy has failed, should it be changed? If so, toward greater opposition to China’s domestic and international practices that the United States finds objectionable, or toward greater accommodation of legitimate Chinese concerns and objectives? Alternatively, if the problem lies in implementation of a strategy that was largely correct, can the United States better execute that policy to achieve more satisfying outcomes?

So far, there is little consensus on the answers to any of these questions, and the debate will probably remain inconclusive for some time. But with the stakes increasing as

China's power and reach continue to grow, the debate may become increasingly heated, particularly if Chinese domestic and international behavior continues to disappoint. Moreover, the chances that China policy will play a role in the upcoming U.S. presidential election campaign will increase as well.

The immediate stimulus for the current debate over U.S. China policy is a growing and widespread dissatisfaction with China's evolution both domestically and internationally, especially after the end of the global financial crisis and the emergence of Xi Jinping as China's president and Party general secretary. A number of observers have analyzed the sources of the increasing U.S. displeasure with China, as well as the grounds for China's corresponding unhappiness with the United States.² Both are important—what the United States regards as disappointing Chinese behavior, Beijing and some Western analysts portray as a response to provocative conduct by the United States or its allies. However one assigns responsibility for the problem, the sense of mutual frustration has led to increasing mutual mistrust; at both the elite and popular levels.³ In the Some believe we may be reaching a tipping point toward an outright strategic rivalry.

United States, the displeasure with China has reached the point that an avalanche of books, reports, and essays has appeared, all of them challenging some aspects of present U.S. China policy and proposing change. Many, although not all, of those analyses demand a tougher stand toward Beijing. Even at this relatively early stage in the debate, therefore, some analysts believe that the two countries may be reaching a tipping point at which their relationship will assume a fundamentally competitive character, even turning into an outright strategic rivalry.⁴ One source of U.S. disappointment is China's domestic political evolution over the last several years, especially since the selection of Xi Jinping as Communist Party leader in 2012. Not only has Beijing failed to liberalize its political system, as many observer shopped would come about as the eventual result of the 1989 Tiananmen Crisis and China's increasing prosperity, butt as actually tightened government and Party control over Chinese society, particularly over the press, social media, universities, and non-governmental organizations. What appeared to be promising trends in the past—such as the emergence of an active and lively cyber space, the creation of non-governmental organizations to provide social services and promote better

governance, and the emergence of lawyers and activists dedicated to combating violations of civil and political rights—have been suppressed or reversed. Of particular concern is a draft law on non-governmental organizations, released in the spring of 2015, that would place both domestic and foreign NGOs under the supervision of the domestic security apparatus, and place greater restrictions on their activities in China. Second, while achieving some welcome rebalancing of the Chinese economy—away from its previous dependence on exports, investment, and state-owned enterprises—the government and the party retain significant control and substantial ownership in core sectors of the Chinese economy. Small and medium enterprises still have difficulty raising capital from the state banking system, and Chinese citizens have few profitable vehicles in which to invest their savings. Chinese equity markets, which were presented as the solution to some of these problems, have experienced a severe stock bubble that, when it recently burst, triggered a round of extensive state intervention that has worried and disappointed those who had been hoping for further reform of the country's financial sector. Many in the business community are also concerned that current Chinese policy is further restricting, rather than expanding, the opportunities for foreign businesses in China, including those from the United States. While the two countries continue negotiations over a bilateral investment treaty that may further facilitate U.S. investment in China, U.S. complaints about violation of intellectual property rights, the promotion of “indigenous innovation”⁵ and “national champions”,⁶ and the seemingly selective targeting of foreign ventures in the implementation of anti-monopoly and product safety regulations have not abated. The most recent survey conducted by the United States China Business Council has concluded that member companies “have seen little tangible impact from China's economic reforms and report little improvement in any of the top 10 issues over the past year.”⁷ Similarly, the American Chamber of Commerce in Beijing has concluded that “challenges in China are on the rise, with a significant increase in the number of companies reporting that the quality of China's investment environment is deteriorating.”⁸ These concerns about China's domestic politics and the Chinese economic environment are long-standing. When we turn to China's behavior abroad however, we see the rapid emergence of a newer set of disappointments. Critics of Chinese foreign policy, including some U.S. former and even present government

officials, have expressed their frustration that China has failed to become the “responsible stakeholder” in the international system for which Americans had hoped. The first complaint along these lines was that China is doing too little, acting as a “burden-shifter” rather than a “burden-sharer,”⁹ or as a “freerider”¹⁰ or “cheap-rider”¹¹ on the public goods provided by the United States and U.S.-led institutions. China was accused of failing to pull its weight on issues where it has both significant influence and major stakes such as climate change and nuclear proliferation. Citing Napoleon’s description of nineteenth century China as a sleeping giant that when waked would “shake the world,” Princeton professor and former deputy assistant secretary of State Thomas Christensen portrays China as “napping in the early twentieth-first century,” rather than fulfilling its international obligations.¹² More recently, the problem has become just the opposite: China has awoken, but is still not turning itself into a responsible stakeholder in the existing regional and global system. Instead, China is viewed as increasingly challenging that system, in part by disparaging some of its major components, particularly the U.S. alliance structure in Asia, and also by sponsoring or endorsing new institutions intended to serve as alternatives or even competitors to existing organizations such as the World Bank, the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). These include the Asian Infrastructure Development Bank (AIIB), the New Development Bank (more commonly known as the BRICS Bank), and the trade grouping known as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership for the Asia-Pacific Region (or RCEP). Some of these new institutions, in turn, will help finance Beijing’s new regional infrastructure project the “One Belt, One Road” that will build a system of railroads, pipelines, roads, and ports linking China more closely to Southeast Asia, South Asia, Central Asia, the Middle East, and Europe. Given China’s large domestic market and huge foreign exchange reserves, these new institutions and infrastructure projects have the potential to build a network of economic partners, strategic allies, and international organizations that may rival what the United States created in the decades after World War II. So far, it is unclear what conditions, if any, Beijing will place on the financing provided by these new financial organizations. Most important to many analysts, China is increasingly posing a security challenge to its neighbors in the Western Pacific, and thus to the United States as well. In the absence of what those analysts

grades any clear threat to its own interests, China is developing a variety of military capabilities most particularly a blue water navy aimed at deterring Taiwanese independence and compelling Taiwan's unification with China, denying U.S. and allied forces unfettered access to the Western Pacific, and controlling sea lanes of communications in the region. These capabilities include aircraft carriers, advanced surface ships and submarines, tactical and strategic missiles, and also a variety of asymmetrical weapons systems intended to negate U.S. technological advantages such as anti-satellite weapons, multiple-reentry warheads, and cyber warfare techniques which can both engage in espionage and disrupt critical infrastructure. More recently, Beijing has used some of these capabilities to take unilateral actions to reinforce its claims to disputed reefs and islands in the South China and East China Sea, engaging in "land reclamation" projects to build up small islets and reefs that it controls, building runways and other facilities on those artificial islands, sending oil rigs to explore for oil and gas reserves in parts of the sea bed claimed by China, and conducting more aggressive sea and air patrols in areas claimed by others. It has announced an expanded air defense identification zone in the East China Sea. Moreover, an increasing number of cyber intrusions against U.S. government and private institutions have allegedly originated in China. All this is widely viewed as part of a general shift toward greater assertiveness in Chinese foreign policy after the global financial crisis and the U.S. withdrawals from Afghanistan and Iraq, when the country's leaders perceived that the international balance of power between China and the United States had shifted in Beijing's favor, allowing it to challenge aspects of its international environment that it previously had been forced to tolerate. While few of these facts are in dispute, much debate exists over the degree to which they all represent improper or unacceptable Chinese behavior, let alone major concerns to the United States. A more favorable interpretation of China holds that these concerns are only part of a larger and more positive story. In that assessment, China has been gradually adopting positions more in line with those of the United States and the rest of the international community, including a growing willingness to cap its Carbon emissions by the year 2030, clearer expressions of its displeasure with North Korea's development and testing of weapons of mass destruction, and cooperation with the United States and the rest of the P5+1 in the negotiation to limit Iran's nuclear enrichment

and weapons programs. XiJinping's emphasis on bolstering the rule of law, restructuring the economy, and fighting corruption can also be seen as beneficial domestic developments, despite the fact that they have been accompanied by the strengthening of political controls over much of society. And the two countries appear to be making progress on a bilateral investment treaty and have agreed to provide each other's citizens with long-term multiple-entry visas, greatly facilitating travel between them. This more benign assessment would also assert that many critics in the U.S. downplay areas of progress in U.S.-China relations.¹³ This echoes the Chinese position that U.S. critics are placing too much emphasis on secondary issues where the two countries differ, such as the South China Sea, and are paying insufficient attention to the more important global matters on which China and the United States are demonstrating an increasing ability to work together, such as counter terrorism. A second relatively positive assessment of China's recent international conduct is that Beijing has been more reactive than assertive. It is responding to provocative behavior by others, to gaps in the existing international order, and to the limits that others have placed on Beijing's role in international financial institutions.¹⁵ In this account, the development of military capabilities to deter Taiwanese independence and to obstruct U.S. participation in the defense of Taiwan is an understandable response to the steady rise of a Taiwanese national identity and to the prospect that the traditionally pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) is favored to win the 2016 Taiwanese presidential election. Similarly, China's reflect its reasonable disappointment with the U.S. Congress denying it greater voting rights in the IMF, Bank can meet Asia's growing needs for infrastructure investment. In addition, China's support of the RCEP was a response to the creation of regional trading blocs elsewhere in the world, and especially to the U.S. decision that China should be excluded from the negotiations over the Trans-Pacific Partnership (or TPP). In this interpretation, China's offshore exploration and its construction of artificial islands in the South China Sea were also reactions to similar activities, albeit on a smaller scale, by other claimants.

The chances of conflict, although still low, have been increasing

No matter how an objective observer would portray these developments, the fact that the two societies interpret them so differently has led the relationship between them to take a

turn for the worse. Despite each government's repeated pledges to seek a stable and collaborative relationship, and despite the numerous bilateral dialogues convened to clarify intentions, provide reassurance, and build trust, mutual suspicion has continued to increase. While not everyone would agree with U.S. Naval War the chances of conflict, although still low, have been increasing.

College professor Lyle Goldstein's assessment that the relationship is near "the brink of disaster,"¹⁶ the consensus is that the relationship between the two countries has been deteriorating and that the chances of conflict, although still low, have been increasing. This feeds the growing perception that the United States' China policy has failed and thus requires reconsideration and perhaps significant modification.

Evolving U.S. China Policy

Before examining the possibility that U.S. policy toward China has failed, and considering potential alternatives, one naturally asks what that policy has involved in the past. Before the 1972 Nixon visit to normalization of relations under Jimmy Carter, U.S. policy toward China had been a combination of containment deployments that could deter or defend against Chinese aggression and subversion, coupled with isolating China diplomatically and economically. With the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and China, and with China's inauguration of economic reform and adoption of a more moderate foreign policy, the United States' previous China policy was replaced by a dramatically different. The U.S. government began an early version of engagement with China shortly after normalization, when the program stolen virtually every U.S. government agency with its Chinese counterpart, coupled with frequent summit meetings between Chinese and U.S. leaders. The 1989 Tiananmen Crisis disrupted this policy by leading the United States to cancel collaborative activities between the two countries' defense establishments as well as suspend most high-level official exchanges. However, the 1995–96 Taiwan Strait crisis, which resulted from the Chinese military exercises aimed at influencing the Taiwanese presidential elections, illustrated the risks inherent in a policy of limited contact with China. The Clinton administration therefore announced a policy of "comprehensive engagement" with China to resume and expand discussion of the bilateral and multilateral issues arts take in the

relationship. This culminated with the inauguration of the Strategic Economic Dialogue in 2005 on bilateral economic issues, it became evident that many of the economic issues under consideration were similar to those that were being addressed with other countries through successive rounds of multilateral trade negotiations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, or GATT. By encouraging China's inclusion in GATT's successor, the World Trade Organization (WTO), many of the economic issues between the United States and China could be discussed in a multilateral rather than a purely bilateral setting, with greater opportunities expanded to include integrating China into a full range of international regimes and institutions. With the successful admission of China to the WTO in 2001, and Beijing's accession to a variety of additional undertakings in the areas of nonproliferation and human rights, the process of integrating China into the existing international system seemed complete. The focus of U.S. policy then shifted from the extent of China's integration into the international order to the quality of Chinese participation within it. In a speech subtitled "from Membership to Responsibility" in 2005, then-Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick called on Beijing to become a "responsible stakeholder" in international institutions, actively upholding the norms of those institutions, enforcing their decisions, and providing the political and financial resources to ensure their success rather than remaining a relatively passive beneficiary.¹⁷

A third strand of U.S. policy toward China, not always adequately understood or appreciated by either side, has been the provision of technical and financial assistance to China's program of economic reform and development. This has not taken the form of official U.S. developmental aid to China—in fact, anything so categorized was generally banned after the 1989 Tiananmen Crisis on human rights grounds—but rather through a large number of technical assistance and training programs for Chinese government agencies provided by their U.S. counterparts or by U.S. foundations. One could also view the extensive financial support provided to Chinese students and scholars to study in U.S. universities as part of this aspect of U.S. China policy, as one could similarly view U.S. broad range of domestic social and economic issues as well as the assistance on improving governance offered by many U.S. foundations and NGOs. In this regard, it is telling that Thomas Christensen's first-hand account of the origins of the Strategic Economic Dialogue describes its purpose not so much as a way of addressing bilateral economic

issues as it is customarily understood, but rather as a means for discussing how to resolve the structural problems in each country that were producing those issues, and thereby to demonstrate that the aim of the U.S. government was “to help, rather than hinder, China’s economic development.”¹⁸ Beyond technical assistance programs and fellowships, the most important way in which the United States assisted China’s development was simply relaxing restrictions on technology transfers to China and opening its markets to Chinese imports, first by providing Most-Favored Nation (MFN) treatment to China on an annual basis and then extending “permanent normal trade relations” (i.e., permanent MFN) to China when it became a member of the WTO. Indeed, it was the result of the structural imbalances that were the topic of discussion at the Strategic Economic Dialogue—that led to China’s massive accumulation of foreign exchange reserves, eventually enabling it to finance the new international financial institutions it has created in recent years, as well as to support an increasing out flow of Chinese foreign direct investment and overseas development assistance. Finally, the fourth and most recent strand to be added to the United States’ China policy has been a response to the sustained rise of what the Chinese call their “comprehensive national power.”¹⁹ China’s increasing military.

There is no consensus on past U.S. policy toward china , much less whether it should be changed.

With such divergent assessments of past U.S. policy toward China, it is not surprising that no consensus exists on whether that policy should be changed at all, much less in what direction. There are now numerous proposals for revising U.S. policy, but they can be grouped into three broad categories: “stay the course” (continue engagement and integration), “toughen up” (balance the rise of Chinese power), or “strike a deal” (accommodate China either through one “grand bargain” or through multiple smaller bargains). The remedies generally stem logically from the diagnosis. Those who think the policy was well conceived but poorly implemented focus on staying the course but improving the implementation. Those who believe the policy ignored the dangers posed by the rise of China propose greater efforts to balance the policy was in sufficiently sensitive to Chinese concerns favor greater accommodation, or “striking a deal.” To be sure, these are broad generalizations, as many analysts propose policies that draw

elements from more than one of these categories, making the differences among their proposals less stark than may initially appear. Yet these categories help us understand the outlines of the quickly evolving debate and foresee the possible directions U.S. policy may soon take. There is no consensus on past U.S. policy toward China, much less whether it should be changed.

“Stay the Course” Some who acknowledge the disappointing results of U.S. policy still argue that the best option is to stay the course.

The current debate places far less emphasis on human rights and political liberalization in china.

Lyle Goldstein says flatly that “human rights should not be a major issue in U.S.–China relations,” and cites Australian analyst Hugh White, Henry Kissinger, and Michael Swaine as believing that democratization should not be the main goal of U.S. China policy. Instead, he suggests that a “hands-off approach” will make it more difficult for Chinese leaders to discredit domestic demands for political reform as being directed by the United States.⁵⁶ The paradoxical conclusion, then, is the less effort the United States expends, the greater its chances of success in seeing eventual political liberalization in China may be. Similarly, although recommending a fundamentally different strategy toward China than Goldstein, Blackwill and Tellis also believe that pressing for human rights through high-level discussions was a waste of time and should be dropped from future bilateral dialogues.⁵⁷ And while Steinberg and O’Hanlon offer a balanced summary of the debate over the role of human rights in U.S. policy toward China, they also appear sympathetic to those who call for a “non-confrontational approach” and who propose instead to continue “dialogues on human rights and the rule of law to make progress.” They conclude that “there is no support in any camp for an active regime change strategy, given China’s growing power and its economic importance to the United States. ⁵⁸ To be sure, there are some exceptions to this argues that the United States should “protect the political dissidents in China” and criticizes the Obama administration for downplaying human rights and failing to link China’s human rights record to “issues Beijing cares about, such as trade relations.”⁵⁹ Dan Blumenthal of the

American Enterprise Institute and William Inboden of the University of Texas, while saying that the United States should continue its policies of engagement and hedging, propose that a “measure dye persistent push for a free and democratic China” should become the “third prong” of U.S. strategy toward China. This can be done, they argue, by supporting the “latent democrats” in China, including entrepreneurs, lawyers, and Christians, through the extension of both official and unofficial dialogue to include them and through expanded “information and counter-propaganda campaigns.”⁶⁰ Nevertheless, the issue remains whether the Chinese government would permit these efforts to go forward, whether they can proceed if the Chinese government blocks them, and whether their effectiveness would warrant the costs and risks to other U.S. objectives.



A Framework for U.S. Policy toward China



A FRAMEWORK FOR U.S. POLICY TOWARD CHINA

Serious people understand that the manner in which the United States deals with China will be a critical, if not the critical, overseas challenge for the United States in the 21st century. China will likely be the largest economy in the world within one or two decades; the second or third strongest military soon, if not already; and competitive with the United States and Europe in global economic, and perhaps political and cultural, influence in some regions. China is ruled by a Communist Party resistant to political liberalization at home and wedded to nationalist rhetoric and behavior in dealing with its neighborhood, enhancing the chances for rivalry with the United States.

For those students of history who see conflict as the likely outcome when rising powers encounter dominant powers, these are precursors of a dark future.

How should we deal with China? What policy framework best optimizes our interests, which are multiple and not always consistent with each other? Americans are in the midst of an ongoing presidential campaign that, in a better world, would be asking and answering such questions, but this is not such a campaign.

The Balance Sheet In a previous essay in this series, I described how China's leader, Xi Jinping, sees the world and its governance.¹ Xi is a strong and innovative Leader, but not someone who stands apart from modern Chinese history in his objectives. He appears

different from his predecessors, however, because the China he rules is very different in its capacities and capabilities. Xi is moving more rapidly and assertively toward achieving some of China's goals, but he is generally operating along well-traveled paths within post-1949, and especially post-1978, China. These goals include, inter alia:

- Maximizing Chinese influence in the Western Pacific.
- Building Chinese economic ties with and leverage over the countries of the region.
- Seeking reunification with Taiwan and asserting Chinese territorial claims (especially in maritime areas) against competitors.

Xi's actions broadly have been within these parameters, but with China's expanding capabilities have come actions that have greatly unsettled its neighbors and called into question whether its rise will be peaceful or threatening. Its construction of artificial islands in the South China Sea and deployments of radars and surface-to-air (SAM) missiles have compounded anxieties about its intentions. Its challenge to Japan's control of the Senkaku islands in the East China Sea has had a similar impact. While narrowing space for political dissent at home, it has signaled tighter limits to democratic development and political heterodoxy in Hong Kong and warned Taiwan of the consequences of deviation from the one China principle under its incoming president. Its navy is expanding in capacity and geographic reach. Its cyber-hacking and cyber-espionage are on a scale that alarms governments, militaries, and corporations. It has developed a strategic partnership with Russia that goes well beyond the transactional relationship the two powers enjoyed before.

These are the goals China is pursuing, and some of the things it is doing. It also is important to note what China is not doing, or at least has not yet done:

“With China's expanding capabilities have come actions that have greatly unsettled its neighbors and called into question whether its rise will be peaceful or threatening”

- It is not seeking wholesale revision of the global order. Its creation of an Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) rivaling the World Bank and Asian Development Bank has launched a host of narratives premised on that thesis, but

why then is the AIIB open to the major economies of Europe, hiring Americans and Europeans from World Bank backgrounds in many of its key management positions and eagerly voicing its determination to live up to the highest international standards? And why is China not structuring the AIIB's rules to give it an effective veto power over loan decisions?

- It has not sent military forces to intervene in any foreign conflicts in over three decades.
- While it may resort to strong-arm tactics against Taiwan's new government, the chance that it will use military force to seek reunification in the near- to medium-term future is very slight.
- It has not attacked any island in the South and East China Sea occupied by another claimant.
- It asserts it has no intention to challenge the United States for global supremacy and has not built an alliance system to support its goals. Above and beyond the troubling things China has done, and the troubling things it has not done, it is important also to take note of the contributions it has made, either by design or by sheer presence, to global prosperity:
- It has become the largest trade and investment partner of virtually every country in Central Asia and the largest trade partner of every country in East and Southeast Asia.
- It rivals Canada as the number one trading partner of the United States.
- It has become a significant global investor, including in the United States.
- It has provided substantial bilateral economic aid to numerous countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.
- Its currency will soon be included in the global reserve currency basket utilized by the International Monetary Fund for balance of payments transactions.

Policy Options for the United States

China presents unique challenges for the United States in formulating a coherent, effective policy. It is woven into the fabric of the global economic and trading system and is a major and frequently constructive player in international organizations. But it has

large gaps in its adherence to global rules. Its rapid rise from poverty and the margins of the international system mean it is still a work in progress, with an unpredictable trajectory. Uncertainty about its future aims and ambitions creates legitimate debate about U.S. choices, especially since the choices we make will influence how China views the United States and its own opportunities and challenges.

There are three broad options for the United States to respond to the China challenge. All have their prominent advocates in the current policy literature:

1. Accommodation. Its proponents see the rise in Chinese influence, particularly in the Western Pacific, as inevitable, producing a China that is the region's center of gravity, an inevitable outcome that they say the United States should accept. Some who advocate this view believe Chinese ambitions are considerable but limited—national unification including Taiwan and the land features and associated waters of the South China Sea; a diminished role for U.S. alliances; and reduction in U.S. basing, patrols, and military presence in the Western Pacific. In their eyes, U.S. resistance to these ambitions will prove fruitless but will feed China's hostility and ambitions. They contend that the United States will need to make hard choices among its global and domestic priorities and that maintaining military preeminence in the Western Pacific should be abandoned.

2. Containment, confrontation, or untrammelled strategic rivalry.

This school argues that China's ambition is to dominate the Western Pacific and its periphery. It aims to expel the United States from the region, or at least marginalize the U.S. military, attenuate or destroy U.S. alliances, and bring the other countries of the region into submissiveness to Chinese preferences and interests. It believes that U.S. and Chinese interests regionally, and perhaps globally, are fundamentally incompatible, and we should acknowledge this if we are to adopt a coherent strategy. Usually, but not always, advocates of this approach emphasize the dominant role of the Chinese Communist Party, internal repressiveness, and clashing values with the United States. They point to China's rapid expansion of its military capabilities and foresee a day before "(China's) rapid rise from poverty and the margins of the international system mean it is still a work in progress, with an unpredictable trajectory."

Long when they will be used to achieve its nationalist goals, either through military force or intimidation. Therefore, they call for the United States to marshal its political, military, and economic tools to prevent China from becoming the preeminent regional power and to maintain U.S. regional dominance.

3. Global cooperation, regional resolve. People in this camp believe that there are elements in approaches 1 and 2 that are sound but that aggressive and exclusive pursuit of either option is neither required nor desirable. In the eyes of advocates of option 3, the accommodation option would accept a second class status for the United States in the region by choice, not necessity. The untrammelled rivalry option would deprive us of the benefits of a constructive relationship while locking in a destructive competition that would fail to enhance our security. Supporters of option 3 believe that the relationship with China cannot, and should not, be reduced to one of pure rivalry, nor should we overlook the very real strategic differences in the Western Pacific between us.

Elements of a Successful Option 3

State Department lore—derived from an observation by Henry Kissinger—has it that an option memo for decision by the secretary of state should always have three options: 1) Nuclear war; 2) Surrender; and 3) A sensible middle-of-the-road diplomatic solution. Just because it's a joke, and just because option 3 lacks the clarity of options 1 and 2, does not mean that option 3 is just an easy escape from hard thinking. Sometimes, indeed often, the option 3 templates provides the right way of thinking about the issue, even in cases where options 1 and 2 are less extreme. In the case of U.S. policy toward China, I believe it does.

US CHINA FOREIGN POLICY

CURRENT AFFAIRS



The United States seeks to build a positive, cooperative, and comprehensive relationship with China by expanding areas of cooperation and addressing areas of disagreement, such as human rights and cybersecurity. The United States welcomes a strong, peaceful, and prosperous China playing a greater role in world affairs and seeks to advance practical cooperation with China. The annual Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) has served as a unique platform to promote bilateral understanding, expand consensus, discuss differences, build mutual trust, and increase cooperation. The strategic track of the S&ED has produced benefits for both countries through a wide range of joint projects and initiatives and expanded avenues for addressing common regional and global challenges such as proliferation concerns in Iran and North Korea, tensions between Sudan and South Sudan, climate change, environmental protection, and energy security. The United States has emphasized the need to enhance bilateral trust through increased high-level exchanges, formal dialogues, and expanded people-to-people ties. On November 10, 2014, President Obama announced a reciprocal visa validity arrangement with China, increasing the validity of short-term tourist and business visas issued to each other's citizens from one to ten years, and increasing the validity of student and exchange

visas from one to five years. The U.S. approach to China is an integral part of reinvigorated U.S. engagement with the Asia-Pacific region¹.

The People's Republic of China assumed the China seat at the United Nations in 1971, replacing Taiwan, and is a permanent member of the UN Security Council. Over the years, China has become increasingly active in multilateral organizations, particularly the United Nations. China and the United States work closely with the international community to address threats to global security, including North Korea and Iran's nuclear programs.

Early 2013, President Obama yielded to Beijing's insistent backstage pressure and, with China's authoritarian chief Xi Jinping beaming by his side, announced a "new type of major power relationship" with China: In other words, a formulation of Chinese parity with the United States.

Since that meeting in California, even the pretense of positive feelings evaporated. Make no mistake, nothing in the world needs resolute American leadership more than dealing with a China that's both on the march and economically erratic—as misguided steps to buttress Shanghai share prices this past week show.

In short, and despite renewed uproar in Ukraine and the Middle East, China and Asia will be dominating the 2016 U.S. elections as the most consequential foreign issue, bar none.

It's not just a matter of "managing" or even "counterbalancing" China. Nor should we succumb to a temptation to "democratize" China, as some Republican commentators would have us do. The root cause of the Chinese challenge lies in two sources, whatever that country's form of government—Han Chinese chauvinism and cascading wealth enabling military expansion that was unimaginable a few years ago. From these two fonts come Beijing's intent to marginalize and then displace America in Asia.

Despite Obama's claim to have "rebalanced" America's Asia policy, it was the previous administration that, by 2007, had resumed strategic discourse with China's neighbors, all anxious about bad behavior going far beyond Beijing's "assertiveness" in the South

• ¹ On China by Hanry Kissinger

China Sea. The Obama administration didn't craft but, instead, inherited a renewed emphasis on America's place as a "resident power in Asia." By 2007, bilateral discussions became the norm with anxious countries, large and small, along China's long periphery.

Sadly, while the incoming Obama administration adopted and even (as in normalizing with Burma) expanded the Bush agenda with Asia, White House fecklessness elsewhere in the world has telegraphed hesitation and lack of resolve. Asians watch Obama's failure to prioritize U.S. foreign issues using a metric of immediate, as well as of long term, importance. The latter counts most in Asia, where China is playing a long game, using "sweet & sour" diplomacy to telling effect.

Bluster now greets U.S. indictments of Chinese officials for cybercrime. We get the same response to major or minor frictions, from car tariffs to rare earth mineral export controls. In recent months, Beijing's "island creation" in the South China Sea (dredging to create permanent land on shoals and atolls) has put a big butcher's thumb on the scales of regional balance, tilting them away still more from the United States, whose presence prevents Chinese hegemony.

Once again, the Obama administration has responded tepidly, belatedly, and reactively. Yet the U.S. military, especially the U.S. Navy, knows that China, and the region, need American clarity. Luckily, much of what is now occurring in the western Pacific never reaches the public domain.

Now that belated U.S. resolve has become evident in surface, subsurface and air encounters with the Chinese military the diplomats in Beijing are sending a "sweet" message, signaling they're now willing to taper off the island creation.

It's but a temporary respite. Chinese threats will be throwing long shadows across the western Pacific, and will also loom large over the coming U.S. elections. During the remainder of this year, and the next, proportionate U.S. military movement in the western Pacific, and corresponding diplomacy all across the pan-Asian arc, will inevitably influence the presidential campaign.

The Obama administration had been slow to accept senior USN advice about the need to show determination. A new generation of admirals is coming into positions of influence and command. They see through the latest Chinese tapering ploy, an old gambit: push and push and then, for a little while, relent and allow one's adversaries the illusion that responsive moves have had a moderating effect.

Yet the underlying momentum continues, unabated. Party Chairman Xi has chosen an unequivocal path. The correct—the ONLY—way to respond lies in a strategy of restless proactivity, avoiding the game of thrust-and-parry, a game in which too often we parry, belatedly; a game in which we surrender the initiative.


The current administration's fecklessness telegraphs in capital letters our reluctance to square off in the western Pacific. It enables the Chinese to equate the understandable American war-weariness to reluctance in recent years to push back, and then push back again without waiting for the next provocation, the only serious way to signal enduring intent.

In our travels and previous work, we've seen how senior Chinese officials know next to nothing about U.S. *maritime* resolve. They don't understand that what they call our "forward presence" stems from strategic intent formed in the infant American republic, in the late 18th century, and continuing without break to the present day.

Many U.S. observers have become increasingly concerned about China's growing economic and political reach in the world, often referred to as "China's rise," and what it means for global U.S. economic and political interests. Some in this debate believe China's growing global power and influence is a malign threat that needs to be thwarted; others believe that it is an inevitable phenomenon that needs to be guided and managed. Complicating this debate are the effects of globalization, which have bound together U.S. and PRC interests much more closely than in the 1990s. These extensive inter-linkages make it increasingly difficult for either government to take unilateral actions without inviting far-reaching, unintended consequences that could adversely affect other policy interests. Like the 110th Congress before it, the 111th Congress is facing recurring issues involving this debate and what policies and approaches may best serve and protect a

broad range of U.S. interests. This policy debate is animated by continuing uncertainty over how China ultimately may choose to wield its rising capabilities. According to one school of thought, China's economic and political rise in the world is inevitable and needs to be accommodated and managed. In this view, as China becomes more economically interdependent with the international community, it will have a greater stake in pursuing stable international economic relationships. China has a vested interest, for instance, in cooperating on ways to address the global economic crisis by helping to craft a new international financial system. Growing wealth in the PRC also is likely to encourage Chinese society to move in directions that will develop a materially better-off, more educated, and cosmopolitan populace. Such a populace, according to this view, is likely to be more conservative and more desirous of avoiding conflict with the United States. Already, say such proponents, these developments have led China's population to press its government for greater political pluralism, transparency, and inclusiveness—key U.S. objectives—and this trend is likely to continue as China's capabilities grow. From this perspective, U.S. policy should seek to work more closely with the PRC, not only to encourage these positive long-term trends, but to seek ways to mutually benefit by cooperating on important global issues such as the international financial system, alternative energy sources, climate change, and medical research. Ultimately, some proponents of this view say, the United States simply will have to make room for the economic and political appetites of the superpower that China is likely to become. Viewing the PRC as a “threat” or attempting to contain it, these proponents say, could produce disastrous policy consequences. In addition to possible military conflict with the PRC, these consequences could include the possible creation of greater Chinese nationalism with a strong anti-American bias, a breakdown in PRC governance, the bolstering of party power and subsequent retrenchment of reforms, and/or an increasingly isolated United States that the international community may see as out of step with global trends. Other proponents of the “inevitability” of China's rise especially stress the extreme competitive challenges of China's growing power. They say these challenges, even if benign, pose potentially huge consequences for U.S. global interests. Beijing officials, say this group, view the world as a state-centered, competitive environment where power is respected, and are determined to use the means at their disposal to

increase their nation's wealth, power, and influence in a largely opportunistic fashion. A militarily muscular China with substantial international economic ties will be able to exercise considerable political power that could prompt U.S. friends and allies to China-U.S. Relations: Current Issues and Implications for U.S. Policy Congressional Research Service 3 make different choices, eroding U.S. influence around the world. These observers charge that the PRC already is exploiting the international financial crisis to strengthen its access to international energy sources and other commodities. The United States, they argue, should develop a comprehensive strategic plan in order to counter China's growing power by strengthening its existing regional alliances and making new ones, expanding overseas investments, sharpening American global competitiveness, and maintaining a robust military presence in Asia and elsewhere as a counterweight to growing PRC power and influence. Others in the American policy debate see malign factors at work in China's growing power. PRC leaders, they argue, may be portraying their growth as a "peaceful rise" with no harmful consequences, but actually they are biding their time, simply conforming to many international norms as a strategy while China is still weak. In reality, these proponents say, Beijing seeks at least to erode and at best to supplant U.S. international power and influence. In conducting their international relations, they maintain, Chinese leaders seek to cause rifts in U.S. alliances, create economic interdependence with U.S. friends, and arm U.S. enemies. Despite the statements of support for the U.S. anti-terrorism campaign, according to this view, the PRC's repeated violations of its non-proliferation commitments actually have contributed to strengthening nations that harbor global terrorists. Furthermore, they maintain that the PRC under its current authoritarian form of government is inherently a threat to U.S. interests, and that the PRC political system needs to change dramatically before the United States has any real hope of reaching a constructive relationship with it. From this perspective, U.S. policy should focus on mechanisms to change the PRC from within while remaining vigilant and attempting to contain PRC foreign policy actions and economic relationships around the world where these threaten U.S. interests. Current Issues in U.S.-China Relations



ASSESSING AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD CHINA

Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Subcommittee on Near East, South Asia, Central Asia and Counterterrorism

Chairman Corker, Ranking Member Cardin, Subcommittee Chairman Risch, Subcommittee Ranking Member Murphy, Sen. Gardner, and members of the committee, thank you for this opportunity to discuss U.S.-China relations.

We are witnessing a period of great change within China and in China's behavior abroad. Under President Xi Jinping's leadership, the Chinese Communist Party is launching a wave of policy reforms that aim to fundamentally restructure China's economy and move the nation away from the "hide your strength, bide your time" foreign policy strategy it has adhered to since the Deng Xiaoping era. Beijing is demonstrating a new assertiveness across multiple policy fronts. That assertiveness creates new opportunities and new challenges for the United States.

The United States has pursued an engagement strategy toward China for almost four decades. Regardless of party affiliation, every U.S. president since Nixon has aimed to integrate China into the international system. That decision has been and continues to be one of the greatest American foreign policy successes of the post-World War II era. The U.S. engagement strategy toward China and alliance relationships in the Asia-Pacific region made it possible for Asia-Pacific nations to focus on economic development at home instead of strategic competition abroad.

Now, nearly 37 years after U.S.-China normalization, China is an upper-middle-income nation. China's economic growth is allowing it to expand its military capabilities and foreign policy ambitions. That is a natural expansion. Beijing is increasingly unwilling to sit on the sidelines and watch other nations shape international norms. Today, instead of biding their time, Chinese leaders are experimenting with new ways to use their nation's growing strengths to shape the international environment in China's favor. On some issues, those efforts dovetail with U.S. interests, so China's new assertiveness is opening up new opportunities for cooperation. Where U.S.-China interests are not aligned, however, Chinese actions are reheating old frictions and creating new ones. Those frictions—most notably in the South China Sea—are triggering new debates in the United States about overall foreign policy strategy toward China. Some U.S. observers discount the new opportunities for cooperation and argue that because some challenges in the U.S.-China relationship appear difficult to navigate, the United States should scrap the entire engagement strategy and begin treating China as a strategic rival. Those arguments are misguided.

The fundamentals of the U.S.-China relationship are the same today as they were in the 1970s when the United States first reached out to turn this former rival into a strategic partner. Chinese leaders still prioritize domestic economic growth and stability above all other policy goals; they still view the U.S.-China bilateral as China's most important foreign policy relationship and want that relationship to be peaceful and cooperative. The Chinese military still focuses first and foremost on defending the Chinese Communist Party's right to govern the Chinese mainland and its territories. These fundamentals have not changed. What has changed in recent years is China's capabilities and the tools Beijing is using to further its domestic and foreign policy interests. Those changes call for some tactical adjustments on the U.S. side. Those changes do not warrant an abandonment of the engagement strategy that has brought, and can continue to bring, decades of enduring peace and economic growth for all Asia-Pacific nations, including the United States

The U.S. challenge: Dealing with a more assertive China

China's new assertiveness creates new opportunities and new challenges for the United States. On the positive side, China is showing an increasing willingness to play a leadership role among nations outside the highly industrialized democratic block. China played a key role in the Iran nuclear negotiations, helping the process through shaky moments, and Chinese nuclear experts helped Iranian officials redesign the Arak plutonium reactor so that it will never produce nuclear fuel. On climate change, China's willingness to issue bold climate targets with the United States last November challenged other developing nations to follow suit and knocked down a firewall that has hindered global climate negotiations for decades. China also appears to be leaning harder on North Korea. China supported the U.N. Security Council effort to sanction North Korea in response to that nation's February 2013 nuclear test. Earlier this month, after North Korean officials announced plans to launch another long-range rocket, China's foreign minister warned against "taking new actions that could lead to tensions" on the Korean peninsula and called for all nations to take a "responsible attitude." On all of these recent survey conducted by the Rhodium Group reveals that 340 of the 435 American congressional districts have at least one China FDI project. Many of those projects are providing jobs for American workers: More than 80,000 Americans are now directly employed through a Chinese investment project in the United States. Economic competitiveness has always been an issue in the relationship, including U.S. concern that American jobs will migrate to China. Now the reverse is happening: Chinese companies are finally creating jobs in this nation—a trend that leaders in both countries should support.



POLICY TOWARD THE DISPUTES IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA 1995



One defining feature of the international relations of East Asia over the past five years has been the steady increase in tensions in the disputes over territorial sovereignty and maritime jurisdiction in the South China Sea. Although the United States does not claim sovereignty over any of the land features being contested, it has increased its attention to and involvement in efforts to manage these disputes. This policy brief will review the evolution of U.S. policy towards the conflicts in the South China Sea and assess the implications of greater U.S. involvement for U.S.-China relations in the coming decade².

U.S. policy towards the disputes in the South China Sea has four features. First, the United States has altered the content of its declaratory policy in response to changes in the level of tensions in the dispute. In other words, the United States has increased its level of involvement following the increase in tensions among the claimants. During periods of stability in the dispute, the United States has not altered its policy or increased its involvement.

² Amer Rizwan Proffesional Script Writer

Second, U.S. policy towards the South China Sea has been premised on the principle of maintaining neutrality regarding the conflicting claims to sovereignty. This means that the United States does not take sides and support one state's claim to sovereignty against the other claimants. Taking sides would be costly for the United States, as the United States does not want to increase its direct involvement in China's sovereignty disputes nor make the South China Sea a central issue in the U.S.-China relationship. Nevertheless, a tension exists between the principle of maintaining neutrality and greater involvement in efforts to manage tensions in the dispute, especially when one country is identified as being the primary source of increased tensions.

Third as its involvement in managing tensions has increased, the United States has emphasised the process and principles by which claims should be pursued more than the final outcome or resolution of the underlying disputes, especially conflict management through the conclusion of a binding code of conduct between ASEAN and China. The focus on process and principles aims to thread the needle of maintaining neutrality over sovereignty while increasing involvement to reduce instability. The general approach is to articulate principles that should be followed by all claimants and to use those principles as the basis for U.S. policy.

1. U.S. policy toward the disputes in the South China Sea has four features. First, the United States has altered its policy in response to changes in the level of tensions in the dispute. Second, U.S. policy toward the South China Sea has been premised on the principle of maintaining neutrality regarding the conflicting claims to sovereignty. Third, as its involvement in managing tensions has increased, the United States has emphasised the process and principles by which claims should be pursued more than the final outcome or resolution of the underlying disputes, especially conflict management through the conclusion of a binding code of conduct between ASEAN and China. Fourth, U.S. policy in the South China Sea has sought to shape China's behaviour in the South China Sea by highlighting the costs of coercion and the pursuit of claims that are inconsistent with customary international law. Looking forward, the involvement of the United States in seeking to manage tensions in the South China Sea is likely to continue so long as

the territorial and maritime jurisdictional disputes remain unresolved and states take declaratory steps and operational actions to assert and defend their claims.

U.S. Policy towards the Disputes in the South China Sea Since 1995

Executive Summary

2. U.S. interests in the South China Sea

The United States has two principal interests in the South China Sea: access and stability. First, the United States has a powerful interest in maintaining unhindered access to the waters of the region. From Washington's perspective, all countries enjoy high seas freedoms, including freedom of navigation, beyond any coastal state's 12nm territorial seas over which the coastal state enjoys sovereign rights. Both commercial and military vessels enjoy such high-seas freedoms as contained in articles 56 and 87 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Towards this end, the United States has conducted multiple "operational assertions" of such freedoms in Malaysian, Vietnamese and Chinese waters annually since 2007.¹ Although the details of these operations are not publicly available, they have presumably occurred in the South China Sea among other areas.

Unhindered access to the waters of the South China Sea is important for two reasons. First, it underpins the economic dynamism of the region, which is based on extensive intra-regional and international

U.S. policy changed slightly in 2012. The proximate cause was the stand-off between China and the Philippines over Scarborough Shoal, which then subsequently resulted in ASEAN failing to issue a joint statement for the first time in its forty-five year history. In early April 2012, a standoff over control of the shoal began after the Philippine navy attempted to arrest Chinese fishermen who were operating in the shoal's lagoon. At the end of May 2012, the United States brokered an agreement for a withdrawal of forces, but China reneged on the deal in early June and returned to the shoal once Philippine vessels had departed. When the Philippines sought to include a reference to Scarborough in an ASEAN joint statement following a ministerial meeting in July 2012, China placed

pressure on Cambodia to reject the Philippine request, which resulted in a decision by Cambodia as ASEAN chair not to issue a joint statement at all.¹⁴

In the spring and summer of 2012, tensions in the South China Sea increased for other reasons that were also linked with Chinese behaviour. In June 2012, China announced that it was upgrading the administrative status of the islands in the South China Sea by creating a prefectural level city, Sansha City, based on Woody Island in the Paracels. As part of this administrative change, the PLA mostly symbolically established a new garrison on the island.¹⁵ In June 2012, Vietnam issued a national maritime law that included its claims to sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly Islands while also conducting for the first time air patrols over the Spratly Islands with advanced Su-27 fighters.¹⁶

In response to these events, especially China's actions, the United States clarified its policy. In early August 2012, the United States issued another policy statement on the South China Sea.¹⁷ This one was delivered by the State Department spokesperson, not the Secretary of State. The statement reiterated the U.S. interest in peace and stability and noted the

18 Russel, "Maritime Disputes in East Asia." 19 Russel, "Maritime Disputes in East Asia." 20 Russel, "Maritime Disputes in East Asia."

if the South China Sea were to become a more central issue in the bilateral U.S.-China relationship, it would most likely signal greater competition between the two states in regional security.

Looking forward, the South China Sea is poised to remain an issue in the U.S.-China relationship for the medium-term, if not longer. The underlying disputes over sovereignty are unlikely to be resolved anytime soon. No claimant appears willing to moderate its claims towards seeking a final settlement and even the scope of maritime jurisdiction claims remains unclear in the case of Vietnam as well as China and Taiwan. Thus, the disputes in the South China Sea are poised to remain a feature of regional security for some time to come. The best that can be achieved would likely be an agreement to maintain the status quo of control over the land features and perhaps

measures to reduce the salience of maritime jurisdiction, such as provision agreements to limit fishing in contested waters, in addition to a code of conduct. But continued efforts by China and other claimants to assert their claims are likely to produce increased periods of tension, which in turn will create demand for continued U.S. involvement in efforts to manage these tensions.

The role that the South China Sea will play in the U.S.-China relationship is difficult to predict, as it depends fundamentally on how the disputes themselves evolves over time. Nevertheless, maintaining the balance between neutrality over sovereignty and involvement efforts to manage instability in the disputes will be a critical task. If the U.S. appears to be siding with other claimants against China, not just on questions of process but also substance, then the South China Sea disputes will play a much greater role in the U.S.-China relationship and become an additional element of competition. From China's perspective, such U.S. partiality would feed the perception that the U.S. was becoming increasingly involved in questions of Chinese sovereignty, not just over Taiwan but also in the East China Sea through U.S. obligations under its defence treaty with Japan. To maintain this balance, as Jeff Bader has argued, the United States needs to maintain the importance of following international norms regarding what kind of claims are pursued and how they are pursued.


25“Clinton, Philippine Foreign Secretary Joint Press Availability,” Department of State, 16 November 2011, 26“U.S. commits \$40 mil. to boost Philippines’ maritime security,” Kyodo, December 17, 2013

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Studies, International Studies Review, The China Quarterly, The Washington Quarterly, Journal of Strategic Studies, Armed Forces &

Society, Current History, Asian Survey, Asian Security, China Leadership Monitor, and Contemporary Southeast Asia. His research has been supported by various organisations, including the National Science Foundation, the United States Institute of Peace, and the Smith Richardson Foundation.

U.S. AND CHINA FOREIGN POLICY IN FUTURE



China America as deeply opposed to China's rise, and driven to do whatever it takes to prevent China usurping American regional and global power.

China's worldview, as for all nation-states, is deeply shaped by its past. In China's case, this means one of the world's oldest continuing civilizations, with a continuing written language and literary tradition over several thousand years. For China, the mark of history is profound, as are the scars of collective memory. This applies to China's

philosophical tradition; its core, continuing values; its historical experience of its neighbors and those which invaded it; and its cumulative perceptions over time of the United Kingdom, the United States and the collective, colonizing West.

China also takes great pride in its civilizational achievements; the glories of its imperial past; and the resilience of its people across the millennia, celebrating the material and cultural achievements of the Han (汉) people. Within those achievements, China has also generated a self-referential body of philosophical thought and way of thinking (siwei 思维) that does not readily yield to the epistemological demands and intellectual taxonomies of the Western academy. And within this philosophical system, Confucianism in its various forms lies at the core. Westerners may find Chinese public formulations arcane. But that is the way the Chinese system conducts its official discourse, in which case we have some responsibility to understand what these formulations really mean, rather than once again simply dismissing them as propaganda.³

Chinese intentions are shaped not simply by the deep value structures alive in Chinese tradition and in China's modern political mind-set. They are also shaped by China's national historiography – its narrative about its own place in history, as well as its historical account of its dealing with its neighbors, the phalanx of Western colonial powers eager to carve up its territory, and the United States. China's lived experience of the outside world, as well as how it recalls that experience in the current period, exercises a profound impact on how China now views the world. The main thematic that emerge in China's own account of its historical engagement with the world are as follows:

First, China, at least over the last 500 years, has been the innocent party and did nothing by way of its own offensive actions against the West or Japan to provoke the imperial carve-up of its territory and its people in the modern period;

- Second, China has therefore been the victim of international aggression, rather than a perpetrator, particularly during the so-called “century of foreign

³ Hegemony or Survival : American's Quest For Global Dominance By Bob Woodward

humiliation” from the First Opium War to the proclamation of the People’s Republic;

- Third, Chinese national losses during the Japanese invasion and occupation were of staggering proportions even by global standards, explaining Beijing’s unique and continuing neuralgia toward Tokyo, both in terms of the official Japanese historical record of the war as a basis for any effective long-term reconciliation with Japan, and in terms of any evidence today of Japanese remilitarization or revanchism;
- Fourth, Russia too has loomed large in the Chinese national memory and has been predominantly seen as a strategic adversary through most of its history, rather than as a strategic partner;
- Fifth, throughout its past, right through to the present period, China’s national pre-occupations have been primarily, although not exclusively domestic: governing a quarter of humanity rather than dreaming of carving out even more territory for itself;
- Sixth, China, after 150 years, has now regained its proper place in the community of nations, as a product of its own efforts to build national power, rather than depending on anybody else; and
- Finally, Chinese leaders have a profound sense that China’s time has now come for China to have its own impact on the region and the world; but they are concerned that others (principally the United States) will now prevent it from doing so because this will challenge U.S. global dominance.

Americans offer their own variations on the same theme concerning Chinese mirror imaging. Nonetheless, the report argues that Chinese leaders have begun to form a worrying consensus on what they believe to be the core elements of U.S. strategy towards China, despite Washington’s protestations to the contrary. These are reflected in the following five-point consensus circulated among the Chinese leadership during 2014, summarizing internal conclusions about U.S. strategic intentions: ⁴

⁴ On China By Hanry Kissinger

To isolate China;

- To contain China;
- To diminish China;
- To internally divide China; and
- To sabotage China's leadership.



While these conclusions sound strange to a Western audience, they nonetheless derive from a Chinese conclusion that the United States has not, and never will, accept the fundamental political legitimacy of the Chinese administration because it is not a liberal democracy. They are also based on a deeply held, deeply “realist” Chinese conclusion that the U.S. will never willingly concede its status as the pre-eminent regional and global power, and will do everything within its power to retain that position.

US FOREIGN POLICY ISSUE IN SOUTH ASIA.



WRITEN BY: HIRA HAI AND IQRA AKBAR



INTRODUCTION:

SOUTH ASIA AND THE SECURITY DILEMMA

In recent years, experts have closely studied two main aspects of regarding South Asian nuclear issues. First, nuclear modernization in the region continues with the development of longer-range and more reliable delivery systems, as well as qualitative and quantitative increases in fissile material and warheads. Initiatives, such as the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal, have brought renewed focus on this issue due to its potential impact on proliferation in South Asia. Second, the A.Q. Khan network confirmed the entry of non-state actors into the realm of nuclear proliferation. Lingering questions regarding the network's activities suggest that its impact has not yet been fully assessed. There is still considerable demand for nuclear technology, both through horizontal proliferation from aspiring nuclear states such as Iran, and terrorist networks looking to augment their capabilities. This study will analyze these varied developments and investigate proliferation trends in the region.

This study examines proliferation trends from three perspectives. The first section looks at the doctrinal issues arising from security disputes that are the driving forces for nuclear modernization in South Asia. The second section examines proliferation linkages between South Asia and other regions, focusing on the A.Q. Khan network, among other issues. This section also highlights a key problem arising from contemporary WMD proliferation-the involvement of non-state actors. The final section addresses the potential impact of a crucial development-the Indo-U.S. nuclear cooperation agreement.

Nuclear proliferation in South Asia is in part a consequence of the security dilemma existing in the subcontinent. Security dilemmas arise when a state's mechanisms for increasing its security negatively impact the security and threat perceptions of other states. As one expert stated, the South Asian nuclear security complex involves several security dilemmas, including Pakistan/India, India/China, and Russia/United States. A further security dilemma dyad is that of the United States and China, since it has an impact on attitudes in India and Pakistan, and helps shape their nuclear decisions.

It is helpful to analyze the security dilemma briefly through an example. From India's perspective, the threat from China is of prime importance, and therefore New Delhi's

nuclear and missile development program is geared, in part, toward countering Beijing with a secure deterrent. However, Beijing's primary threat perception stems from the United States' role in the Asia-Pacific region. Consequently, one must consider the possibility that Beijing may conduct nuclear tests in the coming years if Washington goes ahead with plans to construct newer, more reliable warheads. In addition, analysts have predicted that Washington is likely to abandon the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty-I (START-I) when it goes out of force in 2009. The abandonment of START-I would remove all obstacles for U.S. plans to counter the strategic threat from China and other potential adversaries. To deal with this threat from the United States, Beijing has proceeded with its plan to strengthen its second strike capability through the development of mobile long-range ballistic missiles, both land-based and submarine-launched, according to a May 2007 Pentagon report.

However, China's desire to catch up with the United States would oblige India to prevent an adverse strategic balance. India's need for a reliable nuclear deterrent against China involves expanding New Delhi's nuclear weapons and delivery systems capabilities. Advanced capabilities include the development of a thermonuclear weapon and second strike capabilities through long-range ballistic missiles, such as the Agni-III or submarine launched ballistic missile capabilities, within the proposed nuclear submarine project and the Sagarika missile.


This impacts on the Indo-Pakistani equation because while New Delhi has a China focus for its expanding nuclear arsenal, it naturally increases its capability vis-à-vis Islamabad as well. It is widely accepted that since its inception, Pakistan's nuclear policy has been a constant response to the perceived threat from India. Therefore, in order to maintain the strategic balance or to at least prevent from the present imbalance from widening, Pakistan further expands its own nuclear capabilities. Furthermore, India on one side, and China and Pakistan on the other, are concerned over the extent of U.S. interactions with the other side, and the long-term impact this will have on the strategic balance in South Asia. This was evidenced in the immediate period after 9/11, when the U.S.-Pakistan counter-terrorism alliance was seen as detrimental to Indian interests.¹

¹ Charles L. Glaser, "The Security Dilemma Revisited," *World Politics*, 50:1 (1997), p. 174.

The security dilemma in the South Asian subcontinent operates as a chain reaction that includes regional and extra-regional powers with competing interests. For countries like India and China, it is important to note that while the goals of nonproliferation (especially at a time of potential WMD-related terrorism) are extremely crucial, perceived national interests are a greater factor in shaping the eventual policy direction. With this motivational framework in mind, one must examine recent proliferation-related developments in South Asia, that are likely to have far reaching consequences both regionally and in terms of the global nonproliferation regime. They include the proposed Indo-U.S. nuclear cooperation, the significance of the A.Q. Khan network, and links between South Asian and Middle East proliferation dynamics. These developments reflect, partly or in whole, the need for the weaker protagonist to correct the perceived security imbalance against the stronger threat.

Security Disputes, Nuclear Doctrines, and Proliferation Trends

To begin with, proliferation issues in South Asia must be understood in context of vertical and horizontal proliferation. Vertical proliferation takes place as nuclear states modernize their nuclear arsenals with more reliable delivery systems and warheads. Countries including the United States, China, India, and Pakistan, are in the process of modernizing their arsenals through actions such as proposals for "a reliable replacement warhead" (as in the case of the United States). In the context of South Asia, nuclear modernization is mainly a function of prevailing threat perceptions arising from security dilemmas. Modernization of arsenals includes the development and testing of longer-range missiles-such as the tests of the Agni-III by India, and the Shaheen-II by Pakistan in the first half of 2007.



Horizontal proliferation is the spread of nuclear weapons technology from nuclear states to other entities, including aspiring nuclear weapon states, as well as non-state actors such as terrorist groups. Horizontal proliferation generally involves a significant role for WMD supply networks that may or may not have a connection to official entities in a nuclear state. In the South Asian context, this variant of proliferation is especially pertinent, given the history of the A.Q. Khan network and its assistance to states such as North Korea and Iran. In addition, horizontal proliferation includes second-tier proliferation, where developing countries trade and barter nuclear technology with each other. While vertical and horizontal proliferation are variants of the proliferation dynamic, it is entirely possible that a nuclear state (such as Pakistan) could make use of non-state networks in the pursuit of nuclear modernization².

From the sub continental perspective, one main question arises-given the lack of a comprehensive resolution of the disputes between India and Pakistan and India and China, how do nuclear doctrines in South Asia impact trends in the acquisition of nuclear and missile technology? The answer to this question links threat perceptions and nuclear doctrines with recent proliferation-related developments and requires a brief discussion of existing nuclear postures of India and Pakistan.

Non-State Actors And Security In South Asia

As aforementioned, nuclear weapons development and enhancement in South Asia are intricately related to long-standing rivalries between the concerned states. However, instability does not just stem from the risk of nuclear warfare between states in the region. Non-state actors also play a significant role in the nuclear security framework, aside from their role in facilitating nuclear proliferation. First, terrorist groups (such as Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Toiba) that are connected to the Pakistani religious-political establishment can provoke tensions between India and Pakistan through mass casualty attacks. This was amply demonstrated following the

2 Naeem Ahmad Salik, "Pakistan and the Future of Non-Proliferation," IPRI Journal, Winter 2006, Vol. VI, No. 1, pp.

December 2001 attack on the Indian Parliament by Jaish-e-Mohammed militants, which led to a ten-month stand-off between the two armies.³

A second danger is through a Kargil-style episode in which militants, in cooperation with official Pakistani agencies and the military, occupy territory in Kashmir. As the July 2007 siege of the Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) complex in the heart of Islamabad showed, militant groups are steadily expanding their geographical area of influence, adversely affecting the stability of Pakistan. Although the nuclear weapon complex is under military control, there might be pockets within the military that are sympathetic to fundamentalist groups. At the very least, political and religious instability in Pakistan creates uncertainty in the minds of policymakers within and outside the region.

Finally, fears have been heightened since 9/11 over the possibility of nuclear weapons technology transfers from Pakistan to terrorist networks, especially after it was revealed that some senior Pakistani nuclear scientists met with the Al Qaeda leadership prior to 9/11. A related concern in the aftermath of 9/11 is that a fundamentalist Islamic group with Taliban/Al Qaeda links could take over Pakistan and with it, possession of the country's nuclear arsenal. Thus, Indian (as well as U.S.) threat perceptions include not just bilateral nuclear stability issues between India and Pakistan, but also the consequences of nuclear technology and materials falling into the hands of militant groups⁴.

In general, the complex nuclear weapons scenario in South Asia is shaped by two main factors. First, the intense nature of the dispute between India and Pakistan strikes at the very core of their nationhood. It involves territorial disputes and terrorist violence, and is further complicated by the desire of some terrorist groups to acquire non-conventional technology. Second, South Asia is part of a broader nuclear weapons context that includes China and the United States. Military developments by either Washington or Beijing, which are perceived as a direct threat, also impact military policies (both conventional and non-conventional) in South Asia. At the same time, the continued strategic military collaboration between China and Pakistan (such

³ According to one account, the United States prepared contingency plans to take over Pakistan's nuclear arsenal

⁴ event of an impending takeover of the country by fundamentalist groups. See Seymour Hersh, "Watching

as the joint development of the JF-17 fighter plane) is a factor that motivates India to continue nuclear and conventional modernization. Furthermore, while the territorial disputes between India and China are relatively dormant, there is no final resolution. As developments in 2006-2007 demonstrated, there is still a considerable gap between the two sides on the territorial issue. Due to this combination of factors, there are no clear incentives for either party to dramatically reorient its nuclear policy.

Nuclear Policies in South Asia

Keeping the various security disputes and attitudes in mind, the next step is to consider the nuclear doctrines and policies of protagonists in the region. Both India and Pakistan strive for a minimum deterrent. The objective of India's nuclear strategy is credible minimum deterrence (CMD), meaning a secure and reliable second-strike capability after absorbing an adversary's first strike. The main potential targets of this projected deterrence capability are Pakistan and China. Pakistan's nuclear doctrine also seeks a credible deterrent, against India, and according to one senior nuclear weapons planner, its weapons are "aimed solely at India." In particular it seeks to deter New Delhi from launching a conventional military attack such as an offensive for limited war objectives, including destruction of terrorist training camps, as well as attacks on nuclear facilities.

For both India and Pakistan, key components of their attitudes in nuclear defense demonstrate the incompatibility between their mutual nuclear postures. India's offer of a no-first use pact has been rejected by Pakistan as nuclear weapons are an integral element of its (Islamabad's) defense doctrine. On the other hand, Islamabad has offered New Delhi a no-war pact, which ostensibly would reduce the prospect of full-scale conventional war and the risk of nuclear crises. However, such a proposal does not touch upon the proxy war waged by the Kashmiri militants and therefore has been rejected by New Delhi.

Thus, both India and Pakistan strive for a secure second-strike capability as an integral element of their credible minimum deterrent doctrines. Since neither side has constructed systems that are deemed completely satisfactory and reliable, nuclear modernization continues. For India, this means a survivable delivery mechanism that can conceivably strike major cities in China. At present the longest range deployed missile is believed to be the Agni-II with a range of 2,000-2,500 km, and can reach

parts of western China. To have an increased range capability, the Indian Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) is developing the Agni III intermediate range ballistic missile, which was successfully tested for the first time in April 2007 and has a range of about 3,500 km.

Nevertheless, reports have stated that the Indian military is not altogether satisfied with the nuclear capable missiles that are in its arsenal-Prithvi I (short range ballistic missiles) and the Agni I & II. Thus, India's nuclear delivery systems are deemed far from adequate and for the time being. In the opinion of the Indian Air Force, there will be considerable reliance on fighter bombers such as the Mig 27, Jaguar, and Mirage-2000 for a nuclear delivery role.

This implies that for the foreseeable future, the Indian scientific-military establishment will reinforce their commitment to adequate delivery systems, especially the Agni III and the nuclear submarine project (the Advanced Technology Vessel or ATV) that could carry a sea-based deterrent in the form of a submarine-launched cruise missile (the Sagarika-currently under development). Reports in May 2007 stated that the ATV will be commissioned in 2011-2012 and that two Russian nuclear submarines might be leased before that.

As stated earlier, Pakistan's deployed missile systems can reach most parts of India. These deployed missiles include the Ghaznavi (Hatf-3, range 290 km), Shaheen-I (Hatf-4, range 600-800 km), and the Ghauri-I (Hatf-5, range 1,500 km). Development is also taking place on the Shaheen-II (Hatf-6, range 2,000-3,000 km), which was successfully tested in February 2007. These missile developments illustrate Pakistan's desire for a more secure deterrent, once the range issue had been dealt with. In addition, Pakistan is also seeking a more secure second-strike capability through the acquisition of the Agosta 90B class submarine in late 2007. This vessel, the second to be added to Pakistan's navy, can carry the nuclear capable Harpoon cruise missiles.

Both countries have also achieved considerable progress in manufacturing another delivery system-cruise missiles. India, in partnership with Russia, has developed the BrahMos, while Pakistan has the Babur. These missiles are meant to have land, sea, and air versions, and at least in the case of the BrahMos, will also have a variant for export. In the near future, Indian defense planners hope to introduce land attack cruise missiles with the capacity to carry a nuclear warhead over 1,500 km. In addition,

submarine and air force versions of the BrahMos are due to be tested in 2007. The missile is also being installed on ships and IL-38D maritime reconnaissance aircraft to give "strategic relevance" to the Indian Navy. Similarly, Pakistan has successfully tested its nuclear capable Babur (Hatf VII) cruise missile (range 700 km), most recently in March 2007.

In sum, in order to strengthen their nuclear delivery capabilities both India and Pakistan are seeking to perfect their missile arsenals, both ballistic and cruise. The dynamic nature of the pursuit of more reliable deterrence capabilities is also affected by strategic developments involving extra-regional actors, especially China and the United States.

The North Korean Nuclear Test and South Asia

As expected, North Korea's nuclear test put renewed focus on the dangers of nuclear proliferation, and policymakers in India assumed it would lead to more stringent criticism of its nuclear agreement with the United States. Indian experts expected the North Korean test to impact especially on any nuclear test-related provisions of the nuclear agreement with the United States. Consequently, New Delhi swiftly condemned the test and indirectly highlighted Islamabad's contribution to Pyongyang's nuclear test.] Some Indian officials even stated that Pyongyang's illegal acquisition of nuclear technology would actually spur reluctant supplier countries (such as Australia) to legitimately sell nuclear fuel to India, especially since it would be used for civilian purposes.⁵



⁵ Asia News, June 28, 2013, [http:// www .asianews .it /news -en /Religious -leaders: -peace -and -harmony , -only-development -path -for -Myanmar -28325 .html](http://www.asianews.it/news-en/Religious-leaders:-peace-and-harmony,-only-development-path-for-Myanmar-28325.html)

On the other hand, Islamabad refuted any suggestion that the activities of the A.Q. Khan network had contributed to Pyongyang's test, stating that North Korea's nuclear program is based on plutonium while Pakistan relies on uranium. In this manner, both India and Pakistan tried to ensure that proliferation in South Asia was not equated with proliferation in Northeast Asia. To a certain extent, the Bush administration obliged the subcontinental nuclear powers, as senior officials dismissed any parallels between North Korea's path to nuclear weapons to those of India and Pakistan. However, while Pakistan denied any links to the test, it did not help Islamabad's case when Japanese sources stated that days before Pyongyang's test, several Pakistani nuclear technicians arrived in North Korea through China. This augmented the suspicions that Pakistani agencies may have had some role in the test, perhaps through data sharing before or after the explosion.

The A.Q. Khan Network and Proliferation Dynamics

The A.Q. Khan network, which provided nuclear assistance to North Korea and Iran, has represented the most serious proliferation problem in recent years. Since Khan's public confession in February 2004, the Musharraf regime has consistently asserted that this network was the work of a rogue scientist and that the Pakistani government and its military leaders were not involved in these activities. However, it is not clear to what extent this assertion is accurate. Analysts and officials in Pakistan as well as in the United States have expressed skepticism over Khan's confession as well as the implicit professed innocence of the Pakistani political and military establishment. A highly publicized report released in April 2007 by the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies, also stated that individuals and entities involved in the network could still be dormant and can conceivably be reactivated in the future.

So far, Islamabad has refused to allow foreign interrogators to question Khan even though the U.S. government has regularly expressed dissatisfaction over information released by Pakistan.> Furthermore, most individuals connected to the network are still at large, including important figures such as B.S.A. Tahir, while others, such as Henk Slebos, have been given light sentences. Moreover, the Khan claimed in a signed statement that successive army chiefs in the 1990s (Generals Mirza Aslam Beg and Jehangir Karamat) had authorized the sales of nuclear technology. While this could be taken as Khan's attempts to remove the burden of guilt, it is true that the

military was closely associated with the nuclear and missile programs. In fact, in 1990, Gen. Beg warned U.S. government officials that Pakistan would be forced to provide nuclear technology to Tehran if Washington did not offer support to Pakistan.

Other circumstantial evidence, such as visits by the Pakistani military leadership to North Korea throughout the nineties, suggests that there was a barter deal between Pyongyang and Islamabad (uranium enrichment technology in exchange for missiles). Additionally, in August 2005, Gen. Musharraf conceded that Khan had transferred centrifuge machines to North Korea through which uranium hexafluoride (which was also transferred) can be enriched for eventual processing into civilian reactors fuel or for military purposes. Shipping out such large centrifuge machines without the military's knowledge would have been impossible. Therefore, it would have been highly unlikely that these activities were carried out without the military's acquiescence. On a side note, it is possible that Washington's attitude was colored by the need to retain Islamabad's support in the anti-Taliban/Al Qaeda campaign in Afghanistan.

Additionally, for a country to acquire a nuclear delivery system (such as the No Dong missiles transferred to Pakistan), the decision-making process incorporates several factors, as well as the opinions of numerous government agencies to ensure compatibility among the various systems. It is therefore not very plausible that a nuclear-missile barter deal with such serious and risky international consequences could have been approved without cooperation from senior levels of the political-military establishment in Pakistan. The issue of the Pakistani military-scientific establishment's involvement (or endorsement) in the Khan's network activities is crucial due to its implications for contemporary proliferation routes and processes. If these elements within and outside Pakistan (including non-Pakistani nationals) and their methods and routes remain undiscovered, it has two broad consequences for proliferation in South Asia.

First, it allows Islamabad to potentially procure missile and nuclear technology in the future, in an attempt to catch up with India. In this regard, a Pakistani national, Mohammed Aslam, working at the Tabani Corporation's Moscow office, was named by the Russian government in 2006 as having attempted to acquire dual-use technology and other materials for Pakistan's nuclear and missile development

programs. This example demonstrates that elements of the network are still active, though it is unclear if they are directly connected to Pakistani nuclear and missile development programs. Given Islamabad's need to construct a secure deterrent against India (especially long-range missiles that can reach southern and eastern India), it is possible that the above case is an instance of continuing efforts to exploit non-state networks to procure prohibited equipment. As one analyst noted, due to Pakistan's apparent inability to acquire nuclear weapons components legally, it is encouraged to look toward illegal sources. Furthermore, according to some experts, apart from Pakistan, other countries can easily utilize the same supply networks. The Iranian government has made use of these networks for its nuclear and missile programs. As the previously mentioned IISS report states, Tehran controls a clandestine nuclear materials network comparable to the one run by Khan, and in the past has procured technology from some of the same suppliers used by Khan. In context of nuclear proliferation networks, a further concern is that if North Korea dismantles its nuclear weapons program, it will create a potential source of unwanted nuclear materials in the process. Such discarded, but nevertheless lethal technology, could be bought by illegal nuclear supply entities that may or may not have had any connection to the Khan network.

Second, the continued existence of the kind of middlemen that the network generated increases the possibility of nuclear technology leakage out of Pakistan in the event of a coup or widespread instability from radical groups. Since 9/11, there have been periodic fears of internal upheavals in Pakistan, especially from groups linked to the Taliban. Recent reports have also stated that two nuclear scientists from the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) were kidnapped by the Taliban in late 2006, and as of March 2007 remained in captivity in the Waziristan area. > Soon after that kidnapping, there was an aborted attempt to capture six more PAEC officials in the North West Frontier Province of Pakistan in January 2007. While it is not clear if the officials and scientists were targeted specifically because of their links to Pakistan's nuclear program, these incidents demonstrate the potential danger of non-state actors' participation in the illegal market in nuclear technology.

In order to demonstrate to the international community that it is a responsible nuclear power, Islamabad has decided to set up a "Strategic Export Control Division" in its

foreign ministry that will ostensibly prevent prohibited WMD-related technology from being exported. However, this does not necessarily address the problem of possible involvement of government entities and officials that have remained under the radar even after the network was uncovered. In general, the proliferation-related fear for U.S. policymakers is twofold—first, that nuclear technology could be transferred to a terrorist organization; and second, that the Musharraf regime could be overthrown, resulting in uncertainty for the counter-terrorism as well as nonproliferation campaigns.

The case of Pakistan demonstrates the difficulty that arises when nonproliferation goals collide with other strategic imperatives such as counter-terrorism. While the Khan network problem is one of the reasons why Washington has refused to offer a nuclear cooperation agreement to Pakistan, the perceived tilt toward India (through the Indo-U.S. nuclear agreement) can also be a reason why Washington has not pressured Islamabad any further on the A.Q. Khan issue. Nevertheless, in January 2007, in a proactive step, the U.S. Congress under the Democratic leadership passed the Nuclear Black Market Counter Terrorism Act, which authorizes the administration to implement "punitive actions" against states condoning or cooperating with entities actively engaged in nuclear proliferation.

Security Issue:

(U.S. Security Policy on South Asia Since 9/11 — Challenges and Implications for the Future) Pre-9/11 Relations with Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India: The Baseline When 9/11 dawned, US security ties to South Asian nations ranged from minuscule to non-existent. The United States did not recognize the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and had done everything possible to sanction and isolate the Taliban in an effort to induce it to expel Al Qaida. Washington was on shaky terms with Pakistan, having failed to persuade it to slow its nuclear weapons program or to end its support to the Taliban. The United States had blamed Pakistan for provoking a near-war with India in Kashmir in 1999 that had the potential to escalate to nuclear conflict. The Bush Administration was close to publicly recognizing India as a special partner, having concluded, like the Clinton Administration before it, that India must be the linchpin of US policy in South Asia despite American unhappiness about the Indian nuclear weapons program. Both administrations recognized that the post Cold War upswing in

bilateral relations needed to be accelerated, with trade playing an important role. 9/11 made South Asia the initial theater for the “war on terrorism” declared by President George W. Bush and reordered US relations with the region. The most tangible and immediate result was the arrival of American security forces in Afghanistan and Pakistan—as well as in neighboring Central Asia, for the first time. The new arrangements forged with Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India since then have been billed as part of a strategic shift of US policy designed to counter terrorism, but each of these relationships faces unique challenges.

Afghanistan: Still South Asia’s “Ground Zero”

Since the ouster of the Taliban by US forces in late 2001, American troops have worked alongside allied forces, diplomats, non-government organizations (NGOs), and officials of President Hamid Karzai’s administration to provide security, humanitarian aid and reconstruction, and to foster a more representative state that, it is hoped, will be less hospitable to terrorists.

Some 18,000 US-led coalition combat troops have cooperated closely with 9,000 NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) peacekeepers, including US soldiers.

ISAF stands out as an example of the new roles for old allies envisaged by US defense transformation planners, although Washington has been disappointed by NATO’s unwillingness to take over combat operations in Afghanistan, which would free up more US forces to conduct counter terrorism sweeps in Afghanistan and to go to Iraq.

Afghanistan, however, also epitomizes the long-term challenges of addressing the presumed socio economic root causes of terrorism and denying terrorists their base of support. There have been improvements in some areas under ISAF protection, notably the Shomali Plains 16, but security remains an obstacle to building infrastructure as well as new institutions in many parts of Afghanistan.

The Karzai government faces numerous longer term threats as well. In the east and south, remnants of the ousted Taliban have re-coalesced into an insurgency, drawing on support from fellow Pashtun tribesmen on both sides of the border with Pakistan.

While some have seen the Taliban's failure to disrupt the October 2004 national election as evidence that the insurgency is losing steam, others believe that the group can command thousands of Pashtun fighters when it deems the time ripe. That time could come when western forces are drawn down, if not before.

A second and more intractable menace to the establishment of both order and democracy in Afghanistan is the resurgent drug trade, which again dominates the economy. Afghanistan is in danger of becoming a "narco-state," according to Antonio Maria Costa, Executive Director of the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime.

Nathan Hodge, "Americans Keep Peace for NATO," Atlanta Journal-Constitution, October 31, 2004, 5A, and James Morrison, "Embassy Row: Afghans 'Love Us,'" December 23, 2004, Washington Times, A17

Robert Burns, "U.S. Urges NATO to Take Afghan Mission," Associated Press online, October 12, 2004, and Paul Ames, "Germans Reject NATO-Afghan Proposal," Associated Press online, October 13, 2004

John Daniszewski, "Putting Together the Pieces of a Shattered Afghanistan," Los Angeles Times, October , 2004, A1

Keith B. Richburg, "Rivalries, Divisions Take Toll on Taliban; Militia Weakened, but Seen as Threat," Washington Post, November 19, 2004, A24.)

Pakistan: struggling with "front-line" status Turbulent ties

The US-led "war on terrorism" has affected Pakistan as much as Afghanistan—but Pakistan presents even tougher challenges to US security policy. Since 9/11, the United States has moved from a strategy of containing Pakistan to one of re-engagement. Despite Washington's efforts to broaden the basis of the alliance, it remains narrowly anchored in counterterrorism.

Pakistan's cooperation with the United States has grown steadily since Islamabad became the charter member of what E.J. Dionne has called the "coalition of the not-so-willing," in response to an ultimatum to join the war on Al Qaida and the Taliban, or risk becoming a target. Under US pressure, President Musharraf dumped the Taliban, which had been viewed for years by successive Pakistani governments as its best hope to ensure a friendly government on its western border so it could focus on

India to the east. Also under US pressure, Islamabad clamped down—although intermittently and incompletely—on Islamist militant groups based in Pakistan. The United States had worried well before 9/11 about these groups, some of which have links to Al Qaida and/or support remnants of the Taliban. These organizations have variously attacked Indian interests in reprisal for India's continued "occupation" of Kashmir; targeted westerners; and fomented Sunni-Shia violence in Pakistan. Some, however, also have served for years as Pakistan's means of pressing India to settle the Kashmir issue, a fact that has made many Pakistanis ambivalent about reining them in. Musharraf's cooperation with Washington has brought Pakistan important gains. It ended the country's international diplomatic isolation, the result of past sanctions. It also brought desperately needed international aid from the United States, Japan, Europe and international financial institutions. Whereas US humanitarian aid before 9/11 had been viewed partly as a means to keep Pakistan from becoming a "nuclear basket case," the theme after 9/11 was terrorism prevention, including the provision of alternatives to anti-Western madrassah-based education that has been widely blamed for stoking jihadism.

Pakistan's military hopes that former Secretary Powell's declaration of Pakistan as a major non-NATO ally (MNNA) in March 2004 will open the way to significant US military sales to Pakistan. Islamabad has a long shopping list that includes American F-16s; a deal for the purchase of F-16s was put on ice in the early 1990s after Washington imposed nuclear sanctions on Pakistan.

Since most US sanctions were lifted after 9/11, many of the US military supplies flowing to Pakistan have been counterterrorism-related. The Bush Administration has notified Congress of its plan to sell Pakistan \$1.2 billion worth of sophisticated weapons by mid-2005,⁶ to India's displeasure. Lobbying by Indians and opposition by members of the "India caucus" in the US Congress seem likely to limit actual sales to Pakistan, however. New Delhi's protests already have quashed a proposed three-way agreement that would have resulted in the sale of F-16s to Pakistan by Belgium.

Many western observers worry that these "bennies" have strengthened Musharraf's political position at home at the expense of democracy. His decision in late December 2004 to retain his military as well as his civilian leadership role, despite an earlier promise to give up the position of Army Chief, has intensified these concerns

among domestic opponents as well. Certainly, all of Pakistan's key institutions remain firmly under military control.

Whatever the gains, Pakistanis also see a host of interrelated costs to lining up with the United States on counterterrorism.

First, despite US assurances, Pakistanis fear that they are again tethered to the United States in a single-issue alliance, and will find themselves out in the cold when Washington's priorities change—as they did after the Soviets pulled out of Afghanistan.

Second, the war on terrorism has now moved to Pakistani territory. Military sweeps in Afghanistan have pushed Taliban and Al Qaida escapees across the porous frontier into semi-autonomous tribal regions in northwestern Pakistan side, where they have found sanctuary.

Third and related, anger among ethnic Pashtuns about Islamabad's about-face on the Taliban and counterterrorism operations in the border areas has renewed Pashtun chauvinism.

Fourth, Musharraf since 2001 has faced a broad-based political backlash against his counterterrorism cooperation with the United States and his backpedaling, under US pressure, on support for anti-Indian militants operating in Kashmir. The backlash is linked to broad public concerns about Pakistani sovereignty but complicated by resentment at Musharraf's political maneuvering.⁶

Fifth, the war on terrorism has made Musharraf himself a target—and not just of attacks by Al Qaida. In March 2004, Pakistanis heard radio broadcasts, reportedly sponsored by Al Qaeda, urging Musharraf's overthrow. In May, General Musharraf acknowledged that dissident junior military personnel had played a part in assassination attempts against him the preceding December. Their involvement—although probably linked to anger about Musharraf's policy shifts—also raises questions about whether radical Islamism has seeped into the armed forces, Pakistan's

⁶ Extrapolating from Commission on America's National Interests, "America's National interests: A Report from the Commission on America's National Interests," July 2000, 6–7, <http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/amernatinter.pdf>

most coherent institution, despite senior commanders conviction that they have successfully weeded out any zealots.

Sixth, Pakistan now worries about the security of its western flank. President Musharraf officially supports the United States-backed Karzai administration, but relations between Kabul and Islamabad remain tense. Many Pakistanis distrust this Afghan government, which is dominated by officials associated with “the other side” in Afghanistan’s civil war. They fear that Kabul’s shaky control of Afghan territory augurs renewed meddling by Afghanistan’s neighbors, at Pakistan’s expense. Pakistani concerns about Iran’s intentions probably have grown in recent months; some Pakistanis believe Iran is aiding Baluch separatist rebels. The rebels have been attacking government targets there, including gas pipelines and other energy-related facilities.

Seventh, the war on terrorism has put the United States and Pakistan somewhat at odds on Kashmir, whose liberation from India remains a rallying cause for Pakistanis. For decades, Washington avoided taking sides on Kashmir—but, after militants with links to Pakistan attacked India’s Parliament in December 2001, Indian officials charged the United States with practicing a double standard on terrorism. Washington now describes militant violence against Indian targets as part of global terrorism, much to Pakistan’s chagrin.

Several Pakistan-based organizations waging war on Indian rule in Kashmir were added to the United States State Department’s list of terrorist groups. In 2003, 11 young Muslims in the Washington area were charged with belonging to one of these recently listed groups, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), which is linked to multiple terrorist attacks on Indian targets.

Eighth, Pakistan worries about the effects of post-9/11 US security policy toward India, its long-time adversary, and China, Pakistan’s staunchest ally since its independence and a key source of security assistance. Pakistani officials are especially anxious about military sales by the United States and its allies to India—a by-product of growing US India security ties spurred by common concerns about terrorism. Islamabad warned in October 2003, for example, that US approval of Israel’s sale to India of Phalcon AWACS systems would worsen conventional military imbalances in South Asia and increase the risk of war.

India's air superiority has long been a sore point for Pakistan, one of the reasons Pakistan is so eager to acquire F-16s. Pakistani officials worry, too, that the United States will help India develop a missile defense system, which could neutralize the value of Pakistan's nuclear missiles as a deterrent against any Indian attack⁷.

A concern for Washington is whether an acutely anxious Pakistan will be more prone to overreact to perceived threats from India.

Some Pakistanis reportedly fear that the United States' "doctrine" of preemption could spark US efforts to destroy Pakistan's nuclear weapons, either to keep them from falling into the wrong hands or to prevent further proliferation to other countries. Pakistan also keeps a close eye on both US and Indian cooperation with China. After 9/11, China joined the United States in pressing Pakistan to end its support for the Taliban. China's decision to join the Nuclear Suppliers' Group (NSG) and interest in Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) may portend further shifts away from earlier aid to Pakistan's nuclear and missile programs. Pakistan is leery of China's warming ties to India, as well—a trend under way since well before 9/11. Beijing is increasingly acting as a "balancer" between India and Pakistan, rather than as Islamabad's ally.

Ninth, the war in Iraq and its aftermath—widely viewed by Pakistanis as anti-Islamic—have raised concerns in the Pakistani establishment about adverse effects on US aid to Pakistan and on US attention to the resolution of Kashmir, a top priority for Pakistan. Although the Bush Administration has echoed its predecessors' unwillingness to mediate the Kashmir dispute, many Pakistanis see US attention as vital to progress on this issue.

Issues From the US Side

Even assuming that US military sales to India pick up, it is doubtful that the current tactical security relationship will blossom into a strategic partnership. From the US side, the positive bilateral trend of the past four years has broad—though not deep—roots. These include the influential Indian American diaspora; recently realized economic complementarities between the two countries, including India's cheap,

⁷ See Jürgen Haacke, "Myanmar: Now a Site for Sino-US Geopolitical Competition?" London School of Economics IDEAS Special Reports 15 (2012), 54, <http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/47504/>.

highly skilled English-speaking labor force and its potential as a market for US goods; the appeal of a relatively stable country in an unstable region; and, of course, shared democratic values. The bipartisan congressional “India caucus” is one reflection of India’s growing salience in US policymaking. An important uncertainty from the US side is whether Washington’s current relaxed position on India’s nuclear weapons program—a key contributor to New Delhi’s good will toward Washington— will persist. Anticipation of this relaxed posture spurred the BJP-led government to woo incoming Bush Administration officials in 2001 with approving comments about missile defense. The Pentagon has since discussed Indian participation in a US-sponsored Asian missile shield, although India reportedly had not decided whether to take part as of September 2004, in part because of misgivings about China’s reaction.

Nuclear issues could again become divisive if a future US administration revives criticism of India’s nuclear weapons program and renews pressure on New Delhi to join international restraint regimes. India remains unlikely to compromise what it views as sovereign national decisions on security and probably will continue to resist “discriminatory regimes,” instead favoring general nuclear disarmament. An Indian decision to conduct more nuclear weapons tests could cause friction even with a relatively laissez-faire US administration. Some in the Indian nuclear establishment have argued that India will need to test again to demonstrate that it has a credible thermonuclear weapon.

10 More tests Needed- Pokhran Was Just the First Step,” *The Statesman* (India) via 1999 FT Asia Intelligence Wire, March 8, 1999)

Security Dilemma

Among other things, the visit of President Obama to India brings into focus the politics of the region. If Pakistan and India reduce their bilateral insecurities, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation could substantively give shape to a stable regional security complex.

Individual security precedes regionalism. It pertains to lack of threats to the values of a state, or the latter’s ability to avoid wars and achieve victory when provoked.

The insecurities of India and Pakistan undermine Saarc’s stability, and regional security remains a pipe dream. New Delhi’s pursuit of international prestige and its

security calculus dictate Islamabad's hedging. Cooperation is possible if interdependence is built to such an extent that regional "security problems cannot be analysed or resolved apart from one another".

The stakes for the two Saarc heavyweights are high and depend on their simultaneous choices. Without stability, India's aspiration of Security Council membership will remain unfulfilled.

Likewise, Pakistan's prospects of becoming a vital node in the Silk Road would be undermined. As a land bridge between the resource-rich Central Asian region and the Indian Ocean, Pakistan's position remains central despite competing big power interests.

Both nuclear rivals accept that a stable, secure and peaceful neighborhood is in their interest but cannot achieve this. However, the prize for cooperation is bigger than the incentives of competition. If India and Pakistan make some concessions, the subcontinent's teeming population and resources could promise a powerful regional hub. New Delhi may balance its goals to revise the international order. Likewise, Islamabad may create an environment for making this happen.

South Asian Nations Must Overcome Mutual Hostilities

At the moment, India unrealistically expects Pakistan to relent on its demands on bilateral territorial and water disputes; it wants Pakistan to give up allegedly destabilizing India; and to give New Delhi Non-Discriminatory Market Access status.

Pakistan expects India to resolve certain disputes before opening up its fragile markets. It is also refraining from giving India NDMA status because of fears that there is no level playing field that could help Pakistan acquire inexpensive energy sources, such as nuclear energy, essential for economic development. Like India, Pakistan would expect that no state should foment instability. Coercion cannot resolve these seemingly inexorable bilateral expectations, but bold leadership could end the zero sum game.

South Asian nations must overcome mutual hostilities.

The international system holds opportunities for the subcontinent as the economic centre of gravity is shifting from the West to Asia. This transition may also sway military and political power.

China's rise and the potential shift in the balance of power have prompted Washington to cooperate with Beijing in the economic sphere while strategically partnering with Delhi and others to contain Beijing. The success of America's 'rebalancing strategy' would also depend on what is acceptable to China and Russia.

The new Russian military doctrine indicates Moscow would deter Nato's eastward encroachment. Moscow may also react if India pushes American interests in the East China Sea with Russian-supplied technology. India's alignment with America may affect relations with Russia, triggering Moscow's strategic options that would exacerbate South Asian instability.

Some elements of the gestating US-India partnership affect Pakistan's security. It has emboldened India in dismissing Pakistan's peace-building initiatives. And the Indo-US nuclear deal has unlocked India's domestic resources for building a nuclear triad. Denying civilian nuclear technology to Pakistan affects the latter's growth and deprives the global industry from investing in a market that equals the combined populations of UK, France and Germany.

Afghanistan has shown promise under the new government and is cooperating with Pakistan. The aftermath of the Peshawar tragedy marks the beginning of decisive fight against Taliban. Stable borders can help maintain the internal balance, and India can play a role in making this happen.

The future might be more challenging than what the Saarc nations have anticipated or are ready to handle. Governance problems, economic challenges, population growth and recurring natural disasters may rule the geopolitics India is trying to affect and Pakistan is coping with. South Asians have to overcome domestic constraints in order to take advantage of or absorb the stresses and shocks of the international system.

India and Pakistan must lead by taking direct and indirect actions to stabilize South Asia. Restraint and conflict resolution are better options than conflict management. Negotiating the simmering disputes can create space for building greater security for Saarc to finally make up for the lost opportunities of the past.

(Published in Dawn, January 27th, 2015)

Burma Issue:

Top ten human rights abusing in burma 2013

Ethnic Cleansing

Burmese authorities and Arakanese groups have committed crimes against humanity and imposed an ethnic cleansing campaign against Rohingya Muslims since June 2012. There are about 800,000 Rohingya left in Burma, and they mainly live in Arakan State, western Burma. Hundreds have been killed in domestic attacks, though the exact number is unknown because the government blocks international access to the Rohingya. Since the attacks began, thousands have fled Burma by boat, and at least hundreds have drowned. President Thein Sein, who has said the “only solution” to anti-Muslim violence is to deport all Rohingya or put them in camps, is ostensibly seeking to push all Rohingya out of the country by subjecting them to a fabricated and completely avoidable humanitarian crisis. Rohingya IDPs now languish under an imposed system of apartheid, and humanitarian aid workers assisting the Rohingya are intimidated and threatened.

The government discriminatorily considers Rohingya to be illegal Bengali immigrants and rendered them stateless through the 1981 Citizenship Law. The government has long exercised anti-Rohingya policies, including restrictions on travel, employment, education, worship, construction of religious buildings, marriage, childbearing, etc. The government’s discriminatory policies have served to legitimize attacks and massacres against Rohingya, and since March 2013, against other Muslims throughout Burma. Muslims are targets of the “969 campaign,” which in the name of the Buddhist faith, promotes anti-Muslim hate and stigmatizes people who sell goods to Muslims. The Burmese government’s systemic impunity and the military’s independence from civilian control exacerbate human rights abuses – perpetrators of violence are not held accountable for their actions, and the corrupt legal code allows abuses to continue unabated. We hope that the international community will choose to hold the Burmese government accountable for its crimes and that in 2014, there will be no need for a top ten list for human rights abuses in Burma

Extrajudicial Killings

Over the past year, Burmese soldiers have murdered many civilians – men, women, and children – with impunity. At the end of September, troops fired at two farmers sitting in their homes in Shan State; one escaped but the other, 50-yr-old Loong Sai Lek, was bound up and later found dead on the road. Rohingya Muslims held captive in IDP camps over the past year have also been shot dead with impunity by security forces guarding the camps. The Burmese military has murdered many Kachin civilians over the course of the past year, and there have been many reported disappearances.³

Rape & Sexual Violence

Rape and sexual violence have long been used as weapons of war in Burma. On September 3, Burmese soldiers gang raped a group of women and girls in northern Kachin State. The soldiers then abandoned the women naked in the forest. Rohingya women are also being targeted for rape and sexual violence by Burmese security forces, and the US State Department has reported that Rohingya women are being kept as sex slaves on Burmese military bases in Arakan State.

Burma calculatedly refused to sign the Preventing Sexual Violence Initiative at the UN in September 2013. The international community, despite committing to end sexual violence in conflict zones around the world, has not placed any coercive pressure on the Burmese government to sign and has instead continued awarding the Burmese government further diplomatic legitimacy and economic concessions without preconditions.

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pressure on the Burmese government to sign and has instead continued awarding the Burmese government further diplomatic legitimacy and economic concessions without preconditions.

Needlessly Creating IDPs and Refugees

Hundreds of thousands have fled to live in refugee camps or communities in Thailand, Bangladesh, and Malaysia, all countries that refuse to ratify the UN Convention on Refugees and severely limit the basic rights of refugees. In addition, over 250,000 people have been internally displaced since 2011. These currently include 140,000 people in Arakan State, mostly Rohingya, have been confined to apartheid-style internally displaced persons (IDP) camps due to ongoing anti-Muslim violence. The Rohingya are victims of what the UN is calling a deliberately dire humanitarian crisis because the government has blocked humanitarian aid. 10,000 Burmese Muslims in central Burma are also confined to camps, and due to the government's perpetuation of anti-Muslim sentiment and policies, they will likely never be able to return to their property. When the UN special rapporteur attempted to visit these IDPs in August, his convoy was attacked by a Buddhist mob; the government ludicrously denied the attack. 1,000 Shan were displaced when the military broke a ceasefire agreement around a government hydropower project along the Salween River in spring 2013. 100,000 Kachin have been confined to camps along the Burma-China border. The government blocks international or domestic humanitarian aid from reaching the majority of IDPs who live in Kachin-controlled areas. Take action – ask the US Government to direct humanitarian assistance to Kachin IDPs.

Human Trafficking

Labor and sex trafficking have escalated in Burma's most vulnerable areas. Displaced Kachin women and girls on the China-Burma border are extremely vulnerable to sex trafficking; as are Rohingya Muslim women who have been rendered stateless by the government. Those who flee Burma for safety or economic reasons are often looped into trafficking rings on Thai or Malay fishing boats or factories. This year, the Thai navy has reportedly participated in trafficking Rohingya who are fleeing religious violence. Refugees from Burma in the Thai fishing industry are among the most defenseless victims of human trafficking worldwide; nearly 60% of migrants interviewed in a recent UN survey reported having witnessed a fellow worker being

murdered. But the trafficking of Burmese migrants has not given our stomachs pause: most of our shrimp and canned tuna in the US comes from Thailand's trafficking-driven fishing industry.

The US government, along with the US stomach, also turns a blind eye to trafficking in Burma, and falsely upgraded Burma's ranking in the US State Department's 2013 Trafficking in Persons report so that the US could avoid imposing mandatory sanctions. Find out more about human trafficking in Burma on our interactive Conflict & Human Rights map.

Torture

The Burmese government, military, and police use torture and severe beatings to interrogate, intimidate, and discriminate against rural protesters, ethnic civilians, and prisoners. Last month, the Burmese military tortured a 16-yr-old Kachin boy who was coming home from a soccer game. The military also tortured ten male villagers in Nhka Ga village, northern Kachin State. The men were tied up, hung from their feet, and beaten inside their church. Two of the villagers, a church deacon and a young man, were killed, and their bodies were dumped alongside a road; others, including the village's pastor, are in critical condition but are being held as hostages and denied medical care. Instances of torture in Kachin State have increased since August – beating and killing villagers is how the military prepared for the early October peace talks between the Kachin and the government, which unsurprisingly did not lead to a ceasefire agreement.

Child Soldiers

The Burmese military is notorious for its use of child soldiers. More than 5,000 children are currently serving in the military, not including those who were recruited as children but are now past their 18th birthdays. Poor and uneducated children are the most likely to be recruited, and recruiters have been known to use threats and force against them. Children who refuse can be shackled and fettered; many will never see their families again. Children who do manage to escape from the army are detained and treated as adult deserters.

Military perpetrators enjoy total impunity, and the government continues to fail to comply with terms agreed upon in a 2012 joint action plan with the UN that aimed to end the use of child soldiers

Forced Labor

The problem of endemic forced labor and of widespread child labor plagues Burma's most disadvantaged. The US State Department's 2013 Trafficking in Persons report highlights forced labor practices in Burma, particularly in state agricultural and commercial enterprises, and in ethnic and border regions. The UN special rapporteur on the human rights situation in Burma has repeatedly documented forced labor cases, and communities affected by land confiscation or in conflict/post-conflict areas are most at risk. Ethnic people – in 2013 those particularly in Shan, Kachin, and Karen States – are forced by the Burmese military to serve as porters, human shields, landmine sweepers, and construction workers.

Burma is consistently regarded as one of the world's most extreme in terms of child labor violations, and has remained obstinate about addressing child labor. Nearly one in five children in Burma between the ages of 10 and 14 are victims of forced labor, according to a UNICEF report, including many children who are sex trafficked.

Arbitrary Arrests

The Burmese government symbolically releases prisoners of conscience before international trips, using them as pawns, but it simultaneously continues to detain local activists and over 1,300 ethnic people, mainly Kachin and Rohingya men and boys. From June-September 2013 alone, 61 new activists were arrested, and as of the first week of October, around 130 people were awaiting trial for charges under the notorious 2012 Peaceful Assembly and Peaceful Procession Law ("section 18").

These new arrests prove that the Burmese government actively monitors the activities of its civilians, because not only are many activists being arrested under old laws, they are also being arrested for "offenses" that were committed years ago. One example is the July arrest of Daw Baw Jar, a Kachin female activist known for providing legal advocacy to Kachin farmers whose land was confiscated by US-sanctioned tycoon Tay Zaw and the Burmese military. She was outrageously charged with homicide

under the government's absurd allegation that she treated a Kachin IDP last year who later died.

Land Confiscation

New foreign investment has led the government to confiscate millions of acres to use for mega development projects (e.g. mining, dams, pipelines). Two 2012 farmland laws stripped Burma's farmers of the right to property – the government owns all “private” land, and farmers who protest seizures face severe penalties. Private, military, and government enterprises have been allowed to forcibly relocate entire towns, and destroy homes, religious buildings, and land without providing compensation.

Promoting Peace in Myanmar U.S. INTERESTS and Role Lynn Kuok

These were some of the comments made by individuals interviewed on a short research trip to Myanmar.¹ The anti- American sentiment expressed in the first statement was by no means representative— the United States still commands the respect and admiration of the vast majority of the Myanmar people. Many would welcome a greater U.S. presence in the country. Taken together, however, the comments highlight the opportunities and challenges the United States faces in securing its interests in Myanmar and the broader region.

This report highlights U.S. interests in Myanmar and examines perspectives of American involvement there. It then focuses on three areas that have important implications for Myanmar's future: the peace process between the government and ethnic armed groups in the border regions; communal tensions in Rakhine state bordering Bangladesh and in central Myanmar; and the 2015 general election, which can impact peace and conflict outcomes in Myanmar. The report concludes with some recommendations. There is a window of opportunity for the United States to help consolidate positive changes in Myanmar and facilitate the country's goals to usher in democracy and prosperity for its 60 million people. This opportunity needs to be grasped quickly and decisively, not least because the election in late 2015 will mean that short- term political imperatives will increasingly dictate developments. It is also not clear how U.S. influence in Myanmar will be impacted by the outcome of the election.

U.S. National Interests in Myanmar Security, Values and Prosperity

In order of importance, U.S. interests in Myanmar relate to security, democracy and human rights, and the economy. These interests are often mutually reinforcing. A democratic Myanmar will positively impact peace and stability in Southeast Asia and the broader Asia- Pacific region. In some instances, however, these interests may come into conflict. Much of the anger directed at the United States stems from western insistence on the rights of the Rohingya, a community that Myanmar people across all walks of life insist are illegal migrants from Bangladesh. This suggests a potential trade- off between security- and value- related interests, at least if an issue is not handled with sensitivity.

Security

Myanmar is located between two of Asia's behemoths, China and India, and is of geostrategic importance to both countries as well as to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and its member states. China, in particular, has been consistent about expanding its influence in Myanmar.⁴ During decades of western sanctions, China moved swiftly to become Myanmar's main diplomatic and military ally, as well as its source of financial assistance and economic expertise.⁵ When Myanmar was anxious to put on a good show for the recent Southeast Asian Games, Beijing stepped in to assist, reportedly giving the country nearly \$33 million in technical assistance and accepting athletes from Myanmar for training on Chinese soil.

Three prongs have been identified in China's approach toward Myanmar: first, a focus on the stability of neighboring states primarily to avoid instability along China's borders; second, the development of energy security; and third, addressing nontraditional security concerns such as the spread of human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (HIV/AIDS), the trafficking of drugs and people, and other illicit industries. The oil and gas pipelines running from Myanmar's Rakhine state, through territory controlled by ethnic minority groups, to China have heightened China's interests in Myanmar's stability. To this list of Chinese interests, one could also add circumventing what China sees as U.S. efforts to contain it.

Myanmar's strategic importance is heightened by its 2014 chairmanship of ASEAN. This position will allow it to impact the outcome of ASEAN meetings and the handling of issues like the South China Sea disputes since the responsibility for drafting post-meeting declarations is entrusted to the chair. China and four of the ten ASEAN member states, including the Philippines with whom the United States has a mutual defense treaty, have competing claims in the South China Sea, making it a volatile flash-point.⁸

Myanmar's military links with North Korea, which could potentially destabilize the region, are also of considerable concern. President Thein Sein assured President Barack Obama in November 2012 that such ties would cease and that the country would not violate United Nations (UN) Security Council resolutions banning arms sales from North Korea. Such links, however, reportedly continue¹¹ and were implicit in the April 2013 testimony of a senior official from the U.S. State Department revealing that Washington continues to ask Naypyidaw to demonstrate "concrete progress" in achieving an end to military ties with North Korea.

Values

The democratization of Myanmar has been an important policy objective for all recent U.S. administrations. Current sanctions were enacted primarily because of what the United States saw as the former ruling military junta's disregard for the human rights and civil liberties of the people. Without proper support from the outside, analysts say reforms in Myanmar could be side-tracked or the country could "slide back to the dark age of military rule." Myanmar expert David Steinberg thinks that a reversion to military rule is unlikely because any attempt to do so would provoke a people's revolution. Analysts like Min Zin and others, however, are less sanguine. Min Zin describes a worsening situation as "communal riots, deepening poverty, ongoing civil strife, and the rivalries of political elites ravage the country." He says that two senior ruling party insiders told him that another coup could well be a last resort if the nation slides into chaos. A source who studies the Myanmar military described its mentality as follows: while civilians take one step after another, the military is cautious; it tests the ground several times after each step before determining if it is safe to proceed.

⁸ <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-east-asia/indonesia/010-indonesia-overcoming-murder-and-chaos-in-maluku.asp>

Although the military has thus far allowed political and economic reforms, this could change if it considers the country's stability to be at stake.

Prosperity

Many investors are touting Myanmar as the “final frontier.” The country, rich in gems, timber, minerals, oil, and offshore natural gas reserves, has significant untapped potential. It also offers U.S. companies a market that, in numbers at least, is larger than that of South Korea and almost triple that of Australia, though not without considerable investment risks.

Perspectives on U.S. Involvement in Myanmar:

Too Little and Too Much

The U.S. embassy did an excellent job of supporting the transition. But it faces a Washington block in respect of the peace process. It can't take substantial steps to making a difference in the peace process. Every country has nationalism. They have to be sensitive [about the Rohingya/“Bengali” issue]. The general consensus among interviewed individuals is that the United States is doing a good, even “excellent,” job at promoting democracy in Myanmar. In contrast, U.S. promotion of the peace process with ethnic minority groups has been found wanting. Most expressed a desire for the United States to do more, though the extent of U.S. involvement suggested ranged from greater financial support to a more substantive role as an observer in the peace process. A person involved in peace efforts argued that “being the most powerful country in the world, the presence of the United States in the peace process will be a big reassurance that both sides will hold on to the agreement and implement it accordingly.”

A more substantive U.S. role, however, is complicated because of Chinese government sensitivities and the Myanmar government's reluctance to internationalize the peace process. When the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO), the political wing of an armed ethnic group (the Kachin Independence Army or KIA) in Myanmar's north, requested the presence of the United States, the European Union, and the United Nations at its cease-fire negotiations with the government, China reportedly objected.

While the United States is generally regarded as doing too little with respect to the peace process, the United States and western media are seen as interfering too much in relation to the Rohingya issue. A Myanmar nongovernmental organization (NGO) representative explained government resentment of the United States' handling of the issue: "The United States sees it as a human rights issue. But the [Myanmar] government thinks that human rights are not valuable. If [local] officials cannot see from a human rights lens, they think that the United States is biased."

Resentment is not confined to Myanmar government officials; it is shared by many educated elites and the wider populace. Statements ranged from strident ("I feel very anti- American at the moment") to coded exhortations for the international community to "respect sovereignty and citizenship rights," alluding to Myanmar's right to determine how to deal with "illegal immigrants" within its borders. The ethnic Rakhine population in Rakhine state feel aggrieved by what they regard as the international community's neglect of their straitened circumstances and its favorable treatment of the Rohingya. Apart from umbrage over the Rohingya issue, there is also across- the- board sensitivity backlash to Time magazine's article on activist monk Wirathu, which labeled him the face of "Buddhist Terror."

Domestic and International Repercussions of Buddhist- Muslim Conflict

The clashes between Buddhists and Muslims in June and October 2012 in Rakhine state left almost 200 people dead and around 140,000 displaced. The violence in Meiktila, which is where the most serious violence occurred in 2013, resulted in 44 deaths and the wide- spread destruction of Muslim neighborhoods. The United Nations counts 49 Muslims killed in the hostilities in January 2014, though the government insists only one person was killed. Apart from loss of life, violence also threatens Myanmar's economy as it dampens investor confidence. More fundamentally, it could endanger political transformation.

Violence affecting Myanmar's geographic center could lead to a declaration of a state of emergency, with consequences for civil liberties. The risk of extremists targeting Myanmar also cannot be discounted. Groups in Indonesia have called for a jihad against Myanmar. One influential radical cleric declared this an obligation for all Muslims. Extremist groups going to the aid of coreligionists is not without precedent in the region. In mid- 2000, for example, 2,000 members of Laskar Jihad, a Java-

based radical Islamic organization, arrived in Ambon, the capital of Indonesia's Maluku province, to help fellow Muslims fight against Christians.

Communal violence has undermined Myanmar's relations with its neighbors, in particular, Muslim-majority Malaysia and Indonesia, where the numbers of Muslim Rohingya refugees from Myanmar have surged since the unrest in 2012. It has also hurt Myanmar's international reputation. The Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), an association of 56 states with significant Muslim populations, along with other international organizations including the United Nations and human rights groups, have condemned the violence against the Rohingya. With Myanmar chairing ASEAN in 2014, its priority should be to showcase a modern nation that has made strides from its authoritarian and divided past, rather than one that continues to be afflicted by atavistic tendencies.

Communal conflict in Myanmar has regional ramifications as well. Southeast Asia, a religiously diverse region, is generally known for its tolerance, but Buddhists from Myanmar and a Buddhist center were targeted in Muslim-majority Malaysia and Indonesia. The Myanmar embassy in Indonesia was also the target of a foiled bomb plot. Such incidents, even if averted, create a climate of distrust and fear that could destabilize religious relations in the region, if not beyond.

U.S. Strategy and Recommendations

The U.S. needs a clear strategy on the Myanmar transition and peace process both are linked.

Congress is still suspicious of reform here so USAID [U.S. Agency for International Development] is cautious—it is in limbo. Given its interests in Myanmar, the United States needs to be consistent about pursuing policies that will directly or indirectly promote the peace process and support the Myanmar government in ameliorating communal tensions in Rakhine state and elsewhere.

However important securing the release of political prisoners and ensuring that the 2015 election is free and fair might be, they are insufficient to achieve a stable and durable democracy. Hence conflict poses a particular danger to democracy in Myanmar because conflict threatening the integrity of the state could set back or even

reverse reforms. The process of democratization itself can also lead to greater conflict in ethnically divided countries.

The rise in violent communal outbursts since Myanmar's political opening is not surprising and may be regarded as a by-product of the reform process. The lead-up to the 2015 election could see increased levels of conflict. Some in Congress are skeptical about U.S. policy in Myanmar, but engagement with the country is important to securing U.S. interests in the Asia Pacific. Some broad recommendations to encourage the peace process and reduce communal violence in Rakhine and elsewhere follow.

Offer greater monetary and technical support for the peace process. The European Union and Norway have been at the forefront of funding peace initiatives in Myanmar, though Norway is now reviewing its Myanmar Peace Support Initiative. In 2013 the European Union committed nearly \$35 million to the peace process and development in ethnic areas. Funding for the period 2014–2020 is likely to increase to as much as \$122.4 million annually. Japan recently joined the ranks of top donors to Myanmar, pledging to spend \$96 million to develop infrastructure and lift standards of living in Myanmar's conflict-plagued ethnic areas. In contrast, the United States provides a sum that someone involved in the peace process in Myanmar described as "token." The United States should help by providing greater monetary and technical support for the process. Technical experts, such as constitutional law experts, could greatly assist in facilitating preparations for political dialogue and eventual political settlement. This could in turn help encourage a national ceasefire by demonstrating the government's sincerity to reach a political settlement. In providing support for the process, the United States should ensure that both the government and nongovernment minority groups involved in peace initiatives are beneficiaries.

Help create a peace dividend in the ethnic states while urging a political settlement. An important part of supporting the peace process would be to help create a "peace dividend" in the ethnic states. This approach is not without detractors from ethnic groups, community-based organizations, and NGOs that stress the need for political settlement over economic development. As one ethnic Kachin said, "Our primary grievance is self-determination not economic [development]." Ethnic groups regard development with suspicion because they consider it a means by which the

government has sought to sidestep their political demands. However, economic development and political settlement should not be seen as mutually exclusive. Indeed, creating peace dividends can help incentivize a political deal, though it will not seal it. One interviewee highlighted how “ethnic armed groups say they don’t want development, they want political settlement first. However, in peace talks with them, they complain that their state is poor, that they don’t have roads and electricity.” NGO workers have highlighted development issues as those that most concern people on the ground. The point is to recognize that ethnic concerns are first and foremost political, but also to create an environment that encourages political resolution by also addressing the real developmental and economic challenges that ethnic states and their people face. Thus far, the focus of USAID’s efforts in Myanmar is on providing urgently needed humanitarian assistance for internally displaced people, and the promotion of democracy and human rights. The agency, however, has also recognized “the need and opportunity to foster ethnic reconciliation.” One way USAID could do this is by promoting development in the ethnic states through encouraging local entrepreneurship and the creation of jobs, as well as helping to provide technical training, education, and human resource development. Educational efforts currently center on migrant and refugee schools in Thailand and in eastern Myanmar. Many ethnic states are resource rich, but poverty afflicts its people. Developmental needs are particularly great in Rakhine and Chin, the two poorest states in Myanmar. Quite apart from ensuring that political dialogue progresses alongside economic development, economic growth must also proceed in a way that is sensitive to existing power and ethnic relations. This will undoubtedly be a delicate balancing act. One interviewee alluded to part of the difficulty: “We need to ensure the ethnic armed forces are fed. The Tatmandaw too.”

Promote greater military- to- military engagement to help sustain the peace process and broader democratic reform. The Tatmadaw continues to be the most powerful institution in Myanmar. Whether from the perspective of promoting U.S. security or values, a strong case may be made for greater U.S. engagement with the Myanmar military. If the United States does not engage with Myanmar’s military, other powers will fill the void. This will work counter to the U.S. rebalance to Asia. After the suspension of the U.S. International Military Education and Training (IMET) program for Myanmar following the government’s brutal crackdown on peaceful protesters in

the late 1980s, many Tatmadaw officers trained in China, India, Pakistan, Singapore, Russia, and Yugoslavia. Today, the number of active officers trained in China “vastly outnumbers” those trained in the United States, with the Tatmadaw “remaining profoundly exposed to China in terms of training and military culture.” In addition, China recently pledged to work with Myanmar to further improve military ties and jointly safeguard border stability. The commitment was made during a reception for Myanmar’s commander-in-chief Min Aung Hlaing on a recent visit to China. Greater military-to-military engagement will help open channels of communication and afford the United States a better understanding of a notoriously opaque institution. Increased personal ties between members of the U.S. and Myanmar armed forces could potentially serve a socialization function—engagement offers the possibility of “positively influencing the Tatmadaw officer corps . . . [through] exposure to perspectives provided at U.S. military schools, not otherwise possible through conferences, seminars, and observing training exercises.” Those opposed to engagement with Myanmar’s military argue that it confers on it an ill-deserved legitimacy. Even if this were the case, with countries like the United Kingdom and Australia moving forward with engagement, it only makes a marginal difference for the United States to hold back. A stronger argument against military engagement is that the Tatmadaw has not given any indication that it supports the reforms and that it should first be expected to satisfy various conditions, including showing progress on human rights, adhering to cease-fire agreements with the minority armies, and cutting alleged ties to North Korea. This assumes that the Tatmadaw considers U.S. military engagement so critical that it would be willing (and able) to jump through all the hoops needed to fulfill U.S. conditions, including those that it may consider to be against Myanmar’s security interests. While engagement with the United States is viewed as desirable given the “unsurpassed level of quality” of U.S. military education, Myanmar’s military leader Min Aung Hlaing himself a man of little western exposure—is rumored to be cautious about sending his officers to the United States, fearing this could potentially be destabilizing. Indeed, the lukewarm response to U.S. invitations thus far—only a few low-level officers have been sent to attend workshops and courses in the United States—suggests that the Tatmadaw may be testing the waters. Sustained engagement over time could help to reduce suspicions and allow for officers in more senior positions to be exposed. The United States

would be serving its own as well as Myanmar's interests by establishing better ties with a critical institution at this formative stage of the country's development. Limiting the focus of engagement to human rights training and efforts to professionalize the Myanmar army into a law-abiding defense force, as the United States is now doing, could help ameliorate human rights concerns. The Tatmadaw is a highly patriotic institution and will ultimately deal with crisis situations according to its assessment of the country's national interests (perpetuating the military's power and independence is considered one such interest). Given the potentially serious ramifications of the Tatmadaw actions, the United States should not forego the opportunity to potentially shape outcomes, even if only indirectly, or be better prepared to deal with them.

Engage behind the scenes on Rakhine state (softly, softly does it!). The United States has contributed \$7.3 million for humanitarian assistance for "both Rakhine and Rohingya communities" since June 2012. Ambassador Derek Mitchell has personally made several trips to Rakhine state since violence broke out in May 2012. Outbreaks of violence have been met by statements from the U.S. embassy expressing "deep concern." The latest statement was jointly issued with the British embassy in January 2014 and said the two governments were "deeply troubled" by reports of violence in Maungdaw township, particularly allegations that security forces had used excessive means and perpetrated violence. The situation in Rakhine state is a difficult one for the Myanmar government and is therefore one that the international community must broach sensitively. From the Myanmar government's perspective, it is caught between a rock and a hard place. Even if it had the political will to help the Rohingya (there appears to be little with the 2015 election looming and widespread anti-Rohingya sentiment in the country), it would have difficulty persuading the Rakhine and the broader populace to accept this. The Rakhine are said to hate the Burmans almost as much as they despise the Rohingya, so the government has little, if any, persuasive sway. The U.S. embassy in Myanmar appears, broadly, to be striking the right balance between urging the government to address the dire situation in Rakhine state and understanding the constraints it faces. Apart from humanitarian assistance, the United States' focus in the short-term should be on working behind the scenes to keep up the pressure on the Myanmar government to grant individual Rohingya citizenship and the rights that accompany it. This would admittedly benefit only a small number—

Naypyidaw recently categorically rejected the United Nation's call to give the Rohingya full access to citizenship— but it would at least be a start. According to the report of the government's commission on violence in Rakhine state, most Rakhine accept that “Bengalis” who fit the legal criteria for citizenship should be given it, though they oppose the claim of “Bengalis who wish to be labeled one of the indigenous groups of the Union of Myanmar.” The weak appetite for recognizing the Rohingya as a community is replicated outside of Rakhine, even among those who might generally be sympathetic to their situation. Part of the reason for this is a fear that it would pave the way for other communities like the Chinese and Indians to also make claims to be recognized. The 1982 Citizenship Law requires applicants who are not members of one of the officially recognized “national” ethnic groups and who did not apply for citizenship under an earlier citizenship act to show pre- 1948 proof of settlement in order to apply for naturalized citizenship— an onerous requirement for the poor and marginalized Rohingya. There are, however, possible ways to lighten this burden. One interviewee mentioned being told that every local ward has a register of people living in the ward, which could be used as proof of residence/settlement. Another interviewee highlighted the existence of bylaws that allow for a committee member to endorse applications for citizenship without any documentation. If these means are indeed available, it offers the possibility of citizenship for individual Rohingya who might otherwise be unable to meet the strict letter of the 1982 Citizenship Law. Although the second relies heavily on the discretion of a potentially unsympathetic committee member, a significant number of claims could be put through with a strong internal (non- public) top- down directive. Beyond citizenship, reconciliation between Rakhine Buddhists and Rohingya Muslims should also be fostered. The U.S. embassy in Myanmar has rightfully recognized the importance of rebuilding trust between the two communities. Some of the means outlined below, which seek to address broader intercommunal tensions, could help with this outcome.

Promote civil society organizations in the ethnic states, particularly organizations whose goals cut across ethnic (racial and religious) divides. USAID has taken important steps to boost civil society in Myanmar. In March 2013 it announced an \$11 million elections and political process assistance program to “assist the government in improving electoral administration promote voter education; provide

parliamentary strengthening assistance; and support political party development.” In boosting civil society in the country, the United States should pay particular attention to expanding its presence in ethnic states where developmental issues are most acute, given the particular challenges of corruption and warlordism. Civil associations have always played an important role in Myanmar despite repressive action against them under previous regimes, but most civil society organizations continue to be concentrated in larger cities like Yangon and Mandalay. In addition to supporting civil society organizations focused on elections and political process, the United States should look to encouraging civil society organizations that have a more direct nation- building function. Civil society organizations play an important nation-building role because, together with other forms of voluntary associations, they “instill in their members habits of cooperation, solidarity and public spiritedness.” This function can be reinforced by strong U.S. backing of organizations that cut across society’s divisions or, while homogenous themselves, seek to improve conditions for all rather than just catering to members of their own community.

Support expansive interfaith dialogue and work with the Myanmar government to support ground- up initiatives to promote interethnic harmony. The United States is already taking positive steps to promote interfaith relations. In June 2013 the U.S. embassy hosted a small breakfast meeting of seven representatives of the major faiths. In October 2013 Ambassador Mitchell endorsed an international multi faith dialogue attended by over 200 local and international observers. Attendance at interfaith meetings, however, can be self- selecting. It is important to ensure that even extremist elements are brought into the fold. The lack of central control in Buddhism and Islam means that the local abbot or imam can with considerable legitimacy and authority preach messages that depart from the moderate messages of their counterparts elsewhere. The United States can support the Myanmar government’s efforts in reaching out to religious leaders across the country. Beyond promoting moderate religious views, it is also important to encourage ground- up initiatives and activities that advance wider interethnic interaction and cooperation. Together with the Myanmar government, the United States can launch a fund— a “harmony fund” of sorts— that offers grants to mixed groups seeking to solve the needs of their community, or to groups that (while homogenous) directly target fostering better interethnic relations. An example of a project that could qualify would be a joint

Rakhine and Rohingya plan to build and run a school for the children of their communities. Funding under this type of grant could be disbursed over time to ensure that the spirit of the fund is respected and interaction and cooperation sustained over time. Myanmar has embarked on historic political and economic reforms. There is a strong sense of the country being on the cusp of change, but also of time being of the essence. Its chairmanship of ASEAN this year could give it an added desire and impetus for change. There is a danger of the upcoming 2015 election setting reforms back because it could weaken the political will and energy to undertake unpopular reforms. The United States, having satisfied itself that President Thein Sein and his inner circle are making bonafide attempts at reforming the country, should provide the government with as much support and flexibility as possible at this critical juncture. Changes in Myanmar will not happen overnight. The journey toward a stable democracy is likely to be “a long and winding road”—the lyrics of a Beatles song crooned by an interviewee in an old colonial bungalow in Yangon as a parting shot after offering insight into the peace process. Appropriate international support could help make the journey shorter. The United States has interests and an important role to play in supporting Myanmar.

SRILANKA CIVIL WAR



Other links

Tamil Nadu

The Sri Lankan Civil War was an armed conflict fought on the island of Sri Lanka. Beginning on 23 July 1983, there was an intermittent insurgency against the government by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (the LTTE, also known as the Tamil Tigers), which fought to create an independent Tamil state called Tamil Eelam in the north and the east of the island. After a 26-year military campaign, the Sri Lankan military defeated the Tamil Tigers in May 2009, bringing the civil war to an end.^[1]

For over 25 years, the war caused significant hardships for the population, environment and the economy of the country, with an initial estimated 80,000–100,000 people killed during its course.^[14] In 2013, the UN panel estimated additional deaths during the last phase of the war: "Around 40,000 died while other independent reports estimated the number of civilians dead to exceed 100,000."^[17] During the early part of the conflict, the Sri Lankan forces attempted to retake the areas captured by the LTTE. The tactics employed by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam against the actions of Government forces resulted in their⁹ listing as a terrorist organisation in 32 countries, including the United States, India, Canada and the member nations of the European Union.^[18] The Sri Lankan government forces have also been accused of human rights abuses, systematic impunity for serious human rights violations, lack of respect for habeas corpus in arbitrary detentions, and forced disappearances.

Origin and Evolution

The origins of the Sri Lankan Civil War lie in the continuous political rancor between the majority Sinhalese and the minority Tamils.^[31] The roots of the modern conflict lie in the British colonial rule when the country was known as Ceylon. There was initially little tension amongst Sri Lanka's two largest ethnic groups, the Sinhalese and the Tamils, when Ponnambalam Arunachalam, a Tamil, was appointed representative of the Sinhalese as well the Tamils in the national legislative council. Following the

1. ⁹"LTTE defeated; Sri Lanka liberated from terror". Ministry of Defence. 18 May 2009. Retrieved 18 May 2009.

sweeping electoral victory of the United National Party (UNP) in July 1977, the TULF became the leading opposition party, with around one sixth of the total electoral vote winning on a party platform of secession from Sri Lanka. After the 1977 riots, the J. R. Jayewardene government made one concession to the Tamil population; it lifted the policy of standardisation for university admission that had driven many Tamil youths into militancy. The concession was regarded by the militants as too little too late, and violent attacks continued. By this time, TULF started losing its grip over the militant groups. LTTE ordered civilians to boycott the local government elections of 1983 in which even TULF contested. Voter turnout was as low as 10%. Thereafter, Tamil political parties were unable to represent the interests of the Tamil community.

10

Indian Involvement

Sri Lanka



India became involved in the conflict in the 1980s for a number of reasons, including its leaders' desire to project India as the regional power in the area and worries about India's own Tamils seeking independence. Involvement was particularly strong in the

¹⁰ *International Institute for Strategic Studies, [Armed Conflicts Database](#). Archived 11 May 2006 at the [Wayback Machine](#)*

Indian state of Tamil Nadu, where ethnic kinship led to strong support for the independence of Sri Lankan Tamils. Throughout the conflict, the Indian central and state governments have supported both sides in different ways. Beginning in August 1983, until May 1987, the Indian government, through its intelligence agency Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), provided arms, training and monetary support to 6 Sri Lankan Tamil militant groups including LTTE, Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO), People's Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE), Eelam Revolutionary Organisation of Students (EROS) Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF) and Tamil Eelam Liberation Army (TELA).^[49] LTTE's rise is widely attributed to the initial backing it received from RAW. It is believed that by supporting different militant groups, the Indian government hoped to keep the Tamil independence movement divided and be able to exert overt control over it. India became more actively involved in the late 1980s, and on 5 June 1987, the Indian Air Force airdropped food parcels to Jaffna while it was under siege by Sri Lankan forces. At a time when the Sri Lankan government stated they were close to defeating the Talks and further violence In light of this violence, the co-chairs of the Tokyo Donor conference called on both parties to return to the negotiating table. US State Department officials gave warnings to the Tigers claiming a return to hostilities would mean that the Tigers would face a "more capable and more determined" Sri Lankan military.^[96] While the talks were going on there was violence targeted towards civilians such as massacre of 5 Tamil students on 2 January 2006.

End of the war

16 May: Sri Lanka declares victory

Addressing the G11 summit in Jordan, President Mahinda Rajapaksa stated "my government, with the total commitment of our armed forces, has in an unprecedented humanitarian operation finally defeated the LTTE militarily".^[15] Sri Lankan Commander of the Army Sarath Fonseka also declared victory over LTTE.^[232] Sri Lankan troops raced to clear the last LTTE pockets of resistance. As the last LTTE strong points crumbled, Sri Lankan troops killed 70 rebels attempting to escape by boat.^[233] The whereabouts of LTTE leader Vellupillai Prabhakaran and other major rebel leaders were not certain.

17 May: Tigers admit defeat

The LTTE finally admitted defeat on 17 May 2009, with the rebels' chief of international relations, SelvarasaPathmanathan, stating on the website that "This battle has reached its bitter end ... We have decided to silence our guns. Our only regrets are for the lives lost and that we could not hold out for longer".

18 May: First claim of Prabhakaran's death

The Sri Lankan armed forces claimed that the leader of the LTTE, Velupillai Prabhakaran, was killed in the morning of 18 May 2009 while he was trying to flee the conflict zone in an ambulance. The announcement on state television came shortly after the military said it had surrounded Prabhakaran in a tiny patch of jungle in the north-east. The Daily Telegraph wrote that, according to Sri Lankan TV, Prabhakaran was "... killed in a rocket-propelled grenade attack as he tried to escape the war zone in an Ambulance with his closest aides. Colonel Soosai, the ¹¹leader of his "Sea Tigers" navy, and Pottu Amman, his intelligence chief were also killed in the attack."

The head of the Sri Lankan army, General Sarath Fonseka, said the military had defeated the rebels and "liberated the entire country". Military spokesman Brigadier Udaya Nanayakkara stated 250 Tamil Tigers, who were hiding and fighting from within the no fire zone,^[235] were killed overnight.

19 May: President addresses the Parliament and Prabhakaran is dead

At 9:00 am on 19 May 2009 President Mahinda Rajapaksa delivered a victory address to the Parliament and declared that Sri Lanka is liberated from terrorism. Around 9:30 am troops attached to Task Force VIII of Sri Lanka Army, reported to its commander, Colonel G.V. Ravipriya that a body similar to Velupillai Prabhakaran has been found among the mangroves in Nandikadal lagoon. It was identified by the officer. At 12:15 pm Army Commander Sarath Fonseka officially announced Prabhakaran's death, through the State television ITN. At around 1:00 pm his body was shown in Swarnavahini for the first time. Prabhakaran's identity was confirmed by Karuna Amman, his former confidant, and through DNA testing against his son's genetic material who had been killed earlier by the Sri Lanka Military. However, LTTE Chief of international relations, Selvarasa Pathmanathan on the same day

¹¹ [Opposition leader rebuts \[sic\] Sri Lankan government claims.](#)

claimed that "Our beloved leader is alive and safe." On 24 May 2009, he admitted the death of Prabhakaran, retracting the previous statement.^[243]

Reaction

The general public of Sri Lanka took to streets to celebrate the end of the decades long war. Streets were filled with joyous scenes of jubilation.^{[244][245]} Opposition leader Ranil Wickremasinghe, through a telephone call, congratulated President Rajapaksa and the state security forces for their victory over the LTTE.^[246] Religious leaders too hailed the end of the bloodshed.^[247] International response to the end of the fighting was also positive and welcoming, while some countries expressed concern over the civilian casualties and the humanitarian impact. United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-moon said, "I am relieved by the conclusion of the military operation, but I am deeply troubled by the loss of so many civilian lives. The task now facing the people of Sri Lanka is immense and requires all hands. It is most important that every effort be undertaken to begin a process of healing and national reconciliation". Time magazine named the end of the Sri Lankan Civil War as one of the top 10 news stories of 2009.

Protests

Canadian Tamils block University Avenue, Toronto demonstrating against the Sri Lankan forces. Tamil diaspora communities around the world protested the civilian casualties in Northern Province, Sri Lanka and the war in general. Active protests occurred in the major and/or capital cities of India, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, Norway, Switzerland, Denmark, Germany and the United States. The collective objective of the protests was to persuade world national leaders to stop the civil war and bring a permanent ceasefire with an internationally coordinated diplomatic strategy

Terrorism



Terrorism

In the early hours of September 11, 2001, the direct attack on mainland, first time in the history, shocked the Americans from a common man to policy makers, smashing geographical invulnerability of The United States of America. The 9/11 Changed America and subsequent changes in US mindset globally resulted into the pronouncement of United States policy of “War on Terrorism” with a determined hot pursuit¹² of terrorist elements, wherever they could be. These attacks had grave ramifications for US South Asia Policy as well. The United States blamed Al-Qaeda as the main perpetrator of September 11th attacks. Afghanistan was identified as the

¹²Abbas hassan 2005 pakistan drift into extremism Allah the army and the American war on terrorism New delhi pentagon press.

sanctuary of Al-Qaeda. Pakistan's vicinity to Afghanistan had instrumented to bring it on the fore front of "War on Terrorism" in Afghanistan. President Mushraf dictatorship was reconciled. India was focused during these years in four difficult areas: civilian nuclear energy deal, civilian space programs, high technology trade, and side-lining nuclear non-proliferation issue. Bush administration carved a policy which meant to address a new emphasis on terrorism adjusting with ongoing concerns such as global economy, nuclear non-proliferation and democracy. In this article foreign policy apparatus of President George W. Bush Jr would be discussed with a focus on US foreign policy parameters towards India and Pakistan during 2001-2008.

Pakistan and the United States

Policy Reversal - 9/11 and Consequences for South Asia: Immediately, after the 9/11 attacks, both India and Pakistan offered to extend all out support to the United States. For the first time in history, America simultaneously enjoyed cordial relations with both Pakistan and India. However, Pakistan with Musharraf's offer for corporations in the fight against terrorism, phenomenally accrued it to the 50's front line status. In a televised speech to the nation on September 19, 2001 Musharraf identified four core Pakistani interests behind this decision: firstly, the security of the country, secondly to meet the economic challenges, thirdly, the emerging need of securing strategic assets of Pakistan and finally to pursue the Kashmir cause.

War on Terrorism:

Terrorism is not a new phenomenon. About two to three decades ago, terrorism was usually occurred due to local issues and conducted by small groups that wanted to draw attention to their cause through terrorist acts. It was designed to kill a few but capture the attention of large audiences. Nowadays Terrorism is an ideologically motivated phenomenon, its agenda is not limited to one country, and it is international in character. The transnational nature of terrorism has led the governments to adopt new doctrines and develop collective regional efforts.

September 11 has changed the needs of international security and the international system drastically as well, forcing states to re-examine their perceptions and responses. Now even marginal local groups across the world are connected by a global ideology. US foreign policy has changed accordingly to deal with menace of

terrorists' threats, and military pre-emption has become a core objective of its policy option. Combating terrorism became the most important aspect of US foreign policy. In March 2004 the Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia, Christina Rocca, told the Senate Foreign Relations committee that the top US policy goals in the South Asia region would be combating terrorism and the eradicating conditions that breed terror in the frontline states of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Rocca (2004) laid out this objective as such

Through a network of partnerships throughout the region, we will achieve our goals of defeating terrorism and preventing the additional spread of weapons of mass destruction. We will do this through cooperation on security and law enforcement, but more importantly, we will consolidate and preserve our gains by encouraging and supporting freedom and democracy, development and human dignity¹³.

To achieve this end, the United States declared War on Terrorism aiming to dismantle terrorist networks and to target states that offer safe haven for those networks. Even states opting not to pursue active measures to eradicate terrorist networks were warned of American wrath. Secretary of State Colin Powell's blunt message to General Pervez Musharraf declaring, "You are either with us or against us" resonates the same viewpoint. (Musharraf, 2006: 119) However while America intensified its efforts against terrorism following the tragedy of 9/11, counterterrorism cooperation was already underway in South Asia prior to this incident. The U.S-India Joint Working Group on Counterterrorism was established in 2000 to intensify bilateral cooperation while mutual collaboration against terrorism between Pakistan and the US was ongoing for more than a decade. The 9/11 Commission Report, released in July 2004, identified the "government of President Pervez Musharraf as the best hope for stability in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and recommended that the United States make a long-term commitment to provide comprehensive support for Islamabad so long as Pakistan itself is committed to combating extremism and to a policy of enlightened moderation." (Akram, 2002:118)

¹³Chohen stephenp 2000 america role in asia ,south asia task force report.

The US Concerns towards Pakistan

Pakistan was identified as a source of nuclear proliferation when the Dr. A. Q. Khan network was revealed in December 2003. A.Q. Khan and his cohorts were blamed for the sale of nuclear secrets to North Korea, Libya, and Iran. At least 6 Pakistani scientists were blamed of having meeting with Osama bin Laden and Ayman Zawahiri, as well as other top al Qaeda and Taliban Leaders in Kabul. But Pakistan refused to allow international investigators to question or trial A.Q. Khan, insisting that it is an internal Pakistani matter and any relevant information discovered during Pakistan's own inquiry would be exchanged with concerned parties. Pakistan also took stance that A.Q. Khan acted independently and not under government direction. Satisfied by Pakistani government's investigation, the US avoided linking North Korea's nuclear test in 2006 to the Dr Khan network, pointing out that Khan had been "out of business" since his gang of nuclear proliferates was discovered. (Rocca, Christina, 2004)

Kashmir Issue



Kashmir

The Kashmir conflict is a territorial conflict primarily between India and Pakistan, having started just after the partition of India in 1947. China has at times played a minor role. India and Pakistan have fought three wars over Kashmir, including

the Indo-Pakistani Wars of 1947 and 1965, as well as the Kargil War. The two countries have also been involved in several skirmishes.

India claims the entire state of Jammu and Kashmir, and, as of 2010, administers approximately 43% of the region. It controls Jammu, the Kashmir Valley, Ladakh, and the Siachen Glacier. India's claims are contested by Pakistan, which administers approximately 37% of Kashmir, namely Azad Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan. China currently administers Demchok district, the Shaksgam Valley, and the Aksai Chin region. China's claim over these territories has been disputed by India since China took Aksai Chin during the Sino-Indian War of 1962.

The root of conflict between the Kashmiri insurgents and the Indian government is tied to a dispute over local autonomy. Democratic development was limited in Kashmir until the late 1970s, and by 1988, many of the democratic reforms introduced by the Indian Government had been reversed. Non-violent channels for expressing discontent were thereafter limited and caused a dramatic increase in support for insurgents advocating violent secession from India. In 1987, a disputed state election created a catalyst for the insurgency when it resulted in some of the state's legislative assembly members forming armed insurgent groups. In July 1988 a series of demonstrations, strikes and attacks on the Indian Government began the Kashmir Insurgency

India-Pakistan conflict

According to the mid-12th century text *Rajatarangini* the Kashmir Valley was formerly a lake. Hindu mythology relates that the lake was drained by the sage Kashyapa, by cutting a gap in the hills at Baramulla (Varaha-mula), and invited Brahmans to settle there. This remains the local tradition and Kashyapa is connected with the draining of the lake in traditional histories. The chief town or collection of dwellings in the valley is called Kashyapapura, which has been identified as Kaspapyros in Hecataeus (Apud Stephanus of Byzantium) and the Kaspatyros of Herodotus (3.102, 4.44). Kashmir is also believed to be the country indicated by Ptolemy's Kaspeiria.

The Pashtun Durrani Empire ruled Kashmir in the 18th century until its 1819 conquest by the Sikh ruler Ranjit Singh. The Raja of Jammu Gulab Singh, who was a

vassal of the Sikh Empire and an influential noble in the Sikh court, sent expeditions to various border kingdoms and ended up encircling Kashmir by 1840. Following the First Anglo-Sikh War (1845–1846), Kashmir was ceded under the Treaty of Lahore to the East India Company, which transferred it to Gulab Singh through the Treaty of Amritsar, in return for the payment of indemnity owed by the Sikh empire. Gulab Singh took the title of the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir. From then until the 1947 Partition of India, Kashmir was ruled by the Maharajas of the princely state of Kashmir and Jammu. According to the 1941 census, the state's population was 77 percent Muslim, 20 percent Hindu and 3 percent others (Sikhs and Buddhists). Despite its Muslim majority, the princely rule was an overwhelmingly Hindu state.

Partition and Invasion

British rule in India ended in 1947 with the creation of new states: the Dominion of Pakistan and the Union of India, as the successor states to British India. The British Paramount over the 562 Indian princely states ended. According to the Indian Independence Act 1947, "the suzerainty of His Majesty over the Indian States lapses, and with it, all treaties and agreements in force at the date of the passing of this Act between His Majesty and the rulers of Indian States".^[34] States were thereafter left to choose whether to join India or Pakistan or to remain independent. Jammu and Kashmir, the largest of the princely states, had a predominantly Muslim population ruled by the Hindu Maharaja Hari Singh. He decided to stay independent because he expected that the State's Muslims would be unhappy with accession to India, and the Hindus and Sikhs would become vulnerable if he joined Pakistan. On 11 August, the Maharaja dismissed his prime minister Ram Chandra Kak, who had advocated independence. Observers and scholars interpret this action as a tilt towards accession to India. Pakistanis decided to preempt this possibility by wresting Kashmir by force if necessary.

Pakistan made various efforts to persuade the Maharaja of Kashmir to join Pakistan. In July 1947, Mohammad Ali Jinnah is believed to have written to the Maharaja promising "every sort of favourable treatment," followed by Muslim League leaders lobbying with the Prime Minister of the State. Faced with the Maharaja's indecision, the Muslim League agents clandestinely worked in Poonch to encourage the local Muslims to revolt. The authorities in Pakistani Punjab waged a 'private war' by

obstructing supplies of fuel and essential commodities to the State. Later in September, Muslim League officials in the Northwest Frontier Province, including the Chief Minister Abdul Qayyum Khan, assisted and possibly organized a large-scale invasion of Kashmir by Pathan tribesmen.^{[39]:61} Several sources indicate that the plans were finalised on 12 September by the Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan, based on proposals prepared ¹⁴by Colonel Akbar Khan and Sardar Shaukat Hayat Khan. One plan called for organising an armed insurgency in the western districts of the state and the other for organising a Pushtoon tribal invasion. Both were set in motion.

UN Mediation

India sought resolution of the issue at the UN Security Council, despite Sheikh Abdullah's opposition to it. Following the set-up of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP), the UN Security Council passed Resolution 47 on 21 April 1948. The measure called for an immediate cease-fire and called on the Government of Pakistan 'to secure the withdrawal from the state of Jammu and Kashmir of tribesmen and Pakistani nationals not normally resident therein who have entered the state for the purpose of fighting.' It also asked Government of India to reduce its forces to minimum strength, after which the circumstances for holding a plebiscite should be put into effect 'on the question of Accession of the state to India or Pakistan.' However, it was not until 1 January 1949 that the ceasefire could be put into effect, signed by General Douglas Gracey on behalf of Pakistan and General Roy Bucher on behalf of India. However, both India and Pakistan failed to arrive at a truce agreement due to differences over interpretation of the procedure for and the extent of demilitarisation. One sticking point was whether the Azad Kashmiri army was to be disbanded during the truce stage or at the plebiscite stage.

Reasons behind the dispute

The Kashmir Conflict arose from the Partition of British India in 1947 into modern India and Pakistan. Both countries subsequently made claims to Kashmir, based on the history and religious affiliations of the Kashmiri people. The princely state of Jammu and Kashmir, which lies strategically in the north-west of the subcontinent bordering Afghanistan and China, was formerly ruled by Maharaja Hari

¹⁴ Kashmir conflict on kargil war

Singh under the paramountcy of British India. In geographical and legal terms, the Maharaja could have joined either of the two new countries. Although urged by the Viceroy, Lord Mountbatten of Burma, to determine the future of his state before the transfer of power took place, Singh demurred. In October 1947, incursions by Pakistan took place leading to a war, as a result of which the state of Jammu and Kashmir remains divided between India and Pakistan

Administered by	Area	Population	% Muslim	% Hindu	% Buddhist	% Other
India	Kashmir valley	~4 million	95%	4%	—	—
	Jammu	~3 million	30%	66%	—	4%
	Ladakh	~0.25 million	46%	—	50%	3%
Pakistan	Gilgit-Baltistan	~1 million	99%	—	—	—
	Azad Kashmir	~2.6 million	100%	—	—	—
China	Aksai Chin	—	—	—	—	—

Statistics from the BBC report "In Depth" *There are roughly 1.5 million refugees from Indian-administered Kashmir in Pakistan administered Kashmir and Pakistan UNHCR

A minimum of 506,000 people in the Indian Administered Kashmir valley are internally displaced due to militancy in Kashmir about half of who are Hindu pandits CIA

Muslims form the majority in the Poonch, Rajouri, Kishtwar, and Doda districts of the Jammu region. Shia Muslims make up the majority in the Kargil district in the Ladakh region.

India does not accept the two-nation theory and considers that Kashmir, despite being a Muslim-majority state, is in many ways an "integral part" of secular India.^[144] It is also worth noting that India has a Muslim population close to 177 Million very close to Pakistan which has a Muslim population of 178 Million. In fact, as per 2001 Census Muslim population in the State of Uttar Pradesh (in India) alone was around 30 million more than Jammu & Kashmir which is at around 6 million.

India has officially stated that it believes that Kashmir to be an integral part of India, though the then Prime Minister of India, Manmohan Singh, stated after the 2010 Kashmir Unrest that his government was willing to grant autonomy to the region within the purview of Indian constitution if there was consensus^l on this issue.

According to the two-nation theory, one of the principles that is cited for the partition that created India and Pakistan, Kashmir should have been with Pakistan, because it has a Muslim majority.

India has shown disregard for the resolutions of the UN Security Council and the United Nations Commission in India and Pakistan by failing to hold a plebiscite to determine the future allegiance of the state.^[183]

The reason for India's disregard of the resolutions of the UN Security Council was given by India's Defense Minister, Kirshnan Menon, who said: "Kashmir would vote to join Pakistan and no Indian Government responsible for agreeing to plebiscite would survive." for the last 40 years. So then what is the solution?"

Water dispute

Another reason for the dispute over Kashmir is water. Kashmir is the source of many rivers and tributaries in the Indus River basin. This basin is divided between Pakistan, which has about 60 percent of the catchment area, India with about 20 percent, Afghanistan with 5 percent and around 15 percent in China (Tibet autonomous region). The river tributaries are the Jhelum and Chenab rivers, which primarily flow

into Pakistan, while other branches—the Ravi, Beas, and the Sutlej—irrigate northern India.

The Indus is a river system that sustains communities in India and Pakistan. Both have extensively dammed the Indus River for irrigation of their crops and hydro-electricity systems. In arbitrating the conflict in 1947, Sir Cyril Radcliffe, decided to

Human rights


Indian Administered Kashmir

The 2010 Chatham House opinion p¹⁵oll of the people of Indian administered Jammu and Kashmir found that overall concern, in the entire state, over human rights abuses was 43%. In the surveyed districts of the Muslim majority Kashmir Valley, where the desire for Independence is strongest, there was a high rate of concern over human rights abuses. (88% in Baramulla, 87% in Srinagar, 73% in Anantnag and 55% in Badgam). However, in the Hindu majority and Buddhist majority areas of the state, where pro-India sentiment is extremely strong, concern over human rights abuses was low (only 3% in Jammu expressed concerns over human rights abuses).

According to Hon. Edolphus Towns of the American House of Representatives, around 90,000 Kashmiri Muslims have been killed by the Indian government since 1988.¹ says armed village of Wawoosa in the Rangreth district of Jammu and Kashmir. They reportedly molested her 12-year-old daughter and raped her other three daughters, aged 14, 16, and 18. When another woman attempted to prevent the soldiers from attacking her two daughters, she was beaten. Soldiers reportedly told her 17-year-old daughter to remove her clothes so that they could check whether she was hiding a gun. They molested her before leaving the house Several international agencies and the UN have reported human rights violations in Indian-administered Kashmir. In a recent press release the OHCHR spokesmen stated "The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights is concerned about the recent violent protests in Indian-administered Kashmir that have reportedly led to civilian casualties as well as restrictions to the right to freedom of assembly and expression." A 1996 Human Rights Watch report accuses the Indian military and Indian-government backed paramilitaries of "committing] serious and widespread human rights violations in

¹⁵ Kashmir conflict

Kashmir. One such alleged massacre occurred on 6 January 1993 in the town of Sopore. TIME Magazine described the incident.



United Nations¹⁶ map of Jammu and Kashmir

As with other disputed territories, each government issues maps depicting their claims in Kashmir territory, regardless of actual control. Due to India's Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1961, it is illegal in India to exclude all or part of Kashmir from a map (or to publish any map that differs from those of the Survey of India).^[293] It is illegal in Pakistan not to include the state of Jammu and Kashmir as disputed territory, as permitted by the United Nations. Non-participants often use the Line of Control and the Line of Actual Control as the depicted boundaries, as is done in the CIA World Factbook, while the region is often marked out in hashmarks. When Microsoft released a map in Windows 95 and MapPoint 2002, a controversy

¹⁶ Dr.ijaz Hussain

arose because it did not show all of Kashmir as part of India as per the Indian claim. All neutral and +

India continues to assert its sovereignty or rights over the entire region of Kashmir, while Pakistan maintains that it is a disputed territory. Pakistan argues that the status quo cannot be considered as a solution and further insists on a UN-sponsored plebiscite. Unofficially, the Pakistani leadership has indicated that they would be willing to accept alternatives such as a demilitarised Kashmir, if sovereignty of Azad Kashmir was to be extended over the Kashmir valley, or the "Chenab" formula, by which India would retain parts of Kashmir on its side of the Chenab river, and Pakistan the other.

History of Jammu and Kashmir United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan Indian White Paper on Jammu and Kashmir All Parties Hurriyat Conference In Urgency in Jammu and Kashmir Pakistan and state sponsored terrorism India–Pakistan relations Indo-Pakistani Wars

Conclusion

from the above description of the U.S.' core interests and policies towards South Asia from the Cold War era to Strategic Rebalancing, it can be asserted that this region has remained a dynamic area where the U.S.' interests and thereby its foreign policy priorities has been oscillating with ups and downs or engagements and disengagements. Nevertheless, it is also observed that the strategic interests have been most important factor for the U.S. policy towards South Asia. Such a policy has remained an important part of the U.S. global strategy that wants to see Europe or Asia free from domination by any hostile power. In the U.S. policy calculations, during the cold war era the Soviet Union was that power and in the 21st century China is emerging such a power. Thus as long as the shadow of "China Threat" remains in the minds of the U.S. policy makers; the U.S. will treat India as its mutual partner in the South Asian region. At the same time, as long as the terrorism is not eliminated and Afghanistan is not transformed into a peaceful and stable country free from terrorism, the U.S. will try to maintain its current balanced policy towards India and Pakistan. In short, India is now a partner in strategy and Pakistan a partner in

necessity. Both India and US have same world view, nature of economies and types of political structures which result in much commonality to devise a lasting strategic partnership. In future politics, they may be close allies. At the same place, US interests cannot completely cease regarding Pakistan. US will be in need of Pakistan to strengthen its influence in the countries around Pakistan. With more internal and external security, an improved economy and a stable political system, Pakistan will be in a position which will not be much affected by a focus of the US towards India in South Asia.

India should understand that it can not assure the responsibility for whole South Asia, all by itself. It cannot do it alone. It requires a friendly disposition from Pakistan to promote its national interests in the region which would be best served on the principle of peaceful and respectful coexistence for both countries. In these times of cooperation, foreign policy of Pakistan needs to be reoriented .Pakistan's badly bruised economy and society andwith festering wounds of many kinds has to fix a new medicine; a new recipe for peaceful co-existence in accordance with time honored and well established good neighborly practice all around it. USA has to maintain the delicate balance in its relationship with India and Pakistan to regain, retain and maintain the saintly role it does and can play between the two neighbors.

According to the United States policy of enhanced engagement in South Asia, US will keep a close strategic relationship with India but at present, US also has to ensure an intense and rather longish partnership with Pakistan as well.

As the United States frames its strategy to secure U.S. global interests and influence in the decades ahead, a far-reaching and close partnership with India must be a central component of it.

To deal successfully with its domestic constraints and the transition to a more multipolar international system, the United States will need partners whose interests and values largely match our own, and whose capabilities will complement and extend those of the United States. It is hard to think of another major nation that better fits that description than India. India's size and geostrategic location, stable democracy, market-led economic dynamism and potential, growing military capacity and liberal values make it an essential player in adapting the international system to new realities while contributing to sustained U.S. influence and leadership. India is an

emerging power that seeks its rightful place at the global high table and insists on the autonomy of its decision-making, but India is neither expansionist nor mercantilist, and it has a profound interest in the kind of 21st-century international order that the United States itself wishes. Building the U.S. strategic partnership has begun but much remains to be done. The United States must make further progress in this effort a high priority in the years ahead.

In the historical context of US relation, it is obvious that the mutual relations between the two countries are based on convergence of common interest from time to time ,When the US required U-2 surveillance flight facilities and an intelligence base against the soviet (1959 -1968) backdoor diplomacy from the Chinese (1970-72) covert operations against the red army in Afghanistan(1980-88).Pakistan's support to the United States in the war on terrorism is buttressed by a consensus from within the Pakistani nation and actively led by President Musharraf. Liberated through a democratic process, Pakistan has strong traditions of pluralistic attitudes in religion, politics, and freedom of speech that are compatible with US values and strategic objectives. Although the events of 9/11 have served as a catalyst for bringing America and Pakistan closer, US policy with regard to Pakistan is not limited to the Global War on Terrorism. Although both nations have their respective national interests and security concerns, most long-term US objectives are shared by Pakistan. Importantly, there are no areas of significant divergence regarding the national interests of both nations.

Historically, some issues and isolated incidents have led to mutual distrust. Both countries have worked through these and acknowledged major areas of coincident interests, deliberately pursuing a closer relationship for the benefit of all. Nevertheless, there are additional opportunities for improving this relationship. An improved US-Pakistani relationship will solidify Pakistan as a reliable regional partner and strengthen the overall conduct of the global war on terrorism, further stabilizing a region that at one time was fraught with danger.

The American domestic and foreign policy after first world war was determined by the thought process and ideology of leaders who subscribed to notion that United States should stay away from affairs of other counters and concentrate on domestic economic development .this policy orientation was influenced by the beliefs

,behaviors ,and tradition of people who argued that the united states was not an imperial power or a country dependent upon foreign goods especially energy needs .Therefore, it did not need to get involved in the affairs of other countries ,including Afghan .The United States was not connected with countries of the Middle East and South Asia politically or militarily .It did not have economic interaction or trade relation with these countries and was not aligned with them military .The landlocked and remote country of Afghanistan was not considered geopolitically , economically or culturally important.

The United States and others in the international community currently support Afghanistan with a broad array of assistance programs. We provide significant support to help Afghan security forces become more effective, professional, and sustainable and focus our development assistance on promoting economic growth, building the capacity of civilian institutions, improving the performance of the justice system, and helping the government maintain the gains made over the last decade in health, education and women's rights. The United States also provides support for Afghan civil society, promotes increased respect for human rights, helps to fight the illegal trade in narcotics, and continues to provide significant humanitarian support. We also use our assistance programs as a means to support Afghan efforts to address official corruption and work to increase the participation of Afghan women and girls in all productive aspects of Afghan society

The last two years of President Obama's second term, and the rapid consolidation of President Xi Jinping's political authority during his first term, provide a unique political opportunity to place the U.S.-China relationship on a stable, mutually beneficial long-term footing. There is a range of different scenarios for U.S.-China relations. The difficulty lies in the fact that these are very much shaped by different assumptions, different variables and their interaction with one another. Nonetheless, given what we know, a number of broad scenarios suggest themselves for the decade ahead. First, we can imagine a cooperative scenario in which the dynamics of an increasingly globalized economy, and growing interdependencies between the United States and China across multiple policy domains, encourage both leaderships to: avoid any possibility of armed conflict; focus on their respective domestic policy priorities; and maintain a geopolitical status quo in the region.

This scenario could also feature more concerted action on individual global challenges like climate change. A second more collaborative scenario is possible, one which resembles a more ambitious and activist version of the first scenario above. In this, both Beijing and Washington conclude that, in order to deal with a range of underlying, structural difficulties in the relationship, they must not only manage their differences, but also collaborate in difficult policy domains to resolve them

Third, a competitive scenario in which fundamental differences are managed, but not resolved. In this case, China and the United States would compete for strategic influence across Asia and around the world, with both sides accelerating their military preparedness to guard against the possibility of long-term conflict. Fourth, a confrontational scenario, which sees Asia dividing between groupings increasingly aligned to either Beijing or Washington because creative ambiguity on both security and economic issues on the part of regional states is no longer tenable. In such a scenario, incidents in the East and South China seas would increase and escalate to the point that conflict between China and a regional friend or ally of the United States would become increasingly conceivable

Fifth, and last of all, there is the implosion scenario. In this hypothetical future, political tensions and structural economic imbalances within the Chinese system would ultimately fracture, causing China to comprehensively and radically adjust its national development strategy. This report does not regard this outcome as a credible possibility. National political leadership in both Beijing and Washington, and the leadership they choose to deliver to the future direction of their bilateral relationship, can have a major, and possibly decisive, effect on which of these scenarios, or blend of scenarios, becomes the more probable. There is nothing determinist about the future relationship between China and the United States.

It is a matter for leaders to decide on an approach, and to execute it, either con-jointly or separately. That is why the narrative they use to describe their relationship to each other, and to their respective political constituencies, is important. And that is where the current U.S.-China relationship is lacking.

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